THE INDIAN ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE: PROBLEMS OF PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY IN A DEVELOPING COUNTRY

Probleme der Bürokratie in Entwicklungsländern, dargestellt am Beispiel des IAS in Indien

Dissertation
zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades
der Philosophischen Fakultät
der Georg-August-Universität zu Göttingen

vorgelegt von
Janaki Ballav Patnaik
aus Puri (Indien)

Göttingen 1974

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Berichterstatter: Prof. Dr. Hans Paul Bahrdt

Mitberichterstatter: Prof. Dr. Konrad Thomas
Prof. Dr. Peter Fuchs

Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 26. November 1974

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This doctoral dissertation deals with the different problems of higher civil service and the public bureaucracy in India.

I am greatly indebted to the members of the dissertation committee for their helpful criticism. They are: Prof. Dr. Hans Paul Bahrdt, Prof. Dr. Konrad Thomas, Prof. Dr. Peter Fuchs -- the latter from the Department of Ethnology.

I owe a great deal to Prof. Dr. Bahrdt, my thesis adviser for his patience, encouragement and penetrating criticism throughout the whole undertaking.

I am also greatful to Prof. Dr. Erhard Schlesier, Prof. Dr. Max Ernst Graf zu Solms-Roedelheim, Prof. Dr. Peter Faßheber, Prof. Dr. Hannes Friedrich for their interest in my work as well as my welfare.

I would like to thank Dr. Yves Chapel, Director of Research, International Institute of Administrative Science, Brussels, who contributed in scharpening my interest in the problems of public bureaucracy in developing countries.

My thanks go as well to Mrs. Brigitte Peter, librarian of the University Library, Göttingen and Mr. Edward Meersmans, librarian of the International Institute of Administrative Science, Brussels, for helping me in providing necessary literature in time.

I acknowledge with gratitude the financial support from Graduiertenförderung which made this study possible.

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CHAPTER I: THE PROBLEM

A. BACKGROUND AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

One of the most significant events of the twentieth century has been the closing out of the colonial era and the emergence of newly independent states in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. Having gained their independence, these developing countries are caught up in the process of modernization and social change. They are all moving from the traditional toward the modern type, from what Riggs once called "Agraria" toward "Industria"[1]. Since in most of these countries government has taken up large scale programmes resulting in social and economic development, the public bureaucracy is significantly engaged in these tasks of development. In these societies the bureaucracy is expected to act as the director, entrepreneur, the accelerator of economic and social change and no longer the preserver of the status quo.

The twentieth century is witnessing an extension of bureaucratic functions beyond all precedent. The unprecedented increase in the variety, number and complexity of functions to be performed by public bureaucracy has resulted in "an administrative lag".

> "A serious imbalance exists between aspirations and performance, between the needs to be met and the adequacy of the administrative machinery to carry them out. This imbalance

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1 Fred W. Riggs, "Agraria and Industria - Toward a Typology of Comparative Administration", in William J. Siffin, ed., Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration (Bloomington: Department of Government Indiana University, 1957), pp. 23-116.

> constitutes a major obstacle to national development. To meet even a part of its growing responsibilities, the modern service state must develop the administrative capacity to implement its programmes of economic and social progress"[1].

For an appraisal of the economic growth in the developing countries one should consider the pace of expansion of trained manpower and the administrative capacity of government. But the review of the

> "administrative capacity of government has not infrequently led to the conclusion that this factor, and not the availability of financial and other resources, is the primary limitation on the size of the development programme which could be undertaken. Sometimes, this has no more than reflected the general scarcity of trained manpower, but often it has also arisen from the outmoded nature of the organizational structure or from malpractices in personnel management"[2].

What are the factors that may be considered typical of administration in developing countries and which tax the "administrative capacity" of government in developing countries? The sociological and political literature on this subject is extensive and the list

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1 United Nations, A Handbook of Public Administration: Current concepts and practice with special reference to developing countries (New York, 1961), p. 5.

2 United Nations, World Economic Survey, 1964-Part 1, Development Plans: Appraisal of Targets and Progress in Developing Countries (New York, 1965), p. 13.

of "administrative pathologies" described by scholars is endless[1]. However, for our purpose the most critical factors appear to be those relating to the structural, normative and behavioural aspects of the public bureaucracy.

I. Structural aspects of public bureaucracy

The historical, political and economic processes and pressures necessarily have their repercussion on the structures of the bureaucracies in developing countries. The developing countries have consciously tried to introduce some version of modern western bureaucratic administration. Since the institution of administration have been imported, since they are European in origin, their ethos and structure reflect European more than the third world conditions. Kingsley has described

> "Indeed, the organization of offices, the demeanor of the civil servants, even the general appearance of a bureau, strikingly mirror the

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1 Representative works in this area include: A Handbook of Public Administration - United Nations, op. cit., pp. 4-14. Public Administration and Economic Development, (OECD), Alcala De Henares, (13th-25th sept. 1965) Paris, 1966; Harold F. Alderfer, Public Administration in Newer Nations, (Praeger special studies in International Politics and Public Affairs) New York, 1967; B.L.St. John Hamilton, "Problems of Administration in an Emergent Nation - A case study of Jamaica", (Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development) New York 1964; S.S. Hsueh (ed.), Public Administration in South and South East Asia, International Institute of Administrative Science, Brussels, 1962; D.P. Singh (ed.) Problems of Public Administration. Institute of Public Administration, Lucknow University, 1967; B.B. Majumdar (ed.), Problems of Public Administration in India, Patna-1951.

> national characteristics of the bureaucracies of the former colonial powers. The functionnaire slouched at his desk in Lomé or Contonou, cigarette pasted to his underlip, has his counterpart in every provincial town in France; and the demeanour of an administrative officer in Accra or Lagos untying the red tape from his files would be recognisable to anyone familiar with Whitehall or, more specially, with the colonial office"[1].

Some developing countries have been more fortunate than others, depending on whether the colonial power was distinguished or otherwise for its skills in administration and whether or not it systematically tried to teach the colonials in these skills. An ex-colony of Great Britain, France or the United States has certainly an advantage over a former possession of Spain, Portugal, Belgium or the Netherlands.

The withdrawal of the personnel of a colonial power has confronted the new government with the task of replacing key personnel and sometimes this has to be accomplished almost overnight. In almost all developing countries, the bureaucracies are thus deficient in skilled manpower. The problem is not a general shortage of employable manpower. The shortage

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1 J. Donald Kingsley, "Bureaucracy and Political Development with Particular Reference to Nigeria", in La Palombara (ed.) Bureaucracy and Political Development, Princeton University Press 1963, p. 303.

is in trained administrators with management capacity, developmental skills, and technical competence. This does not mean that there is a deficit in holders of university degrees. In some countries, for example India, graduate unemployment is very high. It means the degree holders are educated in the wrong subjects or they are the products of marginal institutions. Sometimes the policy of reserving civil service posts for certain minority groups such as "Scheduled Tribes", the "Scheduled Castes" and the "Other Backward Classes" in India, have restricted access to otherwise qualified candidates. Therefore, the gap between the supply and demand for trained administrators is unavoidable during this transitional period.

Public bureaucracies in developing countries are faced also with the problem of excessive centralisation. This is reflected in the undue concentration of work at the senior levels in the ministries and at the centre of government. Further governmental offices tend to be overstaffed at the lower levels and understaffed at the top. As a result, there is an intolerable congestion of business in the office of the minister and his immediate subordinates and many decisions essential to the rapid implementation of a programme on rational development are interminably delayed.

> "Because of overcentralisation and lack of delegation, those close to the goals of action cannot easily co-operate with their colleagues in other agencies whose work directly affects the success of their own efforts. Characteristically, to overcome this stagnation, new agencies are often set up in the hope that,

> outside the bog of established structures, action may be possible. But the new agencies simply add to the intra-bureaucratic conflict and competition, increasing the burden on the top of the hierarchy to impose coordination"[1].

On the other hand, any systematic effort toward development places an additional burden upon the existing administrative machinery and personnel who in the past have served primarily as collectors of revenues, keepers of law and orders, and magistrates in criminal cases.

The relative importance of these structural problems naturally varies in different countries. In these developing countries, the most critical problems seem to be the lack of adequate staff, over-centralisation and too little diversification. However there is considerable overlapping between these different structural aspects.

II. Functional aspects of public bureaucracy

An appraisal of the performance of the public bureaucracy must also take into account the kind of functions it performs in the society and the orientations and ideologies of the bureaucrat. Traditional bureaucracies in these societies were less oriented toward developmental goals. The chief emphasis was on maintaining law and order, collecting

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1 A.D. Gorwala, Report on Public Administration (New Delhi, 1951), p. 39. See also Paul H. Appleby, Public Adminstration in India; Report of a Survey, (New Delhi, 1953), sec. II, especially p. 21.

revenues, settling disputes, and managing the essential services of government. In these societes

> "the cadres of personnel assembled and trained to perform the duties involved in these functions were, and still are to a large extent, commonly organized into such services as general administration, police, and revenue. The duties themselves, by their very nature consist very largely of securing compliance with rules and regulations and obedience to authority. Civil servants performing such duties must quite properly observe a certain aloofness in relations with the public. Their sanctions are those of threat and punishment. Most of the career services providing the personnel for this kind of administration rotate their officers quite frequently, largely in order to avoid personnel and subjective involvement with the interests of the community of residence"[1].

This situation appears to characterize also administratively more advanced countries. Commenting on the Indian case, Merle Fainsod wrote:

> "The ICS (Indian Civil Service) cadres were able and experienced, but they were trained to stress law-and-order and revenue-collection functions of the colonial period, and they found adjustment to a developmental perspective difficult. Members of an elite service which prized and rewarded the general administrator,

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1 George F. Gant, "A note on Applications of Development Administration", Public Policy, XV (1966), p. 199.

> were slow to appreciate the special skills so essencial to development, and they tended to ignore the specialist's claims for equal status and treatment. Elitism was also manifest in a tendency to perpetuate the tradition of aloofness, superiority, and paternalism which characterized the ICS under the British raj. Their conception of guardianship left little room for spontaneous, grass-roots initiative and operated to keep the lesser breeds, inside and outside the administration, in their place"[1].

Remnants of these bureaucratic traits have inevitably carried over to the successor bureaucracy in India. Hoselitz, discussing the problems of economic growth, has remarked that "any one coming in contact with government bureaucracy in India will encounter forms of behaviour which are not logical in the context of modern government of an independent state but are survivals from the time when India was a colony administered by the foreigners"[2]. Taylor and his associates discussing the sociological problems of rural administration in India have commented that "the inadequacies of

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1 Merle Fainsod, "The Structure of Development Administration", in Irving Swerdlow (ed.) Development Administration - Concepts and Problems, (Syracuse University, 1963), p. 5.

2 Bert F. Hoselitz, "Tradition and Economic Growth", in Ralph Braibanti and J.J. Spengler (eds.) Tradition, Values and Socio-Economic Development, (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press 1961), p. 91.

Indian bureaucracy are not due to the fact that it carries too much baggage from the past"[1]. Snowiss added his voice to the chorus, when he observed that the new administrators have not developed a new tradition but continue to draw strength from the ICS tradition which is not suitable to the administrative needs of modern India. "The principles of recruitment and training have not been substantially altered. Nor has the practice of using the superior service as a 'steel frame' binding the Centre with the States and Districts been eliminated"[2].

Most of these commentators agree that the Indian bureaucrats emphasize orientations that are other than production-directed. They are also stressing the point that the British administrative legacy is the most important source of this phenomenon. The British heritage apparently impedes or defeats the national development effort and at the same time undermines the nation-building process.

The British legacy contained two general functional orientations as guides to administrative behaviour:

(a) "that in exercising imperial authority the maintenance of law and order enjoyed absolute priority attention, and

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1 Carl Taylor and Douglas Ensminger and associates (eds.) India's Roots of Democracy (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 579.

2 Leo M. Snowiss, "The Education and Role of Supèrior Civil Service in India", Indian Journal of Public Administration, VII, 1, 1961, p. 24.

(b) that the members of the ICS were responsible and considered themselves responsible to themselves"[1].

The present Indian bureaucrats are accused of drawing their strength from these orientations.

During the struggle for independence, the ICS was condemned as an instrument of imperialism and exploitation. At the time of independence Sardar Ballabhbhai Patel rose to defend the service. "Remove them", he said, "and I see nothing but a picture of chaos all over the country"[2]. Prime Minister Nehru once denounced the ICS for its "spirit of authoritarianism", declared, "the old distinctions and differences are gone ... In the difficult days ahead our service and experts have a vital role to play and we invite them to do so as comrades in the service of India"[3]. Those who had once governed were to become servants. The instrument of law and order was to become the agent of change and development.

B. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

As presently constituted, the public bureaucracy in India is not capable of being an agent of change and development. Various commentators account the British functional orientations as the most important

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1 David C. Potter, "Bureaucratic Change in India", in Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition, (ed.) by Ralph Braibanti (Durham, N.C. Duke University Press, 1966), p. 143.

2 Quoted in Pylee, M.V., Constitutional Government in India, rev. ed. Bombay: Asia Publishing House, (1965), p. 7o1.

3 Jawaharlal Nehru, Independence and After (New York: John Day, 195o), p. 9.

source of this phenomenon. But there has been little serious effort to establish an empirical base for such propositions.

Braibanti has provided valuable work in analysing the content of the administrative legacy and has provided insight into the ethos and dispositions of the British Indian Civil Service[1]. In his historical and comparative analysis of "Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition", Braibanti notes that there was no sharp discontinuity in the elitist character of post-independence recruits into "high civil service" cadres[2].

Bonarjee's work "Under Two Masters" (197o) is a valuable source for the study of India, during the last twenty years of British rule in India and the first twenty of Independence, and of the ICS under two masters. It embodies a dialogue round the assessment to be made of British rule and the country's legacy from it. His defence of the old ICS misses the most telling criticism that can be levelled against it: that with all its virtues it was an inapt instrument for the purposeful economic development of India[3].

Taub's recent study deals with the attitudes, backgrounds, and life style of elite administrators

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1 Ralph Braibanti and Joseph J. Spengler (eds.) Administration and Economic Development in India, Duke University Press, Durham, N.C., 1963.

2 Ralph Braibanti (ed.) Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition, op. cit.

3 N.B. Bonarjee, Under Two Masters, Oxford University Press 197o

in India[1]. This is an empirical work based principally on interviews conducted by him in Bhubaneswar, a small state capital in India. His most interesting findings concern the IAS (Indian Administrative Service) officers reports of how they come to join service, their present dissatisfaction with it, and the lack of integration of the administrative and non-administrative elites. He has identified sources of stress and strain on Indian administrators and in terms of the demands placed on the service feels that "no bureaucratic organisation can carry so heavy a load and acquit itself well under democratic conditions"[2].

The expansion of bureaucratic power causes serious problems such as corruption, inefficiency and mistrust of the government by the people. In his book "Bureaucracy and Politics in India", Bhambhri is entirely concerned with the widely perceived contradiction between the role of the higher bureaucracy and the political leadership in India. His thesis is simple: The bureaucracy was tamed under Nehru - because he provided strong leadership; its power had increased under Shastri and Indira Gandhi because their leadership were weak[3]. P. V. Rao in his study attempts to analyse the causes for the malfunctioning of the administrative machine and points out that a new approach involving important changes in the political, administrative and social infrastructure is urgently needed if democratic values and institutions are to be preserved[4].

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1 Richard P. Taub, Bureaucrats Under Stress (Berkley) University of California Press, 1969.

2 Ibid, p. 203.

3 C.P. Bhambhri, Bureaucracy and Politics in India, Vikas Publications - Delhi 1971.

4 P.V.R. Rao, Red Tape and White Cap, Orient Longmans 1970.

C. FOCUS OF THE PRESENT STUDY

Many difficult problems encountered in the shaping of the new administrative system arise essentially from the country's colonial past. Moreover, the colonial administration has conditioned the character of the present administrative machinery and continues to persist, in a disguised form in the new bureaucracy. A knowledge of the past will help us to appreciate the nature and direction of its development.

The study attempts to evaluate how successfully Indian Administrative Service (IAS) is functioning in the new situation. The central position of IAS raises many questions: How are the IAS officers selected and trained? Is the IAS capable of performing administrative jobs which are becoming highly technical and specialised? Has the service adjusted to the democratic controls exercised by the people's representatives? What is the bureaucrat's relation and attitude towards the public and political sectors.

The study seeks to examine whether the present bureaucracy emerging from the British imperial tradition can function in a developing country in a situation of rapid change. In a society like this the new orientation fixes new goals, thus making unprecedented demands of the bureaucracy in terms of skills, efficiency and the support of democratic institutions.

The study also raises some questions about the adequacy of bureaucratic theory developed in the West as a guide for the study of non-western bureaucracies. Underlying most discussions are

implied comparisons with the classical Weberian type of legal-rational organisation or an entirely neutral civil service. The ideal of such a service was transmitted and still has a stronghold on the developing bureaucracy of India. But no bureaucracy, in fact, does function with the efficiency implied in Weber's ideal type and as a result all will be wanting in this regard. The general cultural values and social settings undoubtedly influence the nature of administrative structure and behaviour in these countries and must be taken into account in their analysis.

D. BUREAUCRACY: SOME TERMINOLOGICAL CLARIFICATIONS

In his study "The Political Systems of Empires" (1963), Eisenstadt treats bureaucracy as the body of administrative officials and after the ruling elite "the first group participating in the political struggle"[1]. This concept has been put to considerable use in recent studies in developing societies. It is common to most of the essays in LaPalombara's collection "Bureaucracy and Political Development" (1963).

In this study Bureaucracy - more specially the "higher civil service" - is viewed as an important "action group" exercising influences upon a country's social, economic and political development[2]. Further, it refers to the "public or civil

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1 S.N. Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires, (1963), p. 157.

2 Fritz Morstein Marx, "The Higher Civil Service as an Action Group in Western Political Development", in LaPalombara (ed.), Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton, N.J., 1963).

governmental administrative component of political systems"[1]. More specifically, it refers to the formal hierarchy of government officials[2].

Bureaucrats are generally "those who occupy managerial roles, who are in some directive capacity either in central agencies or in the field, who are generally described in the language of public administration as 'middle' or 'top management'. The reason for this more restrictive use is self-evident: the managerial group in the bureaucracy is more likely to have a direct bearing on political and other kinds of national development. It is those public servants at the upper administrative levels who will be called upon to provide policy council, to assist in the formulation of programs, and to engage in the management and direction of the people in the interest of translating policy hopes into realities"[3]. They are a small group in relation to the total number of the people in the public service and able to control vast populations by means of a carefully devised apparatus.

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1 John Dorsey, Jr., "The Bureaucracy and Political Development in Viet Nam", in LaPalombara, op. cit., p. 322.

2 Fred Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View", in LaPalombara, op. cit., p. 122.

3 Joseph LaPalombara, "An Overview", in Bureaucracy And Political Development, op. cit., p. 7-8.

CHAPTER II: BRITISH BUREAUCRACY IN INDIA; THE INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE

History provides various examples of "centralised historical bureaucratic empires"[1]. One of these was the British Colonial Empire in India. Many of the modern historians have found out explanations which attribute to the successful impositions of British leadership in India to a variety of factors such as British superior military forces and skilful manipulation of indigenous rulers. But the main instrument on which the success of British Raj depended was an "administrative elite" known as Indian Civil Service. The definitive characteristics of such a group were that it was "small, well defined, homogeneous (as a result of training and the practice of occupation) and cohesive"[2]. This

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1 The most important examples of these are the following: (1) The ancient empires - especially the Egyptian, Babylonian, (2) The Chinese Empire, (3) The various Persian empires, (4) The Roman and the Hellenistic empire, (5) The Byzantine Empire, (6) Gupta, Maurya, and the Mogul Empire in India, (7) The Arab Moslem states in the Mediterranean, Iran, and finally the Ottoman Empire, (8) The West, Central, and East European States, from the fall of the feudal systems through the Age of Absolutism, (9) The Conquest Empires (the various political systems established in non-European countries as a result of European expansion, colonization, and conquest - especially the Spanish-American and French empires, and the British colonial empire in India), S.N. Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires, Glencoe, Ill., 1963, p. 11.

2 T.B. Bottomore, "The Administrative Elite" in I.L. Horowitz (ed.), The New Sociology, New York, 1964, p. 359.

was the "Steel Frame" of the empire and its members were the men who ruled India. It is commonly recognised, even by its critics, that the Indian Civil Service "was an instrument appropriately imaginative in conception and organizationally elegant in form"[1].

The traditions of the Service were unique. These traditions were founded by such men as Warren Hastings, Jonathan Duncan, Theophilus Metcalfe and Mountstuart Elphinstone. They were carried on further by a succession of distinguished men, whose names unknown or forgotten in England, are still remembered in obscure Indian villages[2].

We may now turn to examine the origins, functions and working of the Indian Civil Service in order to evaluate its effectiveness during its lifetime and the heritage it left to its successor, the Indian Administrative Service, built in 1947.

A. HISTORICAL OUTLINE

The Indian Civil Service owed its origin to the East India Company. The Company was founded in 1600 solely in order to trade with the east. The decline of the Moghul empire after 1707 and the rivalry of the French combined to threaten the commercial interests of the company. It had two alternatives - withdrawal or intervention in Indian politics.

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1 Peter Worsely, The Third World (The Nature of Human Society Series) Chicago 1965, p. 52.

2 Sir James Crerar, "The Future of the Indian Civil Service", A paper read before the East India Association on December 8th, 1936. India Office Library. P/V 229-234, Vol. 22.

The Company, however, chose the later and with the help of its own armies, succeeded in the political domination of large areas in India. In the beginning, the Company had to undertake the task of administering these areas.

By the end of the eighteenth century, increasing parliamentary control had converted the Company into an agency of the Crown. Finally under the Indian Act (1833) the Company was prohibited altogether from trading and its officers were confined to administrative work. Nevertheless the Company continued to exist legally until 1858, when it was formally abolished and its Civil Service taken over by the Crown[1].

The Company's civil servants, all British, became servants of the Crown. The Company took leave of its servants and pronounced an epitaph on them:

> "The Company has the great privilege of transferring to the service of Her Majesty such a body of civil and military officers as the world has never seen before. A government cannot be base, cannot be feeble, cannot be wanting in wisdom that has reared two such Services as the civil and military services

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1 For history of ICS see: H.H. Dodwell (ed.), Cambridge, History of India: British India, 1497-1858 (Cambridge: The University Press, 1929), Vol. 5: L.S.S.O'Malley, The Indian Civil Service, 1601-1930 (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1965); E.A.H. Blunt, The ICS, The Indian Civil Service (London: Faber and Faber, 1937); Philip Woodruff, The Men who Ruled India (New York: Schocken Books, 1964), 2 vols., vol. 1.

> of the Company. Let Her Majesty appreciate the gift - let her take the vast country and the teeming millions of India under her direct control; but let her not forget the great corporation from which she has received them, nor the lessons to be learned from its success"[1].

Although the civil service was taken over by the Crown, the Work and the duties of the civil servants remained very much the same. Under the Company's rule the Service was called HEICS (Honourable East Indian Company' Service). Under the Crown the original title was renamed as ICS (Indian Civil Service). Further no Indians were allowed to join the Service in the days of the Company. Under the Crown the real change began with the appointments of Indians to the Service.

I. Recruitment and Training

Recruitment under the Company had been solely by the exercise of patronage by the Directors. Later on attempts were made to combine a more judicious exercise of patronage with more stringent qualifying requirements.

Compulsory training for the recruits was introduced at the Hailebury College (founded on 1806). From 1833 onwards competitive examination for the recruitment to the ICS was urged as the best method of selection. This was finally adopted in 1853. The new

1 Quoted by A.B. Reid, "The Indian Civil Service in historical perspective". A private paper read to a Wimbleden Society in Feb. 1963, p. 6 (India Office Library-London).

recruits were given the name "Competition Wallahs", since their method of entry distinguished them from their predecessors.

Apart from the Oriental languages, the syllabus at Haileybury college included traditional subjects like Latin, Greek, mathematics, history and law. These were also the subjects favoured for competitive examination for many years after the inception of Haileybury College.

> "English boys had been trained in Latin, Greek and mathematics; the one who was best at the tasks that had so far confronted him was likely to be best at disentangling a rent-roll or seeing through a Raja's foreign policy"[1]

Thus the British were expressing a dominant tone in their national culture - belief in the "amateur ideal". Much stress was also laid on the importance of sending civil servants to India, who were gentlemen and trained in classical subjects. What mattered was not the applicability of any subject to the administration. Besides there was the argument that classical studies were the vehicles of the noblest ideas of the western world.

In 1853 Parliament decreed that appointments in the ICS should be thrown open to competition. All British subjects, who met certain conditions with regard to age, health and character, should be eligible. The new examinations were designed to select candidates with good Arts degree from Oxford or Cambridge. The age limits were fixed between 18 and 23 though these were modified from time to time.

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1 Philip Woodruff, The Men Who Ruled India, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 284.

There was also provision for a year's probation, followed by an examination in specialised Indian subjects. Haileybury college, no longer needed, was shortly closed down in 1857. Woodruff summarised the contribution of Haileybury college in the following words:

> "The best argument in favour of Haileybury was that it fostered a close family spirit, a unity of interest; because of Haileybury, the Indian empire was administered by men who knew each other and strove together in the friendly spirit of the cock-house football match. They trusted each other and worked for the Company, the Queen, the team, what you will, but not exclusively for themselves and that was why they overran India[1].

When India won independence, the tradition of Haileybury was not forgotten by the Indians. The National Academy of Administration at Mussoorie in north India fulfils a similar purpose in India which Haileybury college did a century before.

On arrival in India, a probationer was posted to a district within a few days and had to work under the guidance of a senior ICS officer. He had to work in different branches of administration. At the same time he was expected to prepare for departmental examinations in criminal, revenue and rent law, Hindu and Muslim customary law and treasury procedure. He had to learn one Indian

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1 Philip Woodruff, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 285.

language and was expected to pass quite a stringent riding test. After completing his probationary period and passing his departmental examinations, the probationer was to be confirmed as a full-fledged member of ICS. Initially he can start his career as a Sub-Divisional Officer but could hope to be a District Officer within a few years.

II. Life in ICS

The key post was that of District Officer, the man at the head of each district. The District was the basic unit of the British administrative system and the District Officer was its pivot. As District Magistrate, he was responsible for maintaining law and order with the help of the Superintendent of Police. As Collector, he was responsible for the collection of the all important land revenue on which the finances of the government depended. Besides, he had to work as an arbiter of a host of conflicting factional interests, ex officio chairman of innumberable local body committees. He was the person to whom all turned for help in time of natural disaster.

The District Officer was much respected and very often loved by the people of his district. The following words are from a farewell address an officer received on leaving his district:

> "Honoured Sir, Protector of the poor;
> When you took the poor by the hand you made them rich; under your protection the people were happy and reposed upon the bed of ease. When you superintended the garden, every gardener performed his duty and all

> the trees and flowers in the garden flourished. So equal was your justice that the tiger and the kid might drink at the same fountain - the very kid which you had rescued yourself earlier from the same tiger's mouth. In this country we have not known any Government so upright as that of the English. Alas! if our protector forsakes us, we shall be as disconsolate as a widow; we shall mourn the loss of a father, and weep as for the death of a mother. May God continue you to us for ever"[1].

Life in ICS was not an easy one. The officer had to work hard and very often leads a lonely life. Moreover life was exposed to innumberable maladies. The tropical weather and diseases very often made the life more miserable.

K.P.S. Menon, in his Autobiography, describes how an ICS officer was expected to conduct himself before lesser officials:

> "The ICS Manual gave meticulous instructions regarding the treatment to be accorded to people of different grades. With a Deputy Collector or Deputy Superintendent of Police you may shake hands, even though he belonged to the Provincial Service; you may offer him a seat; you may even call him by his name without prefixing Mister or Rao Sahib or Khan Sahib. But to a Tahsildar or Inspector of Police you may not extend these courtesies except on your first arrival in, and departure from, your station. It is by such

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1 Quoted by A.B. Reid, op. cit., p. 15.

taboos that the British Officer maintained his prestige in India; and I too, belonging to a predominantly British service, confirmed to the prescribed etiquette"[1].

III. The size and characteristics of the ICS

Throughout the history of British rule, the size of the ICS in comparison to the various functions it performed, was kept very small indeed. In 1930 the total strength of ICS was 1350[2], which was administering a population of about 350,000,000. This was supported by a two-tier sub-elite bureaucracy consisting of the Provincial Civil Service (now it is called State Civil Service) and a mainly clerical subordinate Civil Service. All the members of the Provincial Civil Service were graduates and recruited by competitive examination. Normally the area of their recruitment was their own province. At the bottem there was a mainly clerical subordinate civil service recruited by selecting qualified persons locally. Below this again there was a mass of small officials at the village level - the patwaris, the village accountant etc.

"The administrative hierarchy, as it was perfected in the latter days of British rule, possessed a refinement of calculated gradation: it embodied both the Hindu caste system and

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1 K.P.S. Menon, Many Worlds. O U P (Bombay), 1965, p. 77.

2 Report of the Indian Statutary Commission, Vol. 1, (1930), p. 268.

> the English class system. A comparison is often made with the Chinese mandarin order, and in general this is apt; but while the Imperial mandarinate was a carrière ouverte aux talents in which the brilliant village lad, just occasionally, might by infinite exertion make his way via an examination ladder to the administrative summit, the heights of British-Indian administration were open only to a very restricted type of talent[1].

Under the British rule, the members of ICS consisted only of those who were directly appointed to it. All the senior posts were entrusted to the officers of this cadre. The characteristics emphasised from the members of ICS were "technical innocence, diversified experience, inadequate articulation of careers, excessive centralisation resulting in an insulated and exclusive elite"[2]. The membership to the ICS developed in them a sense of belonging to a privileged class, respect for hierarchy, status, seniority and anonymity in exercising power.

The ICS officers enjoyed complete security of tenure. They were paid on a scale that put them beyond corruption and incidentally made it one of the best paid civil service in the world. There was a generous pension and in addition a provident fund. Besides, the senior officers were figured in the Honours' list in the new years. Their contentment thus depended on both material and non-material factors.

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1 Hugh Tinker, India and Pakistan - A short political Guide, (Pall Mall Press, London 1962), p. 158.

2 Jitendra Singh, "The Generalist myth", Seminar (India) No. 85, September 1966, p. 21.

IV. Attitude to work

The members of the ICS developed certain attitudes to their work. Through long years of experience, two traditions developed which became the hallmarks of ICS administration in India. First of all, they believed too much in "efficiency and dispatch" in handling of all official work. They all believed in the "efficacy of decisiveness". The administration under the ICS acquired a machine - like character and became insensitive towards public opinion. When they were too much concerned in building up an efficient and honest administration, they could not see the powerful factor in the national opposition to British rule, which ultimately threatened their position.

Secondly the ICS officers were upholding the thesis that "it is the tradition of India that the men with the grievance and the man who decides how the grievance is dealt with should meet face to face"[1], and continued the practice of this tradition for providing the best sort of administration to the Indians . But this was physically impossible. No officer could ever meet a smal portion of the people of a district who had grievances. Besides the cult of personal touch was just contradictory to the exclusiveness and aloofness of the ICS. As a result, the ICS was drifting in the direction of defeating its own end. He became increasingly deskbound and concealed behind piles of reports, files and petitions. One ICS fellow in a district once wrote about it:

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1 Report of the Indian Statutary Commission, Vol. 1, p. 28.

"If I stayed late in office, oh then? oh then!
"If I was kept late in the office, oh then!
"I looked out of the windows
"And damned all the Hindoos,
"Thought myself most unlucky of men,
"Then dejectedly mended my pen"[1].

B. INDIANISATION OF THE SERVICE

In the year 1858, Queen Victoria declared in her initial proclamation that "colour, religion or birth were not to be disqualifications for any office in India under the Crown"[2]. The British were forced to implement the spirit of non-discriminatory policy of recruitment to the ICS. But in practice Indians were kept outside of it. The examination system was constructed to make it extremely difficult for Indian candidates to be successful. Indians had to compete at a very early age varying between 17 and 23 at which the examination was taken. Again the Indians had to compete with Britons in their language in England and in subjects stressed in the British educational system. These factors certainly discouraged Indians from attempting to compete for ICS recruitment examination. But the most discouragement for Indian candidates was that the examination was conducted in London. During this time any Hindu who travelled abroad had to take the

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1 A.B. Reid, op. cit., p. 17.

2 R. Symonds, The British and Their Successors, (Faber and Faber, London 1966), p. 30.

risk of "social ostracism" on his return back to India. This prevented many higher caste Hindues to travel abroad for the competitive examination[1].

I History of Indianisation

Satyendranath Tagore was the first Indian to pass the competitive examination for the ICS in the year 1864[2]. Four years after this achievement, Ramesh Chandra Dutt, along with two other friends (all nineteen years old) travelled to London for this competitive examination. Dutt wrote from the steamer about the risks which he and his friends were taking in the following words:

> "Against the voice of experience and reason we have set out on this difficult undertaking - stealthily leaving our homes - recklessly staking everything on an almost impossible success. Shall we achieve that success or shall we come back to our country impoverished, socially cut off from our countrymen - to face the reproaches of advisers and regrets of our friends"[3].

Indians were pathetically anxious to join the ICS. The Service first of all offered a high status to its members. In a country, where there was relatively

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1 R. Symonds, op. cit., p. 3o.

2 Satyendranath Tagore was the elder brother of the poet Rabindranath Tagore.

3 R. Symonds, ibid, p. 8o.

little industry and therefore less chance for the growth of a class of an industrial managers, the prestige of civil servants remained very high. Educated Indians have regarded the Indian Civil Service as a prize of great merit for many decades. Besides, the members of the Service enjoyed a high pay, pensions and provident funds.

The demand of the Indians for the employment at the most prestigious level of the British India surprised the British, when a few Indians managed to succeed in the examination and entered the "citadel". But what astonished the British more when they found the Indian members of the Service with a few exceptions showed their extreme loyality to the British crown. This experience encouraged the British to select Indians who could be relied upon to assist the alien ruler in keeping their own countrymen in subjection. The British had not to regret this. It was the Indian members of the ICS who gave a broad base to the administrative structure of British imperialism. They helped the British India to last as long as it could. As a result there was "increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration", and this has been the declared policy of His Majesty's Government[1].

Even though Indians were allowed to compete for the ICS examination, so few were successful that in 1919 there were only 78 Indians among the 1,255 civilians. In 1922 it was decided to hold competitive examinations in India as well as in Britain. The member of Indians in the Service increased spectacularly to 241 in 1929 and to 54o in 1939.

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1 Sir James Crerar, "The Future of the Indian Civil Service", op. cit., p. 9.

TABLE I

The strength and composition of the ICS from 1859 to 1942 are given in the following table.

Year	Europeans	Indians	Total
1859	846	-	846
1869	882	1	883
1879	907	7	914
1889	884	12	896
1899	988	33	1021
1909	1082	60	1142
1919	1177	78	1255
1929	881	241	1122
1939	759	540	1299
1942	573	632	1205

(Source: Philip Woodruff, The Men Who Ruled India - The Guardians, London 1954, Vol. II, p. 363.)[1]

II House divided

The ethnic composition of the elite corps had been changed remarkably by introducing this indigenous element, which did not have the same cultural background and educational convention. As a result, they could not share the same value system which had previously been responsible in producing homogeneity of outlook amongst the elite corps. There was friction between the British members of the ICS and their Indian colleagues.

Friction arose, predominantly, due to the principles of appointments to the public service in India so clearly enunciated by Curzon in the following words:

1 See also Rupert Wilkinson (ed.), Governing Elites, OUP, 1969, p. 175.

> "The first is that the highest ranks of civil employment in India, those in the Imperial Civil Service, though open to such Indians as can proceed to England and pass the requisite tests, must, nevertheless, as a general rule, be held by Englishmen, for the reason that they possess, partly by heredity, partly by upbringing, and partly by education, the knowledge of the principles of government, the habits of mind, and the vigour of character, which are essential for the task, and that, the rule of India being a British rule, and any other rule being in the circumstances of the case impossible, the tone and standard should be set by those who have created and are responsible for it"[1].

The spirit of these letters however guided the attitudes of the British members of the Service towards their Indian colleagues. "The simple general principle appeared to be that while the young Englishman was by virtue of his birth and national character a potentially sound administrator, the Indian was expected to prove his worth first, the presumption being that he was unlikely to be in that category until the contrary was clearly shown"[2]. In other words the Englishmen "possess the mental and moral qualities essential for the task of administration, which the average Indian does not"[3].

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1 L.S.S. O'Malley, Indian Civil Service - 1601-1930, (Frank Cass & Co., Ltd. 1965) p. 225.

2 N.B. Bonarjee, Under Two Masters, op. cit., p. 107.

3 E. Blunt, The ICS, op. cit., p. 53.

This assumption of their moral superiority and professional competence over the Indians was never tolerated by the Indian members of the Service. The ICS became in fact a "House divided". It was therefore unable to develop further the self-perpetuating tendency of bureaucratic elites as analysed by Eisenstadt[1].

Besides, there was racial exclusiveness of the British members of the ICS too. The Indian members of the ICS were prevented from becoming members of European clubs.

> "The ban against the admission of Asiatics, however high their social and political status, to European clubs or to society in general had deplorable results, for it placed an embargo on the unrestricted intercourse which is essential if people are to discuss their differences freely and frankly, and appreciate one another's point of view. How many misunderstandings, seemingly insuperable, can be surmounted in friendly conversation over the dinner table or on the golf course! But such opportunities seldom if ever occur east of Suez"[2].

The political system is stable when "a society in which the ruling elite is not exclusive of penetration from other groups"[3]. Further one of the conditions

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1 S.N. Eisenstadt, op. cit., pp. 28o-281.

2 H.G. Rawlinson, British Achievement in India (William Hodge & Company Ltd. 1948), p. 242.

3 Bernard Crick, In Defence of Politics (Penguin Books, 1964), p. 174.

for the survival of an elite group is willingness to broaden its base when conditions demand modifications of its previous exclusiveness[1]. It is this inflexibility in the attitude of British members of Service, that was responsible for lot of discontentment amongst the Indian members. All top jobs like secretaryships and all governerships were given to British members of the Service. "Indians, therefore, could in reality only be in the service, but never of it"[2].

With the transfer of power in 1947, the British as rulers withdrew from India. The British ICS officers in the services occupying most of the top positions either retired or went back to England. "Philip Woodruff sums up the British situation admirably in one sentence: 'It is hard to serve where you have ruled'. This ruling function of the ICS was never really shared with the Indian element in any real sense"[3].

C. AN ASSESSMENT

There is no doubt that every Indian Civil Servant "tried to do his duty" in providing law, order and unity for India. "Law, order, unity, however, are not enough. They may be the preconditions without

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1 Bernard Crick, In Defence of Politics (Penguin Books, 1964), p. 174.

2 N.B. Bonarjee, op. cit., p. 106.

3 N. Majumdar, "That was the Service that was", (Seminar - (published in India) Nr. 84, p. 17.

which no satisfactory society can be built"[1]. No wonder that social change and economic growth in the country took place at a slow tempo in the largely traditional and static Indian society.

In short, ICS did bring a measure of order and peace, if not prosperity, to the areas where anarchy was long prevailing. Reid writes:

> "On the question generally surely we can say that, almost as much as by the keeping of the peace, the uniting and modernisation of the country, and the promotion of humanitarian reforms and achievements such as the abolition of thugee, the Service made an outstanding contribution to India's progess by the example ot its own administrative machinery and civil service system and tradition, as will be recognised by future historians"[2].

The Service can claim to have been the greatest of the Imperial Services of the modern imperial age. From the point of view of Britain, ICS was one of the most effective instrument developed by the Britishers to rule India. Besides in terms of returns for investment of men and money it was very economical.

The efficiency of the Service, made possible by reason of it being a closed and rigid system, had drawbacks for the independent India. When India won

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1 Maurice and Taya Zinkin, "Britain and India - Requiem for Empire", London 1964, p. 73.

2 Reid, op. cit., p. 23.

independence, ICS provided the model for its successor, the IAS (Indian Administration Service). The ICS tradition of efficiency, professionalism and decisiveness has been inherited by the IAS together with its basic procedures of recruitment and training. We will next try to analyse the procedure of recruitment and training for the IAS and its drawbacks for the independent India.

CHAPTER III

THE IAS : THE PROBLEM OF RECRUITMENT

The Indian Administrative Service constitutes the most important and influential service in the country. The IAS officers hold the most important administrative posts of authority and responsibility anywhere in India or abroad either under the central government or under a state government. They consist of a very small selective group of around 2,838 persons[1]. The esprit de corps of the service is very high. It is a cohesive group and tries to preserve its status as an elite group. Consequently, it is worth examining how the recruitment to the IAS is done. This chapter and the next will attempt to show the problem involved in selecting and training the IAS officers.

A. RECRUITMENT

The methods of recruitment to the IAS are (I) open competition, (II) departmental promotion from state civil service and (III) special recruitment. These methods will be dealt here in brief.

I Open Competition

The Union Public Service Commission announces early each year that there will be a competitive examination for the IAS to be held later in the year

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1 Civil List of The Indian Administrative Service (As on 1st January 1972). Government of India, p. 171.

(usually in October-November) in seventeen Indian Cities and London[1]. The result is announced by the end of March. Candidates make application to the Commission and are allowed to take the competitive examination if they

(a) are between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-six on the 1st August of that year; (the upper age limit is relaxed in certain cases, i.e. if a candidate belongs to a scheduled caste or scheduled tribe)

(b) hold a degree in arts, science, commerce, agriculture or in civil, mechanical or electrical engineering from a recognised university approved by the government of India,

(c) are citizens of India,

(d) do not have more than one wife (woman candidates are normally not admitted if they are married),

(e) in good mental and bodily health and free from any physical defect which in the opinion of the Commission is likely to interfere with the efficient performance of the duties after assignment to the job,

(f) are able to pay the application and examination fees of Rs 8o/- (Rupees 2o in case of candidates belonging to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes)[2].

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1 Union Public Service Commission Notice. Indian Administrative Service etc Examination 1972, New Delhi, the 4th March 1972, p. 1.

2 U.P.S.C. Notice, op. cit., p. 3-11.

The General Scheme of the IAS Examination is as follows:[1]

Part I	: Compulsory Papers	(a) English Essay	150 marks
		(b) General English	150 marks
		(c) General Knowledge	150 marks
		Total	450 marks
Part II	: Optional Papers: Three subjects to be selected out of 25 optional subjects, each carrying 200 marks, and covering practically all subjects taught at the universities.	Total	600 marks
Part III	: Additional subjects for the IAS. Two subjects to be selected from a list of sixteen additional subjects (advanced level), each carrying 200 marks.	Total	400 marks
Part IV	: Personality Test: To assess through an interview the candidates' personal qualities and potentiality, which can not be tested by a written examination.	Total	300 marks

1 U.P.S.C. Notice, op. cit., p. 12-13.

The examination must be written in English. The standard of the examination is equivalent to that of an honours degree of an Indian University. The compulsory papers are designed to test the candidate's command of the English language. Since the quality and the standard of the official drafts and notes depend much on the correct use of the English language, this test is justifiable. The paper on General Knowledge is designed to test the knowledge of current events and of such matters of everyday observation in their scientific aspects, which is expected from an educated person who has not acquired any special study in any of the scientific subjects.

Candidates who wish to be considered for the IAS are required to offer three optional subjects and two additional subjects of an advanced level. The range of choice is quite large. A candidate may, for example, "select applied mathematics, statistics, advanced accountancy and auditing, higher pure mathematics, and advanced economic theory; or he may select English literature, philosophy, French, European history from 1789 to 1878, and political theory from Hobbes to the present day; or he may prefer to spread the field, selecting chemistry, law, geography, political organisation and public administration, and anthropology. The range of choice is very wide indeed"[1]. But these subjects do not necessarily relate to the actual work of IAS.

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1 D.C. Potter, Government in Rural India, London 1964, p. 62-63.

The written examination is a test in educational subjects of the candidate's own choice. A minimum qualifying standard in the written test, as decided by the Commission, is insisted upon to restrict the number of candidates in proportion to the available vacancies. A candidate, who qualifies in the written test, "will be interviewed by a board who will have before them a record of his career. He will be asked questions on matters of general interest. The object of the interview is to assess the personal suitability of the candidate for the service..."[1]. The interview is conducted informally and lasts between twenty to thirty minutes.

> "In broad terms, this is really an assessment of not only his intellectual qualities but also social traits and his interest in current affairs. Some of the qualities to be judged are mental alertness, critical powers of assimilation, clear and logical exposition, balance of judgement, variety and depth of interest, ability for social cohesion and leadership, intellectual and moral integrity"[2].

II Promotion to the IAS from state civil service

Although passing the competitive examination conducted by the U.P.S.C. (Union Public Service Commission) is the primary route to membership in IAS, there are other ways in which members can be taken into service i.e. by promotion from state

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1 Union Public Service Commission Notice, IAS etc Exam - 1972, p. 25.

2 Ibid.

civil service. Each state of India has its own civil service modelled on the IAS but subordinate to it. The Indian Administrative Service (promotion) regulations restrict consideration of state civil service officers for promotion to IAS, to those who have at least eight years' service in the former[1]. The Rules also specify that at least twenty-five per cent of the IAS officers in each state must be promotees selected from its state civil service. "The list of eligible state officers" on the basis of seniority and merit is usually done every year by the selection committee in each state. Promotions are made by the commission, presided over by the chairman or a member of the U.P.S.C. in consultation with the special state committee. "In practice, this means that the state committee is primarily responsible for promotions, since there is no way that U.P.S.C. can know the people involved"[2]. But normally U.P.S.C. go through the periodic assessment of the work done by the state civil servants who are

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1 Dutt, R.C., Principles of Selection in Public Services, Ind. Jour. Pub. Adm., Vol. 1 No. 3, 1955, p. 216.

2 Taub op. cit., p. 32. See also N.C. Roy, Civil Service in India, 1958, p. 241. Actually there is a Departmental Promotion Board in every state for recommending names for such promotion to the IAS. It is presided over by a member of the U.P.S.C. and it includes in its membership the Chief Secretary, Member-Board of Revenue and Divisional Commissioners.

up for the selection. It tries to see, as far as possible, that no injustice is being done. When "the list of eligible state officers" to the IAS cadre is approved by the commission, the central government appoints them in order in which the names appear on the list.

III Special recruitment to the IAS

Apart from the direct recruitment and promotion to the IAS from the state service, there is another alternative route left to membership in the IAS known as special or emergency recruitments. The first special recruitment to the IAS was held just after Independence. Immediately before Independence in India, there were 1.157 ICS officers in India, out of which 6o8 were British and 549 were Indians.

TABLE 2: British Officers of Elite Cadre in Service Immediately Before Independence in India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Malaya, and Burma.

Country	Number of officers		Totals	Percentage British
	Indigenous	British		
India Pakistan	549	6o8	1,157	52,6
Ceylon	137	32	169	18,9
Malaya	1o3	2o2	3o5	66,2
Burma	64	81	145	55,9
Nepal	Not Applicable			
Totals	853	923	1,776	52,o

Source: Braibanti & Associates. Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition. Duke University Press, 1966, p. 645.

About 33 British ICS officers remained in India. The bulk of them retired and 5o British ICS officers went to Pakistan. Out of 549 Indian ICS officers, about 96 went to the newly created Pakistan[1]. With the departure of British element of the service and a further loss of Muslim officers as they moved to Pakistan, the necessity of rapid recruitment was essential to keep the service up to full strength. Consequently a Recruitment Board was constituted in 1948 to select candidates from the open market for the Indian Administrative Service.

The Board considered applications of people from open market who fulfilled certain qualifications and were between the ages of twenty-one and forty-five. About 16,14o applications were scrutinised by the Board. About 2,421 candidates satisfied the Board as regards to their career records and were interviewed. The result of the selection was that finally 153 candidates were selected and appointed to the IAS cadre[2]. The Board also selected candidates from the state civil service who had completed six years (not eight years as in case of promotion) of service and were of outstanding merit and ability in 1948-5o and 1956-57.[3] In all these cases, the aim of the Board was to select candidates with diverse backgrounds and experience.

Although the central government takes recourse to special recruitment occasionally, in the permanent set-up the direct recruits and the promotees from

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1 Braibanti & Associates, op. cit., p. 645-646.

2 Pai Panandiker, V.A., Personnel System for Development Administration, 1966, p. 33.

3 The IAS (Special Recruitment) Regulations, 1956.

the state service will together constitute the total strength of the IAS cadre, the percentage of vacancies to be filled being 75 and 25 respectively[1]. This clearly speaks of the importance attached to direct recruitment by the government. In view of this, the bases for direct recruitment to the IAS need further explanation.

B. THE BASES OF DIRECT RECRUITMENT

Recruitment to the IAS, as we have seen, is primarily on the results of a highly competitive examination. The examination is open to all Indian citizens, who are between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-six, in good health and hold a degree from any approved college or university. This implies absence of such requirements as kinship, caste, or any status which help in gaining entry to higher civil services. In other words, this means equality of opportunity for public employment.

I Equality of opportunity

Article 16 of the Indian Constitution states that there is to be equality of opportunity for public

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1 Prasad, Bishwanath, The Indian Administrative Service, 1968 , p. 75. The All-India Federation of State Civil Service Associations representing two thousand deputy collectors has asked the Union Government to intiate action for implementing the recommendations of the Administrative Reforms Commission which had strongly suggested that the promotion quota of the state civil service should be raised from 25 to 4o per cent, DEPUTY COLLECTORS SEEK FAIR DEAL, The Hindustan Times, 31st January, 1973.

employment, irrespective of religion, caste, sex, or place of residence within the country. Before Independence, there were reservation of certain posts in civil service for the Muslims and other minorities.

> "By, 1939, the proportion of Indians (in the ICS) had risen from five per cent in 1913 to forty per cent, when the British left in 1947 it was about fifty per cent. But the Muslims also gained their point, in 1934 twenty-five per cent of the posts in the All India services were reserved for them, to be filled by nomination if they did not win sufficient places by competition"[1].

There is no more any reservation of posts in civil service for the religious minorities. Under the new constitutional provisions, recruitment to IAS is based on the "principle of merit" which contributes to the efficiency of the service.

Bootomore writes:

> "...the recruitment of officials strictly on the basis of ability and qualifications could only be established when public office became accessible in principle to all citizens"[2].

As the constitution confers the right of equality in public employment, it seems that all public employment in India is thrown open to all citizens of India equally. In actual practice it is not so.

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1 Symonds, Richard, The British and their Successors, op. cit., p. 41.

2 Bootomore, T.B., "The Administrative Elite" in the New Sociology (ed.) by Irving Louis, 1964. p. 366.

The Union Government, for instance, has reserved 12,5 per cent and 5 per cent in the civil service for the members of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, respectively the most underprivileged groups in society so long as their appointment does not hamper the administrative efficiency of the service. "Formerly many of the posts in the higher services reserved for members of these communities could not be filled for want of suitably qualified candidates. This is no longer the case and is not likely to be so in the future. To take one example, whereas five of the sixteen posts reserved for the scheduled castes in the IAS were actually filled in 1957, since 1962 all the posts reserved for them have been actually filled. The position with regard to the scheduled tribes is similar"[1]. Besides, there is lotof political pressure in order to fill up the posts reserved for the scheduled castes and tribes. It is very often alleged that the privilege given to these backward classes is at the cost of administrative efficiency of the service. The government uses the recruitment to civil service as a lever for the uplift of the scheduled castes and tribes. One doubts, whether in the interest of administrative efficiency this can be allowed to last long.

Women candidates are ordinarily not admitted if they are married. Any woman, if appointed, must resign from the Indian Administrative Service in

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1 Beteille, Andre. "The Future Of Backward Classes: The Competing Demands Of Status And Power", in India and Ceylon: Unity and Diversity (ed.) Mason, Philip, 1967, p. 1o5.

the event of a susequent marriage. This is done, as has been claimed, for "the maintenance of the efficiency of the service"[1]. But Rao argues that

> "the rules of government of India prohibiting married woman for joining the IAS cannot be sustained unless it can be shown that it is for the benefit of women themselves"[2].

Further recruitment to IAS on the basis of competitive examination, it may be argued, brings about a real equality of opportunity to all candidates, those have equal ability and qualification. In practice it looks quite different. The educational standards of all Indian universities are not the same. Some of the urban universities provide better education and training for the IAS entrance examination. "An analysis of the candidates - university-wise - shows that the degree of popularity of the examination among the alumni of the different universities varied considerably. It has been observed that the generality of students of quite a large number of universities (including their first classes) either do not seem to be aware of this examination, or they do not look to it for a career. The number of candidates from the different universities varied considerably, showing the degree of response of the alumni concerned. Out of a total of 5,706 candidates who take the examination, (1969-70) only 1 belonged to Sardar Patel University, 3 to Jamia Millia Islamia, 4 to

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1 U.P.S.C. Notice IAS etc exam 1972, p. 11 & 23.

2 Prof. K.V. Rao, The Parliamentary Democracy Of India, Calcutta 1965, p. 158.

Kalyani University, 6 to Visva-Bharati, 7 to Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda, and 8 to Dibrugarh University. There were as many as 12 other universities from which not more than 2o candidates appeared. On the other hand, as many as 549 candidates belonged to Delhi University, 542 to Agra University, 5oo to Allahabad University and 461 to Punjab University. There were 11 other universities from which loo or more candidates appeared"[1]. This shows, candidates belonging to certain universities have better opportunities for preparing themselves for the public service, and being recruited to the IAS.

II Union Public Service Commission (U.P.S.C.)

The U.P.S.C. is an independent agency appointed by and responsible to the President of India. In the choice of members, including the chairman of the commission, the President is under the constitutional obligation to see that as nearly as may be one-half of the total number shallbe persons who at the date of their respective appointments have held office for at least ten years either under the government of India or under a government of a state[2], since this would insure possession of administrative experience among a substantial number of members. The constitution has not laid down any qualifications for the other half of the members of the commission, but they are drawn from the men of high public standing in education, professions, business etc.

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1 U.P.S.C. Report 197o, p. 111.

2 The constitution of India, Article 316 (1).

Thus the system tries to combine the advantages of specialist and generalist approaches in regards to the selection of its members. The selection of the members of the commission from the men of high public standing, conveys to the people that recruitments to IAS will be fair and impartial and that the best talents will be selected for the higher civil service.

A member of the commission holds office for a period of 6 years or up to the age of 65 years, whichever is ealier. But on the expiry of his term of office, he is ineligible for re-appointment[1]. This provision does not attract persons of high public standing below the age of 59 years to be considered as commission members. The age of the members will, thus, vary from 59 years to 65 years. We have already noted that the candidates for IAS within the age group from 21 years to 26 years are to be considered. This shows that the members are two generations away from the candidates.

> "Research on the development phases of human growth indicates that the concerns and qualities considered important differ considerably at these two age levels. It is possible that in the interviews, the selectors of an older generation may emphasise qualities of security, of safe decisions, of prudence, whereas for innovative and developmental tasks it may be necessary to emphasise qualities of calculated

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1 The constitution of India, Article 316.
The members of the U.P.S.C. are eligible only for chairmanship of the Union or State Public Service Commission.

> risk-taking, of independence against pressures, and of initiative. A mix of the two types perhaps is important, but it seems in developing countries the edge should be with those having attitudes and beliefs relating to development and growth"[1].

The nature of work of the administrator's has substantially changed after the Independence. The developmental tasks are the most important aspect of their job. Since most of the members, without direct experience in handling developmental work, assess the suitability of a candidate in the Personality Test Boards, discontentment is very often expressed amongst the candidates. "Perhaps , there is a need to represent on the Selections Boards the younger governmental officials, who in terms of work are not too far removed from the kind of realities the young administrator will handle"[2].

The method of examination is not free from criticisms. In the existing system, there are written papers, namely compulsory, optional and additional papers. Every year a few thousand college graduates take the examination. In 197o, the total number of candidates appearing at the examination was 6516[3]. It means in compulsory papers (all candidates have the same examination papers) there are likely to

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1 Chowdhury, Kamla. Union Public Service Commission, Ind. Jour. Pub. Adm. Vol. XIII, oct.-dec., No . 4 1967, p. 719.

2 Ibid.

3 U.P.S.C. Report, 197o, p. 111.

be a number of examiners. When the number of examiners is more than one for the same paper, the problem of uniformity in evaluting it is likely to be great.

The 'optional papers' bring also problem of different nature. The candidates have to select three subjects out of a list of twenty-five subjects. The examination papers are valued and marks are given. Ranking is done on the basis of the pooled marks of each candidate. The defect of this method is that it treats all subjects alike in the matter of ranking. But all subjects are not equally markfetching. Candidates who opt for applied mathematics, statistics or Sanskrit have a better chance of getting higher marks than those who opt for European history, world history or economics. In other words, some subjects have advantage over others. As there is difference in the very nature of subjects. the achievement of candidates in the subjects cannot be assessed properly on the basis of percentage of marks obtained only. We have to take into account the differences in the scoring nature of subjects. Under the present system of examination by U.P.S.C. it is quite likely, that brilliant students who are trained in less scoring subjects may not fare well in the optional subjects and consequently do not find their names in the merit list. Similar arguments can be extended to the additional subjects.

The personality test carries 3oo marks for the IAS competitive examination and as such constitutes a significant element in the final outcome. Until 1958, no candidate who was disqualified in the personality test, could qualify for selection

however high his score in the written test may have been. It was found difficult to give much emphasis on this provision, since unsuccessful candidates could charge the commission of discrimination on the ground of religion, caste, language etc. In 1958 the Government of India has removed the passing requirement in the personality test. Since then candidates have been rated on the combined score obtained in the written and oral tests[1].

III Catch them young

We come now to the third base for direct recruitment i.e. recruitment of persons who have just completed their university education and in their early youth. This is a legacy of the past. In the middle of the nineteenth century, Macaulay as chairman of the committee on examination of candidates for the civil service of the East India Company writes:

> "It is undoubtedly desirable that the civil servant of the company should enter on his duties while still young but it is also desirable that he should have received the best, the most liberal, the most finished education that his native country affords. Such an education has been proved by experience to be the best preparation for every calling which requires the exercise of the higher powers of the mind. We think it is most desirable that the examination should be of such nature that

1 V.S. Hejmadi and V.A. Pai Panandiker, "Public Services-Recruitment and Selection", Ind. Jour. Pub. Adm. Vol. IX No. 3 1963, p. 365.

> no candidate who may fail shall, to whatever calling he may betake himself, have any reason to regret the time and labour which he spent in preparing himself to be examined. Skill in Greek and Latin versification has induced no direct tendency to form a judge, a financier or a diplomat. But the youth who does best, what all the ablest and most ambitious youths about him are trying to do well, will generally prove a superior man"[1].

These were broadly the principles applied to the recruitment of East India Company's Service. After the transfer of government from Company to the crown in 1858, the Company's service was renamed as Indian Civil Service. The framework of the organisation of the service remained the same[2]. The system of selecting candidates on the results of a competitive examination to ICS was discontinued in 1942 due to war conditions. At the time of Independence, Macauley was not forgotten in India.

> "Those who have done well at school and in university and held their own in the competitive written examination would generally be the men who would do well in whatever positions they may be placed and whatever work is assigned to them later"[3].

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1 Quoted by A.J. Platt, Some problem of training in the British Civil Service, Ind. Jour. Pub. Adm. Vol. V, No 1 1959, p. 179.

2 O'Malley, The Indian Civil Service, 1965, p. 86 & 65.

3 Quoted by Roy, N.C., The Civil Service in India (Calcutta 1958), p. 234.

This idea was adopted by the Union Government and competitive examination for recruitment to IAS was modelled accordingly, emphasising the testing of candidates in their respective field of education. These arrangements have continued since Independence with some minor modifications made from time to time.

It is argued that there is an advantage in catching young brilliant students from the universities and then training them in public administration. If this is not done, young brilliant students may get attracted to other professions like engineering, medicine etc. It would be difficult for the government to find out 'best material' from the open market resulting in delay in recruitment. It means also inconvenience to the public service[1]. But this system has its own defects. Wilkinson writes:

> "When for example, a country's economic demands are rising, a governing elite system may be relatively unsuccessful if it directs too much talent away from entrepreneurial and technological roles in favour of governing roles"[2].

From time to time over-age recruitment to the higher grades of the administrative services is suggested. The object of this recruitment would be to bring into the services the persons who distinguished themselves in other fields like education and

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1 Conference on Training, Feb. 24-25, 1969. Sponsored by Training Division, Ministry of Home Affairs, p. 23.

2 Wilkinson, Rupert, Governing Elite (Oxford Uni. Press 1969) p. 216.

industry. This suggestion has not yet been carried out by the government on the ground that the 'over-age recruit' may not be able to acquire the personality and master the techniques of public administration. Such recruitment may have some adverse effect on the prospect of 'direct recruits'[1].

C. AN ASSESSMENT OF RECRUITMENT POLICY

Access to western-type education is the crucial factor for the formation of an IAS officer. Consequently the educational institution has to play a great role in providing suitable education and personnel to the administrative services. The western educational system was originally introduced in India during the 19th century, mainly to provide the manpower requirements of the colonial administration. "In fact, for a long time the possibility of securing a government job was the dominant goal for students entering colleges"[1]. Government service was the only main source of employment. "Examinations geared to the requirement of government service had deferred the whole educational system" in India[2].

It was primarily the higher castes, which made use of the western education. Conscious of low academic standards of the Indian educational institutions, many continued to send their children to England.

> "The embarrassment of the British was considerable when they found that the sons of the Indian and Ceylon middle classes absorbed

1 Gore, M.S. The Crisis in University Education, in "Sociology Of Culture In India", (New Delhi 1965, p. 340.) edited by Unnithan, I. Deva, Y. Singh.

2 Symonds, Richard, op. cit., p. 53.

> European culture so rapidly that they soon became capable of defeating British candidates in open competition"[1].

The competitive examination during the British rule gave the Indian students a feeling of equality with the British candidates, and those who qualified were taken into the ICS. With the introduction of competitive examination, the British introduced a new device which meant triumph of the middle class over the aristocracy in Great Britain. In India too this was appreciated by the new middle class, as under the system of patronage the relatives of Princes were getting better posts.

I Relevant Study Qualification

The British devised a double examination system; comprising a competitive examination followed by a qualifying examination. On the result of first examination a list of selected candidates was to be made. The selected candidates were required to pass a qualifying examination. The considerations which influenced them (Macaulay Committee) in reaching this conclusion were as follows:

FIRST: The recruits "should have secured the best, the most liberal, the most finished education that his native country affords".

SECOND: The competitive examination "should be of such a nature that no candidate who may fail shall, to whatever calling he may betake himself, have any reason to regret the time and labour which he spent in preparing himself to be examined".

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1 Symonds, Richard, op. cit., p. 258.

THIRD: The subjects of competitive examination should be chosen and the marks should be distributed among them "in such a manner that no part of the kingdom and no class of schools, shall exclusively furnish" the recruits.

FOURTH: The second examination (the qualifying examination) should be devised as to require the selected candidate to satisfy the examiners that they "have a competent knowledge of law, the history of India, political economy, and at least one language of India"[1].

The essential principles of Macaulayan scheme was that the competitive examination should be so designed as to provide equal opportunity to all academic disciplines. In addition, the Macaulay scheme was extended to British civil service. Very recently, the Fulton Committee has investigated into the relationship of the older method - the method of competitive written examination and the diversity of academic disciplines within the educational system. The Committee criticised the Macaulay report as having "extolled the merits of the young men from Oxford and Cambridge who had read nothing but subjects unrelated to their future careers"[2]. The Fulton Committee formulated the principles "that the relevance to their future work of the subject-matter of their university

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1 Gopalaswami, R.A., Indian Polity, Bombay 1970, p. 168.

2 Fulton Report, quoted by Gopalswami, op. cit., p. 168.

or other pre-service studies should be an important qualification for appointment"[1], it did raise an important issue not only for Great Britain but to India also.

The competitive examination for the IAS is too much academically oriented and whether this method is suitable to pick up candidates to perform highly specialised work it is open to question.

An analysis of the subject wise distribution of candidates by the U.P.S.C. reveals that the majority of successful candidates are actually examined in the fields of history, social and political sciences, and in English literature. For example in 1970

> "Of the 102 candidates recommended for the Indian Administrative Service/Indian Foreign Service, who were required to offer two additional subjects at a higher level, 30 had appeared with Indian history II (The great Mughals from 1526 to 1707), 29 with political theory from Hobbes to the present day, 25 with European history (from 1871 to 1945), 23 with English literature (from 1798 to 1935), 19 with British constitutional history (from 1603 to 1950), 17 with higher physics, and 11 with constitutional Law of India - the number of candidates who had offered the remaining subjects in this group being less than 10" [2].

1 Gopalswami, op. cit., p. 169.

2 U.P.S.C. Report 1970, p. 21.

The candidates competing in pure sciences such as chemistry, botany, physics and zoology were fewer. The syllabus, it can be argued, seems to have been more oriented towards the arts subjects than to the science subjects. This does not mean that science degree holders can not compete and get into IAS. The study of Trivedi and Rao shows that 32.7 per cent of the IAS entrants had science degrees and the remaining 67.3 per cent held art degrees[1]. But nothing prevents a candidate to offer subjects for examination, which he never studied as part of his degree programme. Many science students often offer the conventional subjects like history, political science etc. relying too much on textbooks and reading them to pass the examination. The existence of "conventional" subjects has certainly some influence in the orientation of studies in the university level. It is very often suggested that the competitive examination to IAS should be open only to the graduates of social sciences and that others with science subjects should look to scientific services and professions.

> "... the competitive examination for recruitment to the Indian Administrative Service should be open only to graduates in social sciences. This would ensure that every official in charge of general administration would bring to bear upon his work a wide basic knowledge of social needs and social institutions. It would also prevent first-class

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1 Trivedi, R.K. & Rao, D.N., "Regular recruits to IAS - A Study", Ind. Jour. Pub. Adm. Vol. V, 1960, p. 50-80. This study was made of all 615 probationers who entered the service from 1948 to 1960.

talent in the natural sciences from being wasted in general administration and would canalise it into scientific services and research institution"[1].

As far as India is concerned, there is no doubt that the candidates should have a better grounding in the study of subjects like law, political economy and statistics and their application to modern government. Moreover, post-entry training at the National Academy of Administration in Mussoorie is not an adequate substitute for pre-entry study of these subjects in the university level. It is to be seen whether the U.P.S.C. feel the importance of this and remodel the syllabus to give a fair chance to those students who have studied the relevant subjects in the context of problems of modern government.

II Abundance of eligible candidates

The most serious problem facing the U.P.S.C. today is the abundance of the eligible candidates for the recruitment to the IAS. The following table makes the problem clear.

TABLE 3 [2]

Year	Number of applicants	Number of candidates who actually appeared	Number of candidates interviewed	Number of candidates recommended for appointment for IAS
1968-69	9726	5706	684	96
1969-70	11302	6516	771	102

1 Natu, W.R., "Public Administration and Economic Development", R.R. Kale Memorial Lecture, 1954, p. 20.

2 U.P.S.C. Report 1969 and 1970, New Delhi.

The existence of this problem has been realised by the Administrative Reforms Commission.

> "An unhappy feature of recruitment to government service in India is the great disproportion between the number of posts available and the number of aspirants. Sometimes, the ratio is as much as one to one hundred or even more. Not only is the expenditure and inconvenience involved in examining a large number of candidates for a few positions great, but the spectacle of so many persons making application and getting disappointed is a dismal one. Furthermore, the large number of applications that have to be processed and the equally large number of candidates who have to be examined and evaluated is a frightful source of delays. Some measures must be, therefore, devised not only to limit the number of applicants to a reasonable level, but also to speed up the actual recruitment procedures. While it is true that no distinction should be made between one candidate and another, so long as he satisfies the minimum requirements, it is equally true that for a large majority of applicants, the prospect of success is but illusory. Some measures must be adopted to bring down the number of applicants for each post. These may involve, an adjustment of age limits; a rational system of short-listing candidates, in enhancing the minimum qualifications in suitable cases, or limiting the number of candidates to be called for interview on some rational criterion. How best the

> purpose in view can be achieved is a matter for detailed consideration. We recommend that a committee should be set up to go into the question"[1].

In an attempt to solve the problem the Administrative Reform Commission have thus recommended certain lines of approach. In the meanwhile the government of India has raised the upper age limit for IAS examination from 24 to 26 years. But raising the age limit to 26 years alone can not solve the problem. Many in India are 24 by the time they are graduates. The real problem lies in restricting the competitive chances which any candidate is allowed to take.

The Administrative Reform Commission also recommends the possibility of enhancing the minimum qualification as a solution to the problem. One way would be to see that eligibility of candidates to IAS competitive examination is restricted to graduates obtaining marks exceeding say sixty per cent. This would certainly create problems of a different order. There are about 7o universities in India. They all award degrees in different academic disciplines. But there is no uniformity of standards amongst the Indian universities. Practically it will be difficult to introduce any method of maintaining and enforcing uniformity of standards. Consequently, if this change, namely restricting the candidature for graduates having more than sixty percentage marks, is adopted, there

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1 Administrative Reforms Commission REPORT (Personnel Administration) April, 1969, p. 45.

may be unhealthy competition between different universities in the award of higher marks. Another way of restricting the candidature for the competitive examination would be to enhance the minimum qualification from graduate level (first degree) to masters level (second degree). But this amounts to denial of opportunity to the poor and the underprivileged classes of the society, since the students of this community may not be able to afford a second degree course.

The Commission further says about a "rational system of short-listing candidates". The candidates, those who find their names in the short-list, will be allowed to compete in the recruitment to IAS examination. However rational the short-list may be, there will always be objections from different quarters that certain names are included by undue influence and others excluded by unfair means.

Thus an attempt is made to analyse the issues connected with the abundance of eligible candidates. The problem is really acute. There can be hardly a solution to the problem so long as the recruiting authorities declare all degree holders of all universities in India eligible to IAS examination.

III Scarcity of selectable candidates

Since Independence there is a tremendous pressure on higher education. The number of graduates produced by the Indian universities are increasing from year to year. There has been declining efficiency in the university education. The universities have failed to maintain the international standards of the former metropolis. Before independence the

proportion of students enrolled in the universities was small and stationary. In recent years the total enrolment in the university is becoming larger from year to year. The universities are subject to various pressures. The sources of pressure are mainly the public at large, the student community and the political system. The general tendency is

> "to forestall the perpetuation of the existing elite stratification by demanding equal chances for all, not in the formal but in the material sense. Insofar they are an expression of the new urge of the lower strata and rural populations to improve their prospects by securing degrees for their younger members"[1].

Thus the system encourages too many persons to study for university degrees resulting in overcrowded universities and fall in the standard of higher education. Consequently there is an increasing proportion of graduates with substandard talent and a decreasing proportion of graduates with high talent. This sad truth is unfortunately reflected in the competitive examination held by U.P.S.C. for the recruitment of IAS officers.

A few relevant facts which indicate a sharp decline of quality relating the candidates who took this examination during two different periods (which may be roughly identified at the First Plan Period and the Third Plan Period) are summarised below.

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1 Prof. Dr. Kruse, Hans, Bochum, "The attitude of new Elites", Working Paper read in Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 3oth nov. 197o, H. 5.

First: Among all the candidates who competed for every 100 vacancies, there were 301 first class graduates during the first period. During the second period, ten years later, this number had dropped to 182.

Second: Among every 100 candidates who were selected for recruitment, there were 43 first class graduates during the first period. During the second period, ten years later, this number had dropped to 25.

Third: Among every 100 candidates who were selected for recruitment, there were only 4 third class graduates during the first period. During the second period, ten years later, this number had increased to 10[1].

Furthermore, the annual reports of Public Service Commission has made frequent references to such qualitative decline. "The fact that the number of first class graduates appearing at the competitive examinations is too small in comparison with the number of such graduates turned out each year and the number of vacancies available, is indeed a matter of concern. We would, therefore, suggest, as an experimental measure, that an examination different from the traditional type may be held for attracting persons with high academic record. This examination would not call for an elaborate post collegiate preparation but would aim at tapping the most intelligent of the first class graduates"[2].

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1 Gopalaswami, R.A., op. cit., p. 157.

2 Administrative Reform Commission REPORT (personnel Administration) April 1969, p. 47.

IV. The language problem

English remains the language of bureaucratic recruitment. But the emphasis on English varies from state to state.

Advocates of Hindi and other regional languages have demanded from time to time some optional media in the civil service examination. Adoption of Hindi alone as an optional medium to English for the civil service examination, will put the candidates of Hindi-speaking areas at an advantage over the other candidates. Adoption of regional languages do not also solve the problem either. This is due to two reasons. Firstly it will be difficult to find always "ready, competent and qualified examiners" in the regional languages; secondly, to maintain an uniformity in evalution of answer papers written in different languages. Again there is the danger that the regional examiners may compete in marking up the answer papers of their regions.

> "If the facile acceptance of the regional languages satisfies regional political aspirations, its effect on standards of examinations, and ultimately the efficiency of the administration, must be viewed with apprehension. The multiplicity of yardsticks may make all measurements dubious, if not suspect"[1].

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1 Chanda, Asok, op. cit., p. 33.

TABLE 4: The Fourteen Languages of India (Census, 1961)[1]

Language	Population (Million)		% of total population (439 million)	
Hindi	133.4		3o.4	
Urdu	23.3		5.3	
Panjabi	1o.9	167.6	2.5	38.2
Bihari		16.8		3.8
Rajasthani		14.9		3.4
		199.3		45.4
Telgu		37.7		8.6
Bengali		33.9		7.7.
Marathi		33.3		7.6
Tamil		3o.6		7.o
Gujarati		2o.3		4.6
kannada		17.4		4.o
Malayalam		17.o		3.9
Oriya		15.7		3.6
Assamese		6.8		1.5
Kashmiri		1.9		o.4
Sanskrit		o.oo2		o.ooo45

The Official Language Commission has visualised the possibility of introducing a regional language as an optional medium only when it attained sufficient usage in higher education[2]. But the Commission was sceptic about the consequences of any change in the examination medium when it observed that "some of us do hope that, when the time comes for taking a

1 Mason, Philip, India and Ceylon: Unity and Diversity, London 1967, p. 54.

2 Report of the Official Language Commission, New Delhi, Government of India, 1957, p. 2o3.

decision on this issue, it may be found that the introduction of the regional language media for these examinations is not necessary"[1]. The Committee of Parliament on the official language also feared that the admission of regional languages could destroy the all-India character of the Services[2].

While the language controversy continues, English remains the medium of examination for the IAS. As an experiment, U.P.S.C. has recently allowed candidates to write their answers of the two compulsory papers, i.e. Essay and General Knowledge, in any one of the language mentioned in the above table. The U.P.S.C. before introducing the use of regional languages as medium of examination for other papers, is supposed to examine the facilities that exist for teaching various subjects at university level in regional languages and the impact of the change over on the official work in the union government, which can not be done through the medium of all regional languages. Again the IAS officers may not be able to attain the required proficiency in the official language of the union government, if it is different from the states, where they are likely to be educated through the medium of their regional languages at the university levels. Thus the introduction of the use of the regional language for the purposes of IAS examination needs careful considerations. Any violent

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1 Report of the Official Language Commission, New Delhi, Government of India, 1957, p. 2o1.

2 Report of the Committee of Parliament on the official language, Government of India Press, New Delhi, 1959, p. 22.

change from the present system without a workable alternative to all states may break the unity of India through the Service.

V. Role of U.P.S.C.

This brings us finally to the main problem i.e. the role of U.P.S.C. as an institution in the Indian democracy. It should regard merit as the sole criterion for recruitment to the public service. Under a multiparty system like India, the responsibilities are still greater since it has to protect the service by maintaining a balance between politics and bureaucracy. Despite its constitutional independence, the autonomy of the U.P.S.C. in India is severely limited. Its jurisdiction is very often controlled by the government i.e. the executive. The members of the Commission are appointed by the executive. Membership has become a reward in the eyes of the public and carries only six years of employment. Since it has no access to public opinion, it is quite natural to conclude that

> "the Commission is really no better and no worse than a typical government department and naturally bureaucratic culture is predominant. Consequently it has become too neutral a body to be able to come out with any fresh ideas to break new ground in the recruitment front. It works on an assumption that there are too many aspirants for government jobs and so irrespective of quality its duty ends if it can ensure an objective recruitment. Most of the examinations and selections are being conducted on old and

> conventional lines and they are repeated year after year"[1].

The present day recruitment technique has its obvious flaws. The written tests examine the knowledge of the candidates in subjects not directly related to Indian administration. The personality test which continues for twenty to thirty minutes, do not always pick up candidates with outstanding administrative leadership. The Commission seems to be not bold enough to deviate from the colonial heritage of recruitment technique and the government is not willing to give up the colonial practice of recruiting IAS officers from the university graduates. The realisation of these difficulties has resulted in blaming either the U.P.S.C. or the government and sometimes the candidates or the educational institutions. Twenty years ago Appleby observed that

> "the criteria by which personnel are selected by the Public Service Commission are not up to date, and examining and approving techniques are far from modern. Selection tends to be by one type of person, which naturally perpetuates its own type ... Recruitment is not imaginative or aggressive enough, is too much limited by concern for persons already employed, and goverend too easily by an underestimate of personnel potentialities in the society"[2].

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1 U.P.S.C. Some comments on selectors and selection methods, Ind. Jour. Pub. Adm. Vol. XIV, No. 2, 1968, p. 373.

2 Appleby, Paul H., Public Administration in India: Report of a survey, 1953, p. 11.

There has been little change in the recruitment policy since Appleby left India.

To conclude, the system gives too much exaggerated importance to the selection of IAS officers. The officers, so selected, remain too much self-conscious of their merit and achievement. It is designed to provide security consciousness rather than public service consciousness. The system does not take into account the personnel potential of the society. It tends to undermine the different parallel services under the union government.

CHAPTER IV:

THE IAS : THE PROBLEM OF TRAINING

A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

I Inherited Tradition

The British seem to have not much faith in formalised training as a means of increasing administrative capability. The training that existed was a preparatory type, viz., it prepared one between recruitment and placement for the career. This reflects the British attitude towards the profession of government. They did not believe in any skill or set of skills as being relevant for the administrator. On the contrary they gave more emphasis on factors like commonsense and the knowledge of human affairs. Knowledge in humanities and liberal arts were essential to develop skills in administration. Besides, they believed that, there "are many aspects of administrative ability which cannot be taught in the university, and must be partly inborn ..."[1]. To be a good administrator one should have liberal education. He should be also 'well-born' and well bred. These were the requirements for an ideal administrator. This no doubt appealed to the higher caste Hindues who believed in the beneficence of noble birth and breeding, and had an appreciation for classical studies. "Before British rule was established India

1 William A Robson (ed.), The British Civil Servant (London, Allen & Unwin, 1937, p. 102).

had bureaucratic castes, a respect for learning and a tradition of using learned men in the administration"[1]. When the British introduced new education in India, it was the higher caste which made best use of it and competed for the Indian Civil Service in England.

Indian ICS entrants required a two year probationary period at either Oxford, Cambridge and London. The probationer had to undergo a special programme of study in these universities. This was not a degree programme. It was common to all entrants viz., the British and the Indians. This was more or less meant to condition the attitude of the Indian Civil Service officers.

> "It put them in intimate contact with English intellectual and social life, perfected their use of the English language, and enhanced their self-confidence, poise, and command presence. It forged a bond of common experience between themselves and their British ICS colleagues. If it served also to detach the Indian officers from the realities of Indian life, it could also be said that it severed them from the corrupting web of tribal, communal, and familial obligations which so strained the impartiality of Indian members of the service. Above all, it immersed them in the stream of British life and thus made them aware of a society in which a high degree of rationality had been achieved and in which Western concepts of the rule of law had

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1 Richard Symond, op. cit., p. 54.

> effectively permeated the fabric. At its worst, this training conducted to a quality of arrogance exasperating to many Indians and a kind of disdain for Indian customs which bordered on snobbery ... At its best, however, it forged a vision of good administration, a set of values emphasising quality of intellect, and it provided a glimpse of the order and progress possible under a government of high discipline and dedication"[1].

II Independence (1947) and the sharp break with the tradition

With the attainment of Independence, the burden and responsibility for developing a new tradition fell entirely on the Indian shoulders. The British India's bureaucracy "had responded well to an environment in which (a) good government did not have to be respresentative, (b) a static equilibrium of social forces and individual relationships was the ideal, and (c) there were relatively less urgent and less competing demands on the economic resources"[2]. These environmental characteristics were changed during the post-Independence period.

The "special programme of study" for the probationers in England was regarded unsuitable for independent India. The immediate problem was to find

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1 Ralph Braibanti and J.J. Spengler, op. cit., p. 58-59.

2 M.B.A. Abbas, Public Administration Training in Pakistan: International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. XXXVI - 1970, No. 3, p. 257.

within India a training system capable of replacing the program of study in the British universities. Moreover, the Indian universities do not specialise in training young men for public service. In this situation the burden of training the new recruits fell on the government of India. So it is interesting to examine the system of training devised by the government for the IAS recruits. After explaining the system of training, we will try to analyse the relevance of training for the IAS officers.

B. INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING

I National Academy of Administration, Mussoorie

The National Academy of Administration at Mussoorie, about ninety miles north of Delhi, was established in the year 1959 to impart training to all new recruits. The Academy of Administration was established to provide the following courses of studies.

a) A common foundational course for direct recruits to the all-India and Class I central services, lasting about five months;

b) "Professional" training to direct recruits to the IAS for about seven months;

c) Two refresher re-orientation course, each of about three months' duration, to directly recruited IAS officers with 6-1o years' service and those promoted to the IAS from the state service;

d) Short courses, seminar conferences, etc. lasting a week to a month, for the benefit of senior officers[1].

1 C.P. Bhambhri, Training Programme for the Indian Administrative Service, International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. XXXVI, No. 1, 197o, p. 25.

II Foundational Course

The training at the National Academy of Administration, Mussoorie, comprises a foundational course of five months for the officers of the following services:

1. Indian Administrative Service.
2. Indian Foreign Service.
3. Indian Police Service.
4. Indian Forest Service.
5. Indian Audit and Accounts Service.
6. Indian Railways Accounts Service.
7. Indian Defence Accounts Service.
8. Indian Income Tax Service.
9. Indian Postal Service.
10. Indian Railway Traffic Service.
11. Indian Customs and Central Excise Service.
12. Central Information Service.
13. Indian Ordnance Factory Service.
14. Military Lands and Cantonment Service.
15. Indian Economic Service.
16. Indian Statistical Service.

The purpose of the foundational course of training is to impart to the probationers a basic understanding of the constitutional, economic and social set-up of the country. Besides, the probationers are taught public administration, basic economic principles, Five-Year Plans, general law, Indian history and culture, political theory. The joint foundational training thus given is expected to promote,inter alia, a common outlook and understanding of the integrated functioning of the public service, a spirit of common purpose among the pro-

bationers of all the higher civil services[1].

The significance of this decision to train probationers of all-India services and the Class I services in the same institution, at the same time and in the same course of study cannot be appreciated without some awareness of the ICS tradition which the foundational course destroyed. That tradition was one which assumed ICS to be the elite service, clearly superior to all others. At no time an ICS officer had to compete with a non-ICS officer or had to take training with officers other than his own cadre fellows. During the British rule the exclusiveness and remoteness of the ICS officers was quite well known. The training programme for the IAS is however designed to break this tradition. For five months IAS probationers have to compete with other all-India and Central Class I probationers for grades and measure each other's intellectual stature and character. Besides, probationers of all services have to stay in one place which may help to remove the artificial barriers between different services from the very beginning of their service career[2].

After the foundational course of five months at the Academy, all other trainees, except those of the IAS proper, leave for their respective training schools. Other services have their own training schools managed by their respective departments,

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1 Directory of Central and State Administrative Training Institutions, Training Division, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. TRAINING MONOGRAPH No. 4, Feb. 197o, p. 5.

2 Braibanti, "Reflections on Bureaucratic Reforms in India", in Ralph Braibanti and J.J. Spengler (eds.) op. cit., p. 6o.

e.g. for Indian Police Service, there is a Police Academy at Mount Abu; for the Indian Audit and Accounts Service, there is a Training School at Simla.

III Professional Training to the IAS Probationers

According to this scheme, the IAS probationers remain for seven more months to complete the professional part of the training. They will have to study in detail the problems of public administration, district administration, revenue administration; Indian legal system with special reference to the Indian penal code, criminal procedure code, Indian evidence act, and Constitutional law of the country; problems of economic theory and Indian planning.

During the period of stay at the Academy, the probationers are divided into two batches for the cultural-cum-study tour, better known as 'Bharat Darshan' (visit to country-side). The probationers hailing from the south visit important places in the north and those coming from the north go to various places in the south. This normally includes visits to places of historical and cultural importance. Besides, the probationers visit a few important public sector undertakings. This is designed to give them an appreciation of cultural regions other than their own and impressing them with the major industrial and power developments of the country. For elementary weapon training the probationers are also attached to the military establishment for a few weeks. After the end of the year of training, the probationers have to take their final examination conducted by the Union Public Service Commission.

Thus the programme for one whole year of the IAS training is like this:[1]

(a) Foundational Course	....	15o days
(b) Army attachment	....	3o days
(c) Bharat Darshan	....	45 days
(d) Visit to Delhi (where they meet the President, the Prime Minister and the Home Minister and get a knowledge of the working of parliament) and to the Central Police Training College, Mount Abu.	....	15 days
(e) Studies at the Academy	....	12o days

C. TRAINING IN THE STATE

Once the Probationers' Final Examination is over, the IAS probationer goes to his alloted state and is given on-the-job training varying from 1o to 25 months. The purpose of this part of the training is to make the IAS probationer well-versed in the process, techniques and methods of work in the state of his allotment where he is to undertake in future responsible post like District Officer.

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1 B. Prasad, op. cit., p. 17o.

TABLE 5: The period of training in the various states of India

State	Period of Training
Andhra Pradesh	41 Weeks
Assam	32 Weeks
Bihar	34 Weeks
Gujarat	64 Weeks
Keral	56 Weeks
Madhya Pradesh	21 Weeks
Madras	54 Weeks
Maharastra	64 Weeks
Mysore	46 Weeks
Orissa	8o Weeks
Punjab	6o Weeks
Rajasthan	14 Months
Utter Pradesh	15 Months
West Bengal	64 Weeks

Source: B. Prasad, Indian Administrative Service, Delhi 1968, p. 175.

On-the-job training consists of the following:

A) A short period in the State Secretariat;
B) Work in the Collector's offices;
C) Work in treasury and accounts;
D) Acquaintance with settlement and land records;
E) Work in Police office and inspection of Police stations;
F) Work in development Departments such as agriculture, cooperation, panchayats, community development and extension service; and irrigation works;

G) Work in sub-divisional office; and
H) Magisterial and other judicial work.

Thus the probationers get practical training in the fields of revenue, magistracy, judicial, development and general administration. After completing practical training, the IAS official is posted to hold a junior post in any sub-division, or the district or the state secretariat[1].

On-the-job training has a very long tradition in India. Even the members of higher civil service in India had to undergo this training for a long time. Even in United Kingdom on-the-job training has always received greater recognition than formal courses in an institution or the universities. All this is not to suggest that on-the-job training is in any way an inferior form of training compared to institutional training. On-the-job training is closest to administrative reality. As such if properly organized it is likely to hold the interest of the trainees to a greater extent than institutional training. Moreover institutional instruction can never be a complete substitute for on-the-job training. Administration is an art. Certain activities and processes cannot be taught but have to be learnt by doing.

D. TRAINING FOR WHAT?

In this section an attempt will be made to analyse the extent to which this training at the academy is relevant for the future administrators of India and what purposes are served by it.

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1 B. Prasad, op. cit., p. 176.

I Potter's Study

Since great importance is attached to the IAS training programme at the N.A.A. (National Academy of Administration), it is interesting to study how the probationers think about their training programme. David C. Potter interviewed sixty-five direct recruits to the IAS[1]. The sample of direct recruits was as follows:

TABLE 6: IAS officers interviewed for this study

Cadre	number interviewed (by batch)									
	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	total interviewed	Total of direct recruits in cadre (batches 1958-64)	% to total
Bihar	5	-	4	-	6	-	2	17	49	36 %
Madras	5	-	6	-	2	-	1	14	39	36 %
Maharashtra	1	-	4	7	3	1	2	18	49	39 %
Rajasthan	2	1	3	4	1	1	4	16	32	5o %
Total	13	1	17	11	12	2	9	65	169	4o %

Source: David C. Potter, Relevance of Training for Indian Administrative Service, The Political Science Review (University of Rajstan. Department of Political Science, Joipur, INDIA) Vol. 8 (3-4), 1969, p. 325-346.

1 Potter, op. cit., p. 326.

The sample represents 4o % of the 169 direct recruits in these four states who completed their training between 196o and 1966. Their views may be taken to represent fairly the views of all IAS officers in these states trained during the same period.

The research done by Potter revealed that most of the IAS officers perceive their training to be largely irrelevant to their subsequent behaviour as civil servants. They were critical of the syllabus and quality of instruction at the National Academy of Administration. The most common complaints were that:

(1) the training is too general and academic and does not relate very clearly to the post they have held subsequently in the IAS;

(2) discipline is lax and few probationers take the Academy very seriously;

(3) there is a lack of individual contact with the Director, the professors and other staff members;

(4) the quality of instruction at the Academy does not compare favourably with the quality of instruction in the colleges from which probationers come;

(5) as regards the syllabus as presently designed, the lecture(s) on linguistics, for example, drew the sharpest and most consistent criticism[1].

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1 Potter, Relevance of Training for Indian Administrative Service, op. cit., p. 328.

But most of the officers admitted that there are "certain intangible benefits" due to their presence in the Academy. The Academy (a) broadens one's outlook, and helps to (b) build IAS esprit de corps. Regarding (a), all the officers who have studied science in the universities, admitted that the Academy curriculum broadened their background. All the officers agreed that mixing with the probationers from all states of the country was beneficial in building an all India outlook. The year at Mussoorie developed a spirit of camaraderie that is carried through life[1]. One IAS informant put it like this:

> "I can go anywhere in India and put up (i.e. stay) with a batch mate (i.e. someone who became a member of the Service the same year). He may not even belong to the same state. This was unheard of in the old India. (Then) you only stayed with relatives (or possibly with) someone from your village or area"[2].

Regarding (b) many officers claimed that the Academy imparted a sense of confidence before they proceeded to their new posts. It helped them to build up some common identification of interests.

II Bhambhri's study

Bhambhri also made a study of the training programme to the IAS officers. His study is a "complete coverage" of the IAS officers who joined the service

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1 Potter, Relevance of Training for Indian Administrative Service, op. cit., p. 327.

2 Taub, op. cit., p. 33.

in July 1969. For about two years they remained trainees. The questionnaire was sent to 98 probationers in May-June 1971. 8o probationers filled in the questionnaire and returned to the author. This study is based on the information available from these 8o respondents[1].

To the question whether the training at the Academy was useful, somewhat useful, or useless, the response was as follows:

TABLE 7: Response of IAS officers to training at the Academy

Useful	55.o %
Somewhat useful	33.7 %
Useless	11.2 %
N=8o	

A supplementary question was asked to all the probationers i.e. "Why do you think so?" The answers have been tabulated in the following way:

TABLE 8: Responses regarding nature of Training Programme

Nature of reply:	Respondents in Percentage:
1. Emphasis is only on theory	3o.o %
2. Training appeared good for future work	28.7 %
3. It imparts administrative knowledge and brings a change in attitudes	28.7 %
4. Others (incompetent staff, new devices were needed)	6.2 %
N.R.	6.2 %
N=8o	

1 C.P. Bhambhri, op. cit., p. 125-128.

The probationers were asked another question too: "What aspects of training courses have been of practical value to you during your stay in the field?" The following table shows how the trainees evaluated the different courses of studies in the Academy.

TABLE 9: Rating of courses for practical utility by the IAS Trainees

Courses:	
1. Teaching of Law, Acts, Land Revenue	33.7 %
2. Law and Public Administration	23.7 %
3. Language and Law	11.2 %
4. Law and Economics	1o.7 %
5. Others	18.9 %
6. Nothing	2.5 %

N=8o

The table reveals that all the probationers considered law as the most important subject for practical use. Only 2.5 % of the respondents did not find any practical utility of the subjects taught in the Academy.

Bhambhri further asked the respondents whether training developed any administrative skills in them. The responses are tabulated below. (Table 1o).

55.o % of the respondents agreed that training helped them to know more about development administration. On the other hand 45.o % felt that training did not help in the development of initiative.

TABLE 1o: Responses regarding Development of Administrative Skills by the Training

Statements	Agree	Uncertain	Disagree
1. Training helped you in improving your decision-making skills.	38.7 %	28.7 %	32.5 %
2. Training helped you to improve your ability to deal with the public.	46.2 %	23.7 %	3o.o %
3. Training helped you to learn how to work for developmental administration.	55.o %	13.7 %	31.2 %
4. Training helped learning how to take initiative.	25.o %	3o.o %	45.o %
5. Training helped learning the techniques of co-ordination in administration	46.2 %	21.2 %	32.5 %

N=8o

Both the studies of Potter and Bhambhri revealed the IAS officers' doubts about the relevance of training to their subsequent behaviour as administrators. They would like to relate the training programme in the Academy to their job requirements in the field. As such, designing a training programme for the IAS officers needs careful study and will remain a difficult assignment for the government for some time to come.

E. ON-THE-JOB TRAINING

After finishing the institutional training at the National Academy of Administration, the IAS probationers are sent to the state of their allotment for on-the-job training. At present on-the-job training in the states received by the probationers varies from state to state, the average being 12 months[1]. Different states offer different types of training programmes: (a) "those providing a detailed and extensive on-the-job training and (b) those providing a combination of field and institutional training"[2].

Each IAS probationer is attached to a senior administrator (usually a District Officer or a Sub-Divisional Officer) or administrators in the revenue and other departments. He is expected to learn by "doing the job". But the problem is to find out sufficient number of efficient senior administrators who can discharge the training responsibilities effectively. "It is one of the unfortunate features of the present time that there are few officers left in the district capable of imparting the right training to the IAS"[3]. The number of senior administrators are less compared to the number of probationers recruited each year. "The trouble has been that the senior officer who is supposed to supervise the

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1 See Table 5 for the period of training in the various states of India.

2 S.P. Jagota, Training of Public Servants in India, in Braibanti and Spengler (eds.), Administration and Economic Development in India, Duke Uni Press, 1963, p. 83.

3 A.D. Gorwala, Report on Public Administration, op.cit p. 60.

training of the juniors attached to him gets so tied up with the other commitments that he does not have much time to spare for training"[1]. Again, there is the danger that "if the new entrants who are very impressionistic, come in contact with old and indifferent superiors, they may develop such attitudes as indifference and cynicism in the formative years of their administrative careers"[2].

We have just examined the inadequacies of on-the-job training. Perhaps this has led to the establishment of training schools in some of the states of India. The contents of the state training school is prepared to suit the local conditions. The IAS probationers are also required to have the training in combination with trainees in the state civil service. But "the usefulness of the training school depends not only upon the satisfactory planning and conduct of courses of instruction in the institute but also upon its ability to integrate formal instruction in the institute with practical training in the field"[3].

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1 H. LAL, Personnel Administration, Training Abstracts - 12. Department of Personnel, Cabinet Secretariat, New Delhi, October 1970, p. 26.

2 Conference on Training, Feb. 24-25 1969, Training Division, Ministry of Home Affairs, p. 92.

3 Conference on Training, op. cit., p. 93.

F. UNIVERSITIES

In most of the developing countries universities and governmental personnel experience some difficulties in establishing mutually satisfactory relationships. Thecommon criticism is that the university people consider the government people as "behind the times" and unaware of modern theories. On the other hand government people think that the professors are too much attached to their "ivory towers" to understand the day-to-day problems of administration[1].

Besides, as a by-product of national movement, the relationship between the civil administrators (specially the ICS) and the university administrators in India during the British rule was very sensitive. The universities in India were more or less sympathetic towards the freedom movement and were looked with suspicion by the Indian Civil Service. However with the attainment of independence, this misunderstanding has been removed but it would take a long time to establish a mutual respectable relationships between them.

There are very few universities in India properly equipped to take the responsibility of providing proper training to the higher civil servants. Besides, when the training function would be organised in a state, government would have to rely on the universities located in that state. Unfortunately there are only few states having good universities with

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1 Elwyn A. Mauck, Some Obstacles to the Improvement of Teaching Methods in Developing Countries, in Donald C. Stone (ed.), Education in Public Administration, Brussels 1963, p. 186.

faculties for administrative science. Again there is the problem of tailoring the teaching programme according to the needs of higher civil servants. Teaching of administrative science is a new phenomenon and mostly academic in character. It may take some more years to develop practical orientation as it has been in the universities in western countries. Government, for the time being, cannot depend on the universities for training of civil servants.

The training programme at the National Academy of Administration aims at two objectives which can hardly be achieved. The objectives are (a) to remedy the deficiency of the university system and (b) to increase the intellectual vigour of the trainees. As regards (a) there is a crisis in college and university education which has been attributed to various causes. There is lack of discipline, and frustration leading to students strikes. A large number of students pursue courses in which they have no interest except that it earns them a degree at the end. The training course at the Academy is designed to remedy these defects. The trainees are required to attend all classes punctually. There is too much emphasis on law and order. Apart from the instruction in various subjects, constant efforts are made to give the trainees the advantage of meeting eminent persons of the country by inviting them to the Academy, with a view to stimulate interest in current problems. The Academy also encourages sports. Horse riding stays as part of the training even if it is considered a "western" sport. A motor mechanics course has also been included[1].

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1 Promila Kalhan, Re-tailoring the bureaucracy. The Hindustan Times Weekly, Feb. 25th 1973, p. 8.

Car driving and horse riding are compulsory because the bulk of the people are still living in the rural areas. The IAS officer not only must be able to drive his car and look after routine maintenance of the car, but also be able to ride a horse and go in the interior, mix with people at their own level and have intimate knowledge of their needs. Thus the training at the Academy solves some of the defficiency of the Indian university system.

Regarding (b) it is doubtful whether the Academy helps to increase the intellectual vigour of the trainees. The probationers have little time to pursue any discipline seriously. There are hardly any research facilities for the probationers. Of course the Academy conducts research on some aspects of public administration. But these are based on field studies done by the staff of the Academy. Further, the method of teaching at the Academy is just like any other university, based on lectures and the reproduction of the same contents by the trainees. The Academy also duplicates the university system by relying too much on the final examination conducted by the Union Public Service Commission after the end of the training. These factors suggest that the inadequacies of the university system cannot be compensated by the National Academy of Administration.

G. SOME ADDITIONAL REMARKS

The emergence of National Academy of Administration has been a characteristic of development politics. When India became an independent sovereign state,

most of the British ICS officers left India. It was decided that the Indian Administrative Service should be organised to take the place of the Indian Civil Service and the recruitment and initial training should be done by the Central Government.

In formulating the programme of training suitable for the new Civil Servants, the main points kept in view were:

a) The entirely Indian composition of the new Civil Service;
b) the new constitutional position and the establishment of a free democratic government in India which would require acivil service quite different from thecolonial Service of the British regime; and
c) the transformation of government from a mainly law-and-order government to a government charged with the duty of promoting public welfare in all spheres, and the consequent extension of governmental activities in social and economic spheres[1].

We have already analysed the training programme designed for the civil servants of the independent India. Institutional training for the IAS officers has been accepted as a policy by the central government. Besides more emphasis has been given on training, that "for example (a) what is wrong with these public services is lack of training, and training will remedy these defects and turn them

1 INDIAN ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE, Training School, 1952 (Ministry of Home Affairs of India), p. 3.

into adequate public services; (b) training is normal, essential part of every public service and public services in developing countries ought, therefore, have training"[1]. But the training could as well have a negative effect by re-inforcing established but inappropriate forms of administration like training in procedures or where the training quality itself is poor.

All developing countries realise that training is necessary and fundamental to the development. "It is not cheap, but its rewards are out of all proportion to the expenditure devoted to it"[2]. An evalution process to assess the rewards in terms of practical utility of the training programme has been subject to comparative research in many of the institutes specialising on developing countries. For the present, one may argue that if the irrelevance of the IAS training, in the light of the analysis already made, is accepted, "then one is bound to say that the present training design for the IAS, particularly the delightful outing at Mussoorie, (N.A.A.) is an extravagance in terms of money and talent which can be more usefully employed elsewhere"[3].

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1 B.B. Schaffer, Bureaucratic Change in New States (paper discussed on 4th March 197o. Institute of Common wealth studies-Post graduate Seminar) London University

2 Quoted by Schaffer, ibid, p. 2.

3 David C. Potter, Relevance of Training for IAS, op. cit., p. 346.

CHAPTER V

THE IAS: A SOURCE OF TENSION BETWEEN THE CENTRE AND THE STATES

A. REASONS FOR THE RETENTION OF AN ALL-INDIA SERVICE

India is a federal state. One must therefore consider separately the civil service of the centre and those of the states. India as a federal state is, however, unusual in one way. Besides, the civil service of the centre and that of the states, there exists a third category of services described as all-India Services, which are common to the centre and the states. The members of these Services are allotted to work under state governments but are centrally recruited. Their conditions of service are finally determined by the central government though only in consultation with the state governments. The Indian Administrative Service and the Indian Police Service belong to such services[1].

Recruitment to the Indian Administrative Service, as we have seen, is on an all-India basis. On recruitment each officer is allotted to a particular state cadre and he virtually never serves any other state. The state government cannot take any serious disciplinary action against a member of the IAS cadre without the concurrence and approval of the centre. Within the state administration, all the top-ranking positions in the districts as well as in the state secretariat are occupied by the members

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1 Three more all-India Services were created in 1962, viz., the All-India Service of Engineers, the Indian Forest Service and Indian Medical Service, thus making these services five now. There is also a proposal now to create an All-India Educational Service.

of IAS cadre. The senior posts in the central secretariat and in other important central government agencies are generally manned by IAS officers on deputation from the states. The centre obtains IAS officers from the states by borrowing them; by agreement of the state government and the consent of the individual concerned. This arrangement provides for a rotation of officers and give them a variety of experience which is of advantage both to the centre and the states.

This arrangement, that an all-India service shall manage the affairs of the states and the centre, is considered essential to ensure a high standard of efficiency and performance in administration. The Administrative Reform Commission wrote in its report:

> "At the time of Independence, two new all-India services, viz., the Indian Administrative Service and Indian Police Service, were created, the existing members of the old ICS and IP being borne on the new cadres. The intention of having all-India Services was mainly to ensure uniformly high standards of administration in all states in key activities, to provide for interchange of experience between the states and the centre, and to obtain, where needed, the experience of State administration at the decision-making levels at the Centre"[1].

During the colonial rule the purpose in forming all-India services was to attract young graduates from the British universities and to retain in their

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1 A.R.C. Report, Personnel Administration, New Delhi, Manager of Publications, April 1969, p. 7.

hands authority at different administrative levels from top to bottom. These considerations have no longer any relevance after India became independent. Under the changing situation different considerations have influenced to retain the all-India services. Asok Chanda writes:

> 1) It is obvious that in any administration, more so in a developing economy, the services should have the best available talent in the country as a whole. All-India basis of recruitment alone makes this possible.
>
> 2) Secondly, the all-India composition of the services with personnel drawn from all the states emphasizes the unity of India and encourages the development of a national point of view. Equally, it ensures that the administration of every state has a leavening of officers from outside whose vision and outlook are not circumscribed by a parochial horizon.
>
> 3) Thirdly, the control of these officers vest jointly in the state and the union government. This provides for a measure of remote control which by its very nature is more objective. The officers are, therefore, able to fulfil their responsibilities without being subjected unduly to the stresses and strains of local influence.
>
> 4) Fourthly, All-India recruitment provides for the attainment of a minimum and uniform standard in the administration of the country as a whole[1].

The retention of all-India services in India is unusual in some way. The present ruling party is in favour of its retention and wants to create more

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1 Asok Chanda, Federalism in India, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1965, p. 106.

all-India services in the different fields of India's economic and social administration. The ARC report confirms to this:

> "The all-India Services have come to stay. The concepts underlying the all-India services, namely, common recruitment which seeks to ensure uniform standards of administration in all the States, and the availability of experience gained in different parts of the country to the higher administration at the centre are valid. More all-India services are being contemplated in different fields of administration in the States and at the Centre. We would urge their early formation. It is, of course, obvious that such all-India Services would be in a position to function effectively only if Centre-State relations continue to rest on a sound and cordial basis"[1].

This extract reveals the fact that all-India service to be effective depends on a better relationship between states and centre. Since the Services involve a dual control (in fact, predominant Central control) states do not take very kindly to their formation, as they take all-India services i.e. IAS as media of interference into their area of activity. This brings to the forefront the issue of the formation of all-India Services and the states' general opposition to its creation.

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1 ARC Report, op. cit., pp. 15.
Personnel Administration

B. THE STATES' INDIFFERENCE AND OPPOSITION TO ALL-INDIA SERVICES

The Rajya Sabha[1] is empowered to organize a new all-India service under the article 312 of the Constitution. Although constituionally, it is not necessary to consult the states regarding the formation of all-India services, the consent of the states should be taken when a new all-India service is to be constituted.

This seems to be an essential condition for the proper functioning of the services and their acceptibility of the people of the states.

The opposition of state government to the creation of all-India services has a certain logic to it. Under the British rule the country was divided into different administrative units. The members of all-India services worked independently of the wishes and aspirations of the people. But in the new set-up, the previous administrative units of the territory have become autonomous states. People of each state are partners in a common enterprise and a common goal. Asok Chanda writes:

> "The whole-hearted association and identification of the people with matters which concern them, more particularly welfare measures, is of vital importance. The constitution of services organised on an all-India basis has been construed as running counter to this conception. The opposition to a large-scale reconstruction of all-India

1 The Legislature of the Union, which is called "Parliament", consists of two Houses known as Rajya Sabha (Council of States) and Lok Sabha (House of the People).

services cannot be lightly dismissed as mere narrow provincialism"[1]

The states oppose the formation of all-India services for various reasons. The all-India services have to be remunerated on a higher level than the state public services. This imposes a heavy financial burden on the states. Secondly the joint control of the all-India services with the centre as the final authority in case of dispute puts the states in a very disadvantageous position. That members of IAS cadre look towards the centre for protection may be detrimental to the state's political authority. One may further inquire what happens when the state governments have not the necessary control over their higher civil servants particularly when they are so much responsible for the vast development projects. Thirdly local candidates of some of the backward states fail to compete successfully in all-India competition. Practically, it means that all-India services operating within these states will be filled by persons from other states[2]. "It also results in heightened tension between the centrally appointed officers and state politicians who often resent the very effort of these officers to resist their pressures. These tensions are particularly great in states like Orissa and Madhya Pradesh which have substantial numbers of centrally appointed officers from other states in prominent position..."[3]. The study of Taub on the

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1 Asok Chanda, Indian Administration, George Allen & Union Ltd., p. 1o5.

2 Ibid, p. 1o5-1o7.

3 Myron Weiner (ed.), State Politics in India, Priceton University Press, Princeton, 1968, p, 22,23

state of Orissa also confirms this[1]. Orissa failed to produce candidates of all-India standard for several years after 1947. Orissa was a poor area and few people could afford to provide higher education to their children. As a result, Orissa is severely under-represented in the higher ranks. The following table shows the positions of twenty top-ranking men in Orissa's administration and their home states.

TABLE 11 : Home States of the Twenty Top Ranking Men in Orissa

Position Held	Home State
Chief Secretary	Madras
Member, Board of Revenue	Madras
Additional Chief Secretary	Madhya Pradesh
Revenue Divisional Commissioner, North	Orissa
Additional Development Commissioner	Andhra Pradesh
Commissioner for Panchayati Raj	Bombay
Revenue Divisional Commissioner, South	Bengal
Revenue Divisional Commissioner, Center	Madras
Secretary, Supply and Commerce	Bengal
Secretary, Irrigation and Power	Punjab
Secretary, Finance	Bengal
Secretary, Industry, Mining and Geology	Bengal
Secretary, Agriculture	Orissa
Commissioner, Commercial Taxes	Uttar Pradesh
Additional Secretary, Industries	Madras
Secretary, Home and Education	Madras
Secretary, Health	Punjab
Secretary, Cooperatives	Bengal
Managing Director, Mining Corporation	Madras
Secretary, Works and Transport	Orissa

Source: See below

1 Taub, op. cit., p. 128.

It has certainly produced a lot of resentment in the state of Orissa, that the best positions have been occupied by 'outsiders'. The developed states like Madras and Maharashtra do not face such problems and there are fewer 'outsiders' working in these states in influential positions. Fourthly, the all-India services form an elite corps of officers from whom state public services may feel alienated and this may hamper economic development.

According to some critics there is a certain advantage in having all-India services posted in the different states of India. Our economy is under-developed. Until it achieves full employment, a large-scale migration of people from one state to another is not possible.In the absence of such migration of people, it is necessary to send educated persons from one state to another which helps them to look upon other parts of the country as their own. Posting the members of all-India services to different states partially serves this purpose[1]. But little effort has been done to establish an empirical base for such propositions.

What degree of control the state governments regard as effective to check the all-India services has still to be spelt out in detail. Since the members of the IAS belong to all-India services, they enjoy considerable protection from the harassment of state politicians. Their scales of pay and promotion opportunities to higher grades are all determined by the central government. Every IAS officer re-

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1 Dr. A. Krishnaswami, The Indian Union and the States Pergamon Press, 1965, p. 59-6o.

cruited is permanently alloted to a state. Whether he works in that state or in the national government for several years, he is always identified with the state of his allotment. "He is by no means a bird of passage in a state administrative organization"[1].

C. THE IAS AND THE PROBLEM OF ADJUSTMENT WITH STATE POLITICS

The IAS personnel, as we have seen, are distributed among the different states and are expected to adjust to the demands of the state politics. We will now make an attempt to analyse their problem of adjustment to state politics. In this context, the performance of IAS officers fell in one of the following categories: (I) The IAS official could not adjust well to the state politcs, (II) The IAS official adjusted well to the state politics.

I Those who could not adjust well

During the post-Independence period many ICS/IAS officers resigned from the service because the norms of administrative efficiency came into conflict with the demands of the state's political leaders. Dr. Nabgopal Das, ICS, resigned while he was serving the state of West-Bengal. He writes:

> "There now functioned an administration in which decisions were taken by only one man (Dr. B.C. Roy, Chief Minister), who would

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1 Winston W. Crouch, "Civil Service in India", Public Personnel Review, Vol. 17 No. 2, 1956, p. 88.

> often impatiently brush aside advice given by senior officers. I do not deny that, in a problem State like West-Bengal, a certain degree of firmness was both necessary and desirable, but I have always held that even the most well-meaning dictator cannot rise above his predilections and prejudices and these latter need not necessarily be always for the common good. It was not, therefore, to be wondered that the Chief Minister and I often clashed. The climax came in 1958 when, as Special Secretary, Home Department, in charge of anti-corruption and enforcement of some special laws, I started submitting reports on corruption and other malpractices in high places and desired that action be taken against certain individuals. A gentle hint was given to me that I should 'go slow' with these enquiries. I was even promised a better assignment if only I would be a little more accomodating. Unfortunately, I was far too pig-headed to listen to such counsel. The result was a virtual deadlock causing considerable agony and worry to me"[1].

The case of N. Baksi, ICS, also deserves mentioning. Baksi narrates his experience about the manner in which the ruling party of the Bihar was subjecting him to humiliation and prosecution of all kinds in the following words:

> "The unmerrited harassment, humiliation and persecution, meted out to me for doing what

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1 Dr. Nabgopal Das, "My Life in the ICS", Kewal L. Panjabi (ed.). "The Civil Servant in India", Bombay, Bhartiya Vidya Bhawan, 1969, pp. 263-264.

> I considered to be only my duty as civil servant, continued to create a cumulative feeling of frustration, not unmixed with revolt... On the 16th March 1959, in a short letter, addressed to the Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs, I sought permission to resign prematurely from the Indian Civil Service. The only reason given was that 'my spirit was not in harmony with the official environment of my life'"[1].

N.B. Bonarjee was the Chief-Secretary of Uttar Pradesh. He resigned from the ICS as he could not adapt to the 'altered administrative ethic' of the state's political leadership. He writes:

> "The conversion of Administration into a playground for political parties together with its re-orientation towards largely personal ends, even under the guise of socialism or social democracy, did not seem to me to be in the true interest of the country any more than the corruption, nepotism, inefficiency and regionalism which were openly fostered by all parties after Independence. Nor was I in agreement with the apparent ease with which so many of my Service colleagues rejected the old in favour of the new values. This being the case, and since I found myself unable to fit snugly into the altered administrative ethic, resignation was the only straightforward course"[2].

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1 N. Baksi, "In Bihar - The State of My Adoption", Kewal L. Panjabi (ed.), op. cit., p. 211.

2 N.B. Bonarjee, 'Under Two Masters', Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 254-255.

How many higher civil servants resigned from the services because they could not adjust to the state politics, cannot be answered in absence of any systematic study on the subject. In any case "there have been few resignations, even from the top category of civil servants... T hey have bowed down to what they consider inevitable"[1]

II Those who adjusted well

On the basis of the available evidence, it can well be said that the number of higher civil servants who resigned due to maladjustment with the political leaders are few. It seems a majority of IAS officials tried to do their best in the states of their allotment. Various factors account for this adjustment. A vast number of efficient administrators are needed to execute the development plans at the state levels.

The formulation of development plans and the allocation of financial recourses will not by themselves ensure fulfilment, unless competent administrative manpower is made available to the states. The IAS officers, recruited on a nation-wide basis, serve this purpose and continue to be the backbone of development administration in the states. The state leaders know that IAS officers being the members of all-India services cannot be easily influenced by the former. Moreover the IAS officers know that the state leaders control their

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1 H.K. Paranjape, 'A Trojan Inheritance' in SEMINAR, No. 84 August 1966, Bombay, p. 33.

posting both inside the state and to the centre as well. Every IAS officer wants to join the central secretariat in New Delhi after serving a few years in the state to which he is alloted. The central secretariat opens many new opportunities for him. This being the case, every IAS officer wants to work efficiently in the state. Bhambhri writes:

> "... a vast majority of IAS officers have worked efficiently and impartially in the states because it was in their own interest to do so. In a rational model of bureaucracy climbing up in the ladder is a legitimate aspiration. This aspiration of the IAS officers to be promoted to the higher posts in the central government has proved useful because it has kept them efficient and honest. Some enlightened state leaders were interested in clean and efficient administration, and the IAS personnel got on very well with them"[1].

But it is worth mentioning that too many IAS officers like to be posted to the central secretariat before they acquire sufficient experience in the states. Once they come to country's capital,they try to stay there permanently. In effect they spend their rest of the service career under the national government. What was originally intended, was a frequent interchange between the central secretariat and the state or district level of administration in order to prevent the development of central

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1 Bhambhri, C.P., Administrators in a changing society, National Publishing House, Delhi 1972, p. 147-148.

secretariat mentality. What is now happening is a 'one way' traffic to the centre which must be causing a lot of annoyance to the states.

The recruitment to the IAS, as we know,.is done through open competition on an all-India basis. Further, the constitution provides that no serious disciplinary action shall be taken against the IAS officials by the states without the prior permission of the centre[1]. But for the rest of the working condition the constitution is not clear, leaving the IAS official to find out his 'personal equation' with the state government. This gives an upper hand to the state government to harass him, if it is interested to do so. The best method adopted by the state government to get rid of an inefficient or uncompromising officer has been to transfer him frequently or to post him to any remote corner of the state without any modern amenities of life. To the administrator, this is certainly a source of irritation.

In a democracy, the role of ministers is to provide both leadership and general supervision. They must be able to inspire confidence in the civil servant and give necessary incentive and encouragement. Instead, "they get involved in all kinds of petty details, like who gets assigned to what job"[2] and interested in day-to-day matters of transfers and posting. Besides the state government can suspend any IAS official on any flimsy ground.

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1 H.M. Join, 'The Union Executive', Chaitanya Publishing House, Allahabad 1969, p. 284-285.

2 Taub, op. cit. p. 109.

The central government, cannot ask a state government not to proceed with an enquiry against an official or not to suspend him[1].

These factors certainly affect the moral of the services and clearly reveal how higher bureaucrats as an institution become a source of tension between the central government and the states.

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1 All-India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1967, Rules 3 & 7.

CHAPTER VI

THE IAS : THE PROBLEM OF NEUTRALITY

A. SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Political neutrality of civil servants means that they should not openly support any particular political ideology and should serve the government in power faithfully irrespective of its political complexion. Further it assures that the ultimate decisions of the ministers will be loyally accepted and faithfully carried out. "Unwillingness to give officials any extensive political freedom is not due to mere caprice; it is due to the recognition, sometimes clear, sometimes vague, of the profound public importance of impartiality in the civil service - and it is a widespread and insistent recognition"[1]. Many of the modern European countries like Weimar Germany, France, and Britain put their civil servants under strict prohibitions regarding the use of political rights. This was designed to serve political neutrality. The question is whether under present conditions ,when the role of the civil servant has changed from a moral and political eunuch to that of a centre of social cooperation,this political neutrality should be maintained. In this changed context, it is necessary once again to examine the question of political rights of the civil servants.

The civil servant is an official and as an official he has got some powers and responsibilities. He is

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1 Herman Finer, Theory and Practice of Modern Government, (Henry Holt and Company, New York 1949), p. 882.

also a citizen. As a citizen he is expected to have a voice in the affairs of the state and is supposed to play an active role in the public life. But the public interest demands that some amount of impartiality of the civil servant is necessary and that there should be certain restrictions on their political rights. Thus there is a conflict between two principles: "between the desires and interests of the civil servant , regarded as a citizen, and the duty of the civil servant, regarded as such"[1]. We may now make an attempt to analyse this dilemma in the context of the Indian situation. Before we take up the Indian situation, it will be interesting to compare it briefly with some other West-European country.

In many of the West-European countries, a civil servant can offer himself as a candidate for parliament, but, if he is elected, he has to resign his civil service post before taking his seat in the legislature. In Western Germany, Hiscocks writes:

> "There was nothing to prevent him taking part in Land and local politics. He could stand for election to the Bundestag, take part in the campaigns, and retain his post as a civil servant if unsuccessful. Subsequent legislation even provided that if elected to the Bundestag he could retire on pension, and then apply for reinstatement on the active list when he ceased to be a member"[2].

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1 Quoted by Leon D. Epstein, "Political Sterilization of Civil servants: The United States and Great Britain", Public Administration Review, Autumn 1950, p. 284.

2 Richard Hiscocks, Democracy in Western Germany, Oxford University Press, 1957, p. 206.

Further the experience shows that the official element in German legislature has provided some of the best legislators. The civil servant in Germany through his experience looks at the political problem from a broad point of view. He can no longer afford to remain detached. "In the absence of a leisured class he is one of the few members of modern society who, provided he retains his status and pension rights, can afford to serve in parliament"[1].

In France, a civil servant has similarly to vacate his post if he is elected to the legislature. He may return to his post with full promotion and pension rights if he loses or resigns his seat[2]. In Norway, Denmark and Sweden, a civil servant is not debarred from becoming a member of the legislature[3].

Herman Finer classifies political rights in the following manner:[4] (1) rights concerning the exercise of vote and general political activity, (2) rights in respect of candidature for legislative assemblies. In India, the constitution guarantees the right of franchise to every Indian citizen who is not less than 21 years of age and who does not

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1 Ibid, p. 207. For further detail see Eschenburg, Theodor, Bemerkungen zur deutschen Bürokratie, Mannheim 1955.

2 P. Williams, Politics in Post-War France, Longmans, Green & Co., 2nd ed. 1958, p. 192.

3 B.A. Arneson, The Democratic Monarchies in Scandinavia. New York, D. Van Nostracht, 1949, p. 150.

4 Herman Finer, op. cit., p. 878.

suffer from other disqualifications. But the civil servants, unlike the ordinary citizens, are not free to give an indication to the public of the manner in which they propose to vote or have voted. They are also forbidden to canvass or use their influence in an election to any legislature or local authority. Even the rules provided that the display by a member of the civil service on his person, vehicles or residence of any electoral symbol should be deemed to amount to using his influence in the election. The civil servants are not expected to attend election meetings. The instructions issued by the central government provide that government servants should not attend election meetings organised by any political party, except to the extent necessary for maintaining law and order[1].

In India the civil servant cannot stand for election to either House of Parliament[2] or to either House of the legislature of a state[3]. In other words, the right to parliamentary candidature has not been conceded to the civil servants in India. They are required first to resign and then to contest the elections.

The restrictions imposed on the political rights of the civil servants in India are severe and by far

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1 Article 326, Indian Constitution. See also All India Services (conduct) Rules, 1954.

2 Article 102 (1) (a), Indian Constitution.

3 Article 191 (1) (a), Indian Constitution.

outdated. While we have accepted a democratic way of political life, it will be generally agreed that we are still a very imperfect democratic community. The higher civil servants today, through their education and training, are one of the most conscious and articulate sections of the populations. To deprive all of them of any opportunity to participate in the debate of political issues would amount to disfranchising a large section of the educated people in a developing country. It is not surprising that the civil service associations are demanding the grant and extension of their political rights[1].

The main object behind this restriction is to ensure a civil servant's detachment from public controversies so that public confidence in his impartiality and fairness may remain unimpaired. One of the underlying assumptions of the permanent civil service is that whatever party is in power the civil servants should serve the government of the day with complete loyality and devotion. The public as well as the political parties should have complete trust in their neutrality and impartiality. The Second Pay Commission (1957-59) examined this question in some detail. The Commission write in their report:

> "The essential conditions for permeating civil servants to engage in political activity are an assurance that they would be able to keep their personal political affiliations

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1 The ICS and IAS have one association known as Indian Civil and Administrative Services Association. It is an all-India association with branches in each state.

> and activities, and their public duties, wholly apart, and that the public would accept that such a separation could be, and was in fact being, made"[1].

The Commission further write that such conditions do not exist in India and "what may be sound and feasible in homogeneous community like that in the United Kingdom, with a long-established tradition of democratic government may not necessarily be sound and feasible in India"[2]. The Commission came to the "conclusion that change or relaxation in the existing restrictions on the political rights of civil servants would not be in a public interest, or the interest of the employees themselves"[3].

The British approach to the problem can be seen in the Masterman Committee Report:

> "There is finally to be considered the harmful effect upon the service itself if the political allegiance of individual civil servants became generally known to their superior officers and colleagues. If a Minister began to consider whether A, on account of his party views, might be more capable of carrying out his policy than B, the usefulness of B would be limited and the opportunities of A would be unfairly improved. This would become known and a tendency to trim the sails to the prevailing

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1 The Second Pay Commission Report (1957-59), Ministry of Finance, Government of India, 1959 New Delhi, p. 533.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

wind would be one consequence. Another would be a cynicism about the reasons for promotion very damaging to morale ... The danger is, we believe, a real one"[1].

Professor Eschenburg in his study 'Herrschaft der Verbände' has dealt with the problems of party influence and political activity in West Germany. He points out, that when the state-secretary in a ministry is appointed for political reasons, the officials working under him are affected. Under a coalition government, when the state-secretary comes from a different party than that of the Minister, he tends to become a kind of rival minister which must be causing a lot of uneasiness to the minister concerned. In his 'Bemerkungen zur deutschen Bürokratie", he writes that sometimes a minister prefers an official who is loyal to his party. In such cases the officials get promotion for their political opinions rather than competence or seniority[2].

There is a wide-spread feeling in India that many ministers judge the civil servant not by their administrative competence but by their willingness and ability to do things which the ministers wish them to do. The Administrative Reforms commission have pointed out:

"Instances are not wanting of ministers prefering a convenient subordinate to a strong one,

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1 Report of the Committee on the Political Activities of Civil Servants (Masterman Committee) London, HMSO (CMD 7718), p. 16, quoted in Second Pay Commission Report, pp. 532-533.

2 R. Hiscocks, op. cit., p. 207.

thereby making the latter not only ineffective but a sulky and unwilling worker"[1].

Thus the danger in India is no doubt a real one. The grant of political rights to a civil servant requires "a considerable degree of self-discipline on the part of the civil servant, and a temperate political climate; parties must not be divided by questions of fundamental constitutional importance, nor anxious to use the public service as a spoils system"[2]. These conditions are not available in India. So there is little hope to remove the restrictions on political activities by civil servants. These arguments appear very cogent but one cannot subscribe to them in full. The political neutralisation of the higher civil servants, which includes a highly educated and intelligent section of the community in a developing country like India would seem to constitute a repudiation of institutional arrangement which plays an important role in a democratic country. Moreover any policy which debars the higher civil servant from effective participation in political activity will reduce the growth of leadership in the higher ranks of the bureaucracy. What the Committee on the review of the Kenya Institute of Administration writes of Kenya has wider application: "The civil servant can no longer afford to remain detached, and the concept of emotional involvement in national objectives becomes more and more fundamental to the evolution of the

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1 Administrative Reforms Commission, Report on the machinery of the Government of India and Its Procedures of Work, New Delhi, Manager of Publications, 1968, p. 56.

2 B. Chapman, op. cit., pp. 288-289.

public service ... There is a wide-spread belief that it (the civil service) has inherited from the past a formal attitude of mind which, if a rift is not to develop between it and the political leadership of the nation, must quickly give place to something more than a sense of patriotism, that is to say a heart and soul commitment to new policies, new approaches, and a new impetus towards national reconstruction and national development"[1].

B. THE BASIC DILEMMA

I Pre-independence period

The impact of British rule and education in India produced an elite capable of filling the highest level of government services. The ultimate decisions were in the hands of Indian Civil Servants, many of them were foreigners and did not try to involve in the conflicting interests of the Indian society. The Indian members of the ICS were chosen from persons, who had western education, travelled abroad and thus could be expected to remain above caste, regional and linguistic differentiations. Both British and Indians alike share the responsibility. The Table 2 shows the numbers of British and Indians in the ICS

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1 Quoted by Richard Symonds, op. cit.,p. 264.

from 1859 to 1942, and the increasing pace of Indianisation of the ICS. The increased pace of Indianisation of the ICS was due to British government policy which intended "increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions"[1].

At the time of independence (1947) there were 1,157 ICS officers in India, of which 9 per cent was Muslim, 39 per cent Hindu and 52 per cent British[2]. Virtually none of these British ICS officers stayed on in India after 1947.

During the struggle for independence, "Indian economists vehemently opposed the employment of foreigners into the Indian Civil Service to the exclusion of Indians. They asserted that it was not only a material loss to India but also the moral loss of experience and wisdom"[3]. Throughout the 19th century congress fought for Indianisation of the Service. The Indians were "debarred from entering the service in the name of efficiency and high morale. But the main thing was that the loyality of Indians was doubted and hence the Empire could not be considered secure in the hands of native Civil officers at the top of affairs"[4]. In order to paralyse the British administration in India, Congress called on the Indian administrators to resign from the ICS. A few responded to the appeal of Congress but a majority of Indians in the ICS cadre continued to stay in the Service.

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1 Rupert Wilkinson (ed.), op. cit., p. 174.

2 Braibanti & Spengler (eds.), op. cit., p. 21.

3 V.C.P. Chaudhary, Imperial Policy of British in India, Punthi Pustak. Calcutta 1968, p. 18o.

4 Ibid, p. 253.

Jawarharlal Nehru once accused ICS as "wholly unsuited to a progressive environment... the ICS and similar services must disappear completely as such, before we can start real work on a new order"[1]. But as India achieved independence, there was some reconciliation between the ICS and Congress. The Indians in the ICS cadre were allowed to continue in the Service in a free India.

Wilkinson writes that during the pre-independence days, "all services were trained in the British practice whereby an officer advises his minister on matters of undecided policy, but once the minister has given his decision, the civil servant is required to carry it out without comment"[2]. The question of bureaucracy being committed to any political ideology or any political party did not arise during the British regime.

II Post-independence period

After India has achieved independence, the higher civil servants are involved in politics and political party activities in various ways. This has been a live issue within the community and one sees it in the journals as well. Bhambri writes:[3]

> "(a) Some civil servants joined a political party after retirement, and became its active members. C.C. Desai, N. Dandekar, H.M. Patel, Lobo Probhu are all active in the Swantantra

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1 J. Nehru, Autobiography, London, 1938, p. 442-445.

2 R. Wilkinson, op. cit. p. 178.

3 C.P. Bhambri. FORUM: Should India Have a Committed Bureaucracy?, The Indian Political Science Review. Vol. V (October 197o - March 1971) No. 1, p. 52-53.

> Party. V. Sankar, ICS, who worked with Sardar Patel in the integration of princely states, has joined the princes in their fight against the policy of the government for abolition of the privy purses. Our concern is not a particular party joined by a civil servant. Here the purpose is to show that politically neutral civil servants were itching to join a party after retirement.... It is impossible to believe that this wisdom dawned on them only after retirement.
>
> (b) Indian bureaucracy during Congress Party rule was in collusion with Congress Party leaders and even factional leaders, actively worked for the personal or party interests of the Congress leaders. This was done in return for benefits of promotion and better jobs".

This shows that Indian bureaucracy is not neutral in politics. Bhambri further comments: "In a conflict-ridden society, where forces of extreme Right and extreme Left are trying to pull their weight to demolish the system, how can one believe that highly educated civil servants are neutral and will serve every political party faithfully, fairly and impartially ... Neutrality of civil service presupposes agreement on fundamentals in society. This is not possible in India of today. Hence to say that our civil service is neutral, like many a priori truths, is a deception and falsehood"[1].

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1 C.P. Bhambri, Forum, op. cit., p. 52.

After the elections of 1967, a new phase in India's political life has started. The Congress Party, which dominated the Indian political scene for twenty years, was defeated, "The results seemed to confirm some of the forebodings about 'disintegration' of Congress power and, through that, of political coherence. In the central parliament's lower house, the Lok Sabha, Congress declined from its luxurious 358 members out of 491 to some 28o in a house now of 521 members - a slashing of its overall majority by nearly one-third. In the state assemblies the majorities which had sustained Congress governments everywhere except Kerala were so successfully attacked that in half the states non-Congress parties or coalitions are in power"[1]. The impact of this change had severe implication for the future of centre-state relations. The Congress Party was called upon to run the central government along with the opposition parties controlling the state governments.

Hanson summarized the political trends of the post-1967 election scene in the following words:[2]

"(a) erosion of Congress dominance, particularly in the States;

(b) a shift in the balance of power from Delhi to the state capitals;

(c) an increase in political fluidity, evidenced not only by the greater difficulty of forming stable governments, but by the growing arti-

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1 W.H. Morris-Jones, The Indian Elections: How much has changed? University of London Institute of Commonwealth Studies. Reprint Series No. 3o.

2 Paul Streeten and Michael Lipton (eds.), The Crisis of Indian Planning, Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 52.

-culation and articulateness of interest and attitude groups old (e.g. caste) and new (e.g. trade and profession)."

The victory of Mrs. Gandhi in the elections of 1971 has, for the time being postponed this possibility. Our intention here is not to analyse the effects of the 1967 election. The fundamental issue is about the role of All-India services in this new context of centre-state relationship. One may ask whether the IAS, which was so far implementing the programs and the policies of the 'dominant party' governments alone, would now implement with the same degree of honesty and zeal the policies of the DMK government in Madras, the Communist government in Kerala and the Akali-dominated Coalition in Punjab. Is a system dominated by one party dysfunctional to the neutrality of civil servants? Will the states, under the variously multiparty-constituted governments, restore the balance in its favour? It will be difficult to give any satisfactory answers to these questions without an empirical base. However, the neutrality of civil servants among the parties should not be confused with value neutrality. The former refers to the party programs and policies and the latter refers to cardinal constitutional values of democracy, secularism and social justice. "Fortunately for us, the ideal of a welfare state is not in our country a controversial political issue, it is the goal laid down in the Constitution itself"[1]. So the problem and challenge presented

1 Quoted by P. Sharma, FORUM, op. cit., p. 60.

to us is how to socialise the civil servants into the ideals of a welfare state and at the same time make them neutral in the programmatic sense.

How does the present-day civil servant stand up to these tests? A study team of the Administrative Reforms Commission under the chairmanship of C.D. Deshmukh commented on what it described as the deplorable trend among civil servants to develop loyalities to individual ministers based on caste or regional considerations. Such caste and regional networks damage both the party in power and the general administration. What the study team said applies to the higher ranks of the civil service as well. It is from them that guidance has to come for the wider network of administrators belonging to the all-India services who function at the state and district levels. How can they be expected to develop qualities lacking in those who set the tone and standards of the service?

Potter writes how 'bureaucracy' is involved"with the sole object of secreting papers from the incoming Ministers", in the past as well in recent years in India.

> "... when election results come in announcing major political changes, outgoing ministers as well as permanent civil servants privately confront the question: what do we do with the confidential files? The answer seems pretty straightforward for those ministers who behaved in an excessively partisan manner: destroy or remove any files likely to prove embarrassing if read by the new government. For the non-partisan

> civil servant, who served the previous government loyally and who is equally prepared to serve the incoming government, the answer is less clear-out ... They have an interest in keeping from the incoming politicians any past actions the knowledge of which might jeopardise their working relationship with them"[1].

Potter comes to the conclusion that, "one might be able to measure the extent of political change when new ministries are being formed by observing the size of the bonfires of files at that time in the rear of secretariats"[2]. He admits that this relationship does not hold good for other societies or governments.

The time has come when government of different political complexion will come into power in different parts of the country. With different political parties in power in the centre and in the states, India may have weak governments. The result of this source of weakness may be the growth in the powers of bureaucracy. The powers of Indian Administrative Service will expand to fill the power vacuum in the emerging political pattern. Joseph La Palombara writes:

> "Following independence, the only political structure with any strength and organised sense of purpose is the bureaucracy. To endow this structure with the major responsibility, to set society's goals and to implement them, is certain to impede the development of other

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1 David C. Potter, Political Change And Confidential Government Files in India: 1937. 1947.1967, Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies. Vol. VIII, No. 2 July 197o, p. 142.

2 Ibid, p. 135.

strong political institutions or other important power centers in the society"[1].

The All-India Services certainly, "maintain links in administrative behaviour throughout the country while political changes visit different states and the centre"[2]. This is certainly beneficial for the national integration and unity of the country. But it may assume more power due to the weakening of political elements in the body politic. In India, bureaucracy constitutes something more than a group of civil servants. IAS is at the apex of the system and its members are carefully selected from the intelligent young men with university degrees. This elite corps of administrators really constitutes a powerful pressure group. They may wield great power in fashioning and executing the policies of government. Whether in future, they can successfully adapt to the orders of new masters and the demands of new electorates, is a moot question. Any judgement at present would be premature.

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1 Joseph La Palombara (ed.), Bureaucracy and Political Development, Princeton University Press, 1963, p. 59

2 A.R.C., Report of the Study Team on Centre-State Relationships, Vol. 1, Sept, 1967, New Delhi, p. 24o.

CHAPTER VII

THE IAS : THE PROBLEMS OF BUREAUCRATIC RELATIONS AND ATTITUDES

Under the British, a strong bureaucracy has existed in the Indian subcontinent for centuries. The Indian bureaucracy emerging from the British imperial tradition ruled the country until 1947, when Great Britain surrendered its sovereignty over India. After that period it was asked to serve the country under the control of popular ministers. This raised the issue of democratising the civil service which is clinched in the discussion of relations with and attitudes toward the political sector and the public, as well as attitudinal factors and problems between the higher and lower echelons within the bureaucracy itself.

A. THE IAS AND THE MINISTERS

During the British Raj, the problem has been one of administrative interference with and encroachment upon what should have been the sphere of politics[1]. The minister, being the only political official in the ministry, was in no position to run it. The best he could hope for was a friendly relationship with the ministry's ICS secretary, the man who actually controlled the bureaucratic apparatus. After independence the problem has persisted. Although there are

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1 Especially in the period following the introduction of Dyarchy (1920) and of the 1935 constitution.

several tiers of assistant and deputy ministers, who facilitate a somewhat greater ministerial control, the civil servant still has his hand quite firmly on the administrative machinery.

Despite the history of administrative interference in the political sphere, the Indian writers tend to see the problems of bureaucratic-political relationships as revolving exclusively around political incursions into what they feel should be the private domain of administration. They complain of politicians belittling the civil services[1], and of political interference in the Panchayat Raj programs[2]. R. Dwarkadas gives a good example of this view:

> "It is precisely such prejudiced views of the role of the Higher Civil Services and bad logic which are responsible for the gap that yawns between the administrative class and the legislators. Hence the need for an enlightened comprehension by the legislators of the creative role of Higher Civil Service in a welfare state context cannot be overemphasised[3]".

To be sure, there is some evidence of legislative prejudice against the higher civil services. Nehru

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1 H.M. Patel, "The Outlook for Future", Indian Journal of Public Administration, IX (1963), 514-522 at 521.

2 B. Mukherji,"Administrative Problems of Decentralisation", Ind. Jour. Pub. Adm. VII (1961), 306-319 at 311-312.

3 R. Dwarkadas, "Role Of Higher Civil Service in India", Popular Book Depot, Bombay 1958, p. 184.

has spoken disparagingly of the tendencies towards "official" caste in the civil services and has referred to the higher services as "kept services"[1]. He accused the ICS as:

> "...self-satisfied and self-sufficient, narrow, with fixed minds, static in a changing world and wholly unsuited to a progressive environment ..."[2].

R.K. Chaudhury once said before the Constituent Assembly:

> "While the ministers were drawing a salary ranging from Rs 750 / - to Rs 1000 / -, their ICS Secretaries were drawing salaries ranging from Rs 2000 / - to Rs 3000 / -. While the ministers were trying to push their old motor-cars on the road in order to get a start - because they could not afford to have new motor cars - these secretaries would pass by the ministers in their new beautiful motor cars and just wave their hands to the minister and say 'cheerio'. He does not care to stop because his fashionable wife is sitting by his side. That sort of thing cannot be repeated now"[3].

This legislative prejudices against the higher civil service is mainly responsible for the lack of

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1 J. Nehru, "Prime Minister's Address at the Annual Meeting", Indian Journal of Public Administration VI (1960), 331-338. Also his, Toward Freedom, Boston: Beacon Press, 1958, p. 280-82.

2 Nehru. Autobiography, London 1949, p. 442.

3 Constitute Assembly Debates, Vol. X 1949, p. 39.

mutual understanding between legislator and administrator. Appleby, perhaps not fully aware of the extent of past bureaucratic interference in the political arena, quite realistically advocated restraint on the part of both administrators and politicians. This has been for the most part ignored.

There is a general feeling that civil servants are critical of the competence and honesty of the political leaders. Subsequently we report the findings of an important empirical study on the attitudes of the IAS towards the ministers. To understand the IAS officer's attitude toward politicians, Taub asked them the following question, "Do youthink politicians in Orissa do as good a job as they might, or is there room for improvement?" In coding the information, he divided the responses into ten categories, and allowed up to two responses per person. The categories were as follows:[1]

1. They are all right, trying their best, doing, surprisingly well.
2. Compared to other states or to past governments, they are not so bad.
3. There is room for improvement (unamplified).
4. The role of the politician is defective: it is the business of scoundrels; power is inherently corrupting; the whole political system is bad.
5. They lack skill; don't know how to administer; they are pushed around by bureaucrats; uneducated; don't lead; don't implement; just raw recruits; the best people don't go into politics.

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1 Richard P. Taub, op. cit., p. 106-107.

TABLE 12: Attitudes of Respondents Toward Politicians

	Number of Times given, IAS Group	% of Responses IAS Group	Number of Times given, Non-IAS Group	% of Responses Non-IAS Group
All right	2	5.4	5	9.3
Comparatively not bad	5	13.5	5	9.3
Room for improvement	1	2.7	3	5.6
Role is defective	2	5.4	5	9.3
They lack skill	9	24.3	11	2o.4
Promise but don't deliver	1	2.7	2	3.7
Not upto pols. before indep.	2	5.4	6	11.1
Self-interested	8	21.6	12	22.2
Corrupt	4	1o.8	3	5.6
"Not permitted to say", but they are all right	1	2.7	o	4.o
"Not permitted to say", but room for imp.	2	5.4	1	1.o
"Not permitted to say", but lack of skill	o	o.o	1	1.9
TOTALS	37	1oo.o %	54	1oo %

a. Totals do not add to exactly 1oo % because of rounding error.

Number in IAS group	28	Number in Non-IAS	4o
Non-respondents	o	Non-respondents	3
Number giving 1 response	19	Number giving 1 response	2o
Number giving 2 response	9	Number giving 2 response	17
	28		4o
Total number of responses:	37	Total number of responses:	54

Source: Bureaucrats under Stress: Administrators and R. Taub Administration in an Indian State, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1969, p. 1o8.

6. They promise a lot, but don't deliver their promises.
7. Those who fought for independence were self-sacrificing and idealistic; these are a different breed altogether, not up to that standard.
8. They are selfish; put their own/party interests above the good of the state/nation; don't represent the people properly; forget their responsibilities; don't educate their constituents; don't work hard enough.
9. They are insincere, lacking completely in character; corrupt.
10. Did not answer (or, not permitted to say).

Thus it appears that in the IAS group 21.6 % of the responses (8 of the 37 responses given) were positive and 78.4 % of the responses were negative. In other words the IAS group expressed disapproval of politicians. Taub writes that it "seems quite striking that even though officers are not permitted to speak critically of the government (either of its policies or its personnel), a high proportion of officers did in fact express negative opinions about politicians"[1].

The relationships between the higher civil servants and the ministers in India like many developing countries have not attained any kind of balance. There is a "smoldering discontent and tension between the ministers and the officers". They come from different backgrounds. Theoretically the ministers

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1 R. Taub, op. cit., p. 109.

are the civil servants' superiors, but the civil servants think that in various ways they are superior to the ministers. They have passed a very difficult competitive examination. They are more westernised in their behaviour and consider politicians to be less qualified. Finally there is an absence of any common goals of aspiration and lack of mutual respect. In this situation it is not surprising that some tension should exist[1].

The Administrative Reforms Commission have realised the importance of a balanced relationship between the civil servants and the ministers and write:

> "In our opinion it should be one of the important duties of the Chief Minister in the state and the Prime Minister at the centre to see that proper relationship between the Political Executive and the Civil Service develops and continues to grow. In case certain stresses and strains are apparent, immediate remedial action should be taken. Any delay is likely to vitiate the atmosphere so badly that till it persists it may adversely affect the working of the whole department"[2].

B. THE IAS AND THE LOCAL POLITICIANS

During the British Raj, the ICS officer holding the post of a district officer was virtually "the king of the district". He was in charge of a district,

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1 R. Taub, op. cit. p. 110-113.

2 A.R.C., Personnel Administration, Chairman R.K. Patel, August 1967, p. 184.

an area averaging 4, 43o square miles. He was mainly responsible for the maintenance of law and order in the district as well as for the collection of the land or other revenues. O'Malley describes the importance of the district officer in the following words:

> "Milton was once impelled by national pride to say that when God wishes to have some hard thing done, he sends for His Englishman. In India it may more truly be said that when the government wants a hard bit of work done, it calls on the District Officer"[1].

The ministerial control over the ICS district officer was limited. The members of the legislatures and the public alike were busy to know the "petty details of administration" and "the shortcomings on the part of government or its officers"[2].

The IAS district officer, as the successor to the more famous ICS officer, must now share his kingdom with the political agents. He is no more the boss of a district. He has become the chief coordinator and conciliator of the district. He must know how to work under the people's representatives. A bureaucracy which was not used to political control must take time to adjust to it. This adjustment to political control is not an easy task. Any M.L.A. (Member of Legislative Assembly) may come to the district officer for any undue favour. The district officer may oblige him because he is afraid of a

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1 C.S.S. O'Malley, "The Indian Civil Service, 16o1-193o", Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. 1965, p. 163.

2 Ibid, p. 168.

phone call from the minister. The following example will make the case more clear:

> "It is related of a certain Collector that a member of a local Legislature appeared before him and made a request. The Collector said he would let him have an answer after two days. Two days later, he explained to the Member of the Local Assembly very politely why his request could not be accepted, and how, if it was, various other people would be detrimentally affected. The M.L.A. with equal politeness asked if he could use his telephone. Permission being given, he phoned the Minister and said that he had made his request and had been given this answer, that he was naturally very disappointed and trusted the minister would take the necessary action. He then handed over the telephone to the Collector saying the Minister wished to speak to him. The Minister said he knew the facts of the case and desired that what the M.L.A. asked should be done. The Collector hesitated, suggested sending him the papers for consideration and attempted to argue. The Minister was adamant and ended the conversation by saying, "Well you know my views. You can do what I want or ---". The collector in this case decided to do what the Minister wanted and passed the orders accordingly. The story came out through the M.L.A. who used it to let his friends and constituents know how Collectors should be dealt with"[1].

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1 A.D. Gorwala, "Report on Public Administration". Government of India. Planning Commission, December 1953, p. 24-25.

The local politicians believe that without some kind of political pressure, the officers would remain indifferent. "These officers are as elastic as rubber. One can stretch them to a great extent to get work out of them, but as soon as one removes the pressure they return to their original mentality of not doing any work themselves. That is why it is necessary to coax them and stretch them every time for work"[1]. The local politicians view 'political interference' from a different angle. S.P. Aiyar provides a very good example of tactlessly utilising political pressures by one M.L.A. and the reaction of the young IAS district officer.

> "An M.L.A. one day burst into his room in order to intervene on behalf of a junior employee and get the transfer order cancelled. This greatly annoyed the IAS officer who brusquely asked the M.L.A. to get out of his room. There was much critisism of the officer's conduct at that time and it was being demanded that he should apologise to the M.L.A. But nothing happened, the storm blew over, the officer continued in his office and the M.L.A. stopped coming to the Secretariat"[2].

It is now evident that at the local level the relation of IAS officer to the local politician is under some strain. The officer is to deal with politicians who are less educated and could be unscrupulous enough

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1 V.R. Gaikwad, Panchayat Raj and Bureaucracy, Hyderabad, National Institute of Community Development, 1969, p. 34.

2 S.P. Aiyar, "Political context of Indian Administration", The Indian Journal of public Administration, Vol. XVII, No. 3, p. 344.

to get his work done. Any dissatisfied local politician could be sufficiently 'covered' by colleagues to take action against one IAS district officer. Taub writes: "For example, in 1958, a collector was suspended on half pay until charges of corruption brought against him could be dealt with in court. Ultimately, he was acquitted, but his career was damaged. Many officers believe that the original charges against him were brought by a minister from his district who wanted to get rid of him"[1].

These examples give an impression that the local politicians can control and alter the behaviour of the IAS district officer. In actual practice the IAS district officer is directly controlled by the chief-secretary concerned. But the IAS district officer can hardly afford to disrespect the M.L.A.'s views. The M.L.A. elected from a district is the representative of the public and the district officer must respect his views. Further he sits in the state's legislative assembly. If he enjoys a certain power as a party leader, he may indirectly influence the chief-minister and through him the chief-secretary to transfer the district officer from his locality and bring another one. This means the M.L.A. is able to control indirectly the behaviour of the IAS district officer in his district. At the local level, it is difficult to refute the factthat the IAS district officer is controlled by the non-bureaucratic institution, however indirect it may be.

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1 R.P. Taub, op. cit., p. 42.

An additional consideration is what part the interest groups play in influencing the behaviour of the bureaucrat at the local level. The interest groups in India are too few and weak. By and large their activities seem quite minimal in its influence in the bureaucratic arena. Under the British Raj, groups enjoying traditional sources of power exerted some pressure at the local administrative level. Since independence, most of the interest groups have been connected with some political party. They serve more as agents of mobilisation than of interest articulation. Hardgrave, Jr. writes:

> "Opposition parties have utilised various front organisations in mass action to rally popular support and augment party strength, and the Congress has sought to co-opt group support through mass organisations and to harness their potential into development activities. The Congress party itself has been an important link between local groups and state governments, acting as a middleman in applying pressure on the administrative apparatus; in states where the Congress is in power, the administration has proved sensitive to such pressure"[1].

It is at the local administrative level, that the district officer remains particularly responsive to the local pressures even though he regards the activities of interest groups with distrust. On the other hand, the interest groups look at the officials as unresponsive and corrupt. The routinised pressures

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1 Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. INDIA: Government & Politics in a Developing Nation, Harcourt, Brace & World, p. 105. The interest groups are as follows: Community associations, agrarian groups, student groups, trade unions, business groups, the military.

that are brought to bear on the political process and the bureaucracy are those of caste, extended family and the like, not those of groups whose raison d'être is political and economic. The result is not so much influence on broad policy-making as it is influence on narrow and particular aspects of administration of policy[1]. Consequently, "Group pressure in India has been directed toward influencing the administration and implementation of policy rather than its formation; its greatest success has been achieved in forestalling certain government actions and in modifying policy rather than in initiating it"[2].

Today's administrator, it is desirable, should develop a new relationship of confidence and understanding with the villagers. He should try to create a new image of government and its relation with the people. If the district officer is to work under the new system, which is not just a bureaucratic organisation but a "democratic decentralisation", then his role must be securely linked with the new community self-government (Panchayati Raj) programme. This programme has been created to enhance the institutional capacity of local government for economic development and to expand democratic participation in rural areas[3]. Maddick writes: "The emphasis on

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1 Myron Weiner, The Politics of Scarcity, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962, p. 1-35.

2 Hardgrave, Jr. op. cit. p. 1o5.

3 In 1958, the government asked each state to evolve a system of Panchayat Raj, suited to its own needs, that followed the broad outlines of the Mehta report. For details see: D.C. Potter, Government in Rural India. G. Bell and Sons Ltd. London 1964, p. 41-6o. There are now 214ooo village panchayats functioning in the country, covering approximately 98 per cent of the entire rural population. INDIA, A Reference Annual, 197o, p. 5o.

popular participation is probably greater than that in any other country outside communist countries and certainly far greater than in any with comparable levels of literacy"[1].

The scheme of Panchayati Raj is designed to foster and revitalise the ancient community institutions for direct popular participation at the local level. This has been sought through a "hierarchical and organically" three-tier linked structure. At the bottem lies the village organisation (Panchayat). The Panchayat is the basic unit and may represent one or several villages. It has a chairman elected by the entire panchayat electorate. All the chairmen elected to panchayats within a block area constitute the larger organisation (Panchayat Samiti), the second-tier, which in turn sends representatives to district meetings (Zilla Parishad), the third tier in the pattern of organisation[2]. The Collector is the only officer in the district level to whom the Zilla Parishad in the panchayat system can be entrusted. The Collector attends and presides over the zilla parishad meetings but has not any voting rights on its resolutions. He however does have certain veto powers.

The panchayati raj scheme added new responsibilities to the duties of the Collector. He serves not as a "Boss" in the zilla parishad but as a recording officer. He is supposed to execute the resolutions

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1 Henry Maddick, Panchayati Raj, Longman, 1970, p. 73.

2 For a full-length study on the structure, composition and election of councils in the system of panchayati raj, see Henry Maddick, op. cit., Chapters 7, 8 & 9.

arrived at the district meetings. "In this setting, the officer is put in the position of taking orders from people whom he thinks are not yet prepared for self-government"[1]. The officer does not like the domineering attitude of the elected representatives. One officer explained his attitude in the following words:

> "It is a clear tendency on the part of the non-officials (elected representatives) to assert themselves. In the past they were ruled by the bureaucrats. Now they want to rule over the government officers. They have a very hostile attitude towards us. Their main idea and ambition are to make the maximum use of their present position and to compel the bureaucrats to do anything they wished. Government servants nowadays find themselves in a very awkward and difficult position"[2].

Traditionally, the Collector is the key administrator in the district. During the British rule, the Collectors were "The men who ruled India" and they were "The Guardians"[3]. Their competence was beyond challenge. They earned reputation for fair dealing. The district units were the centre of their activities. In the present system, the Collector is designed to take the responsibilities of Panchayati Raj, as there is no other competent officer in the district level to whom the Zilla Parishad can be

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1 Richard P. Taub, op. cit., p. 115.

2 V.R. Gaikward, op. cit. p. 30.

3 P. Woodruff, The Men Who Ruled India - The Guardians. London 1963.

entrusted. It seems to be quite reasonable to entrust the young Indian administrator with the responsibilities of the Panchayati Raj system, as public servants are to become advisers and supervisors instead of direct administrators. It is certainly a difficult role to realise that his position is one of adviser but not instructor, a councillor but not a man who could exercise the authority of government. This change of role from the old to the new is bound to put a strain on him in the beginning of his career as a Collector.

The Panchayati Raj programme has limited the powers of IAS officers at the local level. This is certainly not undesirable. During the colonial time, the British district officer (ICS) was becoming autocratic if also frequently paternalistic. The British idea of the father of the people was more of an ideal rather than a reality. That his actions could be always justified, has not always brought the best results. By contrast, the IAS district officer has been brought closer to the people at the local level in the process of decision-making:

> "The fundamental problem, however, is still the shift of the focus of power to the people, and their representatives. While government rests on the support of the collector as its 'eyes and ears', and one might add, its voice, there are many, including academics, who feel that only through the collector, is district leadership to be secured. Yet if democracy has anything to contribute other than the counting of heads to resolve conflicts, it must at the local level be in centres of initiative and in the mediating of change through decisions

> arrived at by local people, or by their representatives, which are therefore legitimate and acceptable to them"[1].

This new ideology has no doubt replacing the mythology attached to the old ICS tradition. This has set new limits to the powers and functions of the district collector, and consequently has been a matter of discussion among officers and others alike.

C. THE IAS AND THE CITIZEN MASS

During the colonial period, the bureaucracy staffed predominantly by nationals of the metropolitan power and maintained a posture of paternalism and arrogance towards the colonized people[2]. The IAS officers, successors to the Indian Civil Service (ICS) inherited this self-assumed role of Platonic guardian as well as the other qualities possessed by that service. The IAS in India appear to have maintained the traditions of superiority toward and detachment from the people, as the ICS did in the days of empire. This has presented bureaucracy with a different problem. After India won her independence, a closer identification of bureaucracy with the masses was called for. The paternalistic and authoritarian tone of administration had to be changed and take on that of public servant to the people[3].

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1 Henry Maddick, op. cit., p. 239.

2 For an excellent historical account, see Phillip Woodruff, The Men Who Ruled India, op. cit., which gives a picture of this tradition.

3 Zakir Hussain, "The Administrator and the People". Indian Journal of Public Administration, VIII (1962) 265-269 at 267.

The United Nations' advice that, the "career officials must accept their role of servants, not masters of the citizen..", has been recognised in principle by most of the developing countries but poor practices often negate the intention[1]. Long before the United Nations made any research on this relationship (1961), one Minister for Home Affairs in India writes:

> "The problem of administration is not mechanical. It is essentially human. Unless,therefore,it is approached in that right spirit with sympathy, solicitude and understanding, the desired results become difficult of achievement ... Service to the people has to be their all-consuming passion and their guiding mission. It needs a full missionary approach for results to be abiding and sweet, and to carry succour and service and light and hope to those still living in hamlets and hutments throughout the country and to apply the soothing balm to the sufferers"[2].

A.D. Gorwala goes a step further and recognises that "the public servant's livelihood is derived from the public revenues and, consequently, on him rests a special obligation of service to the public, from which follows the need for behaving towards all members of public in a particularly courteous and

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1 UNITED NATIONS, "A HAND-BOOK OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION," New York 1961., p. 10-11.

2 G.B. Pant, "Public Servant in a Democracy", Indian Journal of Public Administration 1 (1955), 181-183 at p. 183.

understanding manner"[1]. He stresses the need for better bureaucratic contact with the people.

Nehru remarks:

> "...it is a psychological thing, the administrative approach. It should be a humble approach, and it should always treat the person - whoever he may be, the peasant, the villager, the worker - on terms of friendly equality, never as a boss"[2].

In a different context, Hanson analyses the lack of sociological realism in the Indian planning and the physical isolation of the planners in Yojana Bhavan, Parliament Street, New Delhi. He writes:

> "These men are essentially bureaucratic intellectuals. Most of them have had 'field' experience, but few of them recently. Isolated in the artificial environment of New Delhi, they quickly lose the 'feel' of India's towns and villages ... The Indian intellectual is usually overjoyed when, during the course of his promotion in the government service, he finds himself as far removed as possible from contact with rural or urban 'dirt', and is all too ready to forget all that it implies for the planning of development. Members and officials of the Planning Commission are no exceptions. One must beware of exaggeration here, but the outside observer can hardly fail

1 A.D. Gorwala, Report on Public Administration, 1951, p. 67.

2 Nehru, "Prime Minister's Address at the Annual Meeting", op. cit. p. 337.

> to notice that long residence in Yojana Bhavan, excellent as it may be for the development of the intellect, tends to make those concerned lose touch with the realities of daily life as it exists for the mass of the people"[1].

Now the problem area is quite clear to us. There is a certain isolation of the bureaucratic intellectuals from the Indian masses. Our leaders have realised this problem since Independence. All agree that the elite cadre officer must reform his attitude from one of haughty overlord of the district and sometimes "a picturesque eccentric or a conscientious plodder"[2] to that of public minded servant to the citizenry. The bureaucracy in India should not be tradition-oriented. Rather it should be community oriented. They should prefer service to rule. But when it comes time for practical suggestions for implementing these proposals, ideas appear to be completely lacking. Hanson accuses the planners because they have "never treated the objective situation with sufficient respect"[3]. The planners believe that the plan will be fulfilled:

> "If people work harder, if they are less selfish, if they make the plan their own and contribute enthusiastically and unitedly towards its achievement, if the administration is less corrupt and more efficient, if the peasants make full use of the irrigation waters, if the community projects evoke the planned responses,

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1 Hanson, A.H., "The Crisis of Indian Planning", Political Quarterly, vol.34, London 1963, p. 370.

2 P. Woodruff, The Guardians, London, 1963, p. 300.

3 Hanson, A.H., op. cit., p. 376.

> if the business community becomes public spirited, if the prejudices and antagonisms associated with region, caste, and religious community are significantly diminished, if there is more wholehearted co-operation between the states and the Centre, then we shall achieve our aims: so runs the argument"[1].

They say that attitudes must be changed, everyone must become more honest and work harder, and then the public will respect and appreciate the government, corruption will be eliminated, and the plan will be fulfilled. But how to change attitudes and influence motivations? The Planning Commission have never been able to find out the ways and the means of changing attitudes and motivations for economic development. It seems, they think, that it is necessary only to call for reform and the mere act of calling ensures that somehow the reform will be effected.

Caiden writes:

> "... those occupying elite position in bureaucratic structures are expected to recognise the shortcomings of the social system (at least that part for which they are responsible) and either to devise means for remedying failings or to provide machinery and employ others who can do so ... If they cannot be their own reformers they may have to enlist the aid of reformers or be replaced by others who do"[2].

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1 Hanson, A.H., op. cit. p. 376-377.

2 Gerals E. Caiden, Administrative Reform, Allen Lane The Penguin Press, Great Britain 1970, p. 131.

Two Indian reformers see the problem in a different way. Gorwala thinks that overemphasis on fostering an image of subservience to the people will lead to an administrative surrender to popular whimsy. Attitudinal reform should not mean replacement of the authoritarian officer with the sycophantic one. It means the supplanting of this old type with administrators offering vigorous leadership for development.

> "You may not be able to take the people where they won't go at all, but there is surely a definite duty, provided you are convinced that it is for their own good, at least to lead them where they will not desist from following"[1].

Unfortunately, Gorwala does not follow up with any concrete programme for infusing the public services with such leadership qualities, but he has at least made a suggestion.

Panandiker, another Indian writer, has suggested a different approach to the problem of creating developmental leadership in the bureaucracy. Instead of emphasizing attitudinal change per se as a goal to be brought about in itself, he advocates lifting the whole matter out of the attitudinal realm into the functional one. In his solution, attitudinal change would be a mere by-product of a much more profound reform. The traditional machinery, or executive administration "is designed to fulfil all the legal requirements of governmental operations and to maintain social stability. In the main, this

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1 Gorwala Report, pp. 62-63.

type of administration confines itself to the maintenance of law and order, collection of revenues, and regulating the national life in accordance with the statutory requirements"[1]. The suggested governmental framework, or 'managerial' administration would be oriented towards socio-economic and political development.

> "It focusses its attention not merely on 'carrying out' the dictates and directions of the governmental system but also on the crucial element of securing prescribed programmatic values. The emphasis here is not an appropriational authority or on preventing disequilibrating forces but on the attainment of goals and targets established in the planned programs of the government which in fact may have built-in forces disturbing social equilibrium"[2].

The author suggests the replacement of the old functional agencies with 'programmatic' ones, which would be structured in terms of specific programmatic goals.

In the present system the emphasis is generally towards preventing social disequilibrium. The higher civil service official is viewed in large measure to maintain social stability. The managerial administrator, on the other hand, is charged with the implementation of programmes which will often involve a necessary disturbance of the social equilibrium.

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1 V.A. Pai Panandiker, Development Administration: An Approach, Indian Jorunal of Public Administration Vol. X, No. 1 (1964, 36.

2 Ibid, p. 36-37.

This is evident in the abolition of the zamindars and jagirdars, which is bound to offend the zaminidari landowners. What we are going to stress here is that these landowners are not the people towards whom attitudinal change should be directed. It should be directed to the agriculturalists if development is to take place at all. This may disturb the social structure that has kept them exploited and oppressed. It is here that leadership must be exercised in order to achieve attitudinal change.

While the theorists debate on how to effect attitudinal changes which is necessary for the fulfilment of rural development schemes, a change for the worse may be occurring at the local level. Tinker asserts that the senior district officer is more out of touch with the villagers than the British ICS officer during the pre-independence days. The ties with the people developed by the British ICS officers, however dilatory and pompous they might be, were nonetheless real and genuine. As the traditions which built and maintained these ties have been abandoned, such as the district tour, the ceremonial entry into the village on horseback, hearing of disputes under a banyan tree, so the ties themselves have tended to break down[1].

> "Today, few District Officers go out on lengthy tours. Certainly, they are tied to headquarters by all the reports they have to compile and the ministers and other visitors whom they have to

1 Hugh Tinker, "The Village in the Framework of Development", in Braibanti and Spengler, op. cit., p. 122.

> please. So today's inspections are perfunctory and unsatisfactory. There is no leisurely entry into the village demesne on horseback, giving time for the village folk to absorb their visitor into their own environment. He arrives, in a storm of dust in a jeep, a visitor from another world, and he keeps his other-world aura with him. There is a hasty walk around, a conference, a cup of tea, and he is off - to another village, and another. It is unheard of to stay more than one day in one village. A District Officer said to the writer, 'I am trained to find out all I need to know in one day', and another younger official said, 'Frankly I do not like to spend a night in a village. I have nothing to say to the villagers, nor have they to me'"[1].

Since India won independence, the responsibilities of the district officers have increased due to vast expansion of governmental functions. This means more work is to be done in the district headquarters office and less in the field. In effect, the duties imposed on the heavily burdened district administrator may not permit him to keep proper contact with the people of that area. To the extent that this situation is actually occurring, it may negate whatever plans for attitudinal change the reformers finally bring with.

The problem of bureaucratic relations with the public arises partly due to the "gap between the

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1 Ibid.

TABLE 13: Responses of IAS Officers to the Question, "Which Development Programs Do You Think Are Best?"

Response	Number of Times Given
Industrialization: power, irrigation and flood control; dams; technology; development of mineral resources.	22
Communications: ports, roads.	8
Agriculture: improvement of methods (e.g. green manuring, Japanese method); land reforms and redistribution.	3
Village Programs: cottage industries, Panchayati Raj, resettlement of tribals, multi-purpose cooperatives.	3
Family Planning	1
"The entire program is good".	4
TOTAL	41

Number in IAS group:		28
Number of non-respondents:	1	
Number giving 1 response	13	
Number giving 2 responses	14	
		28
Number of responses given:		41

Source: Richard Taub, op. cit. p. 116-117.

TABLE 14: Responses of IAS Officers to the Question: "Which Development Programs Do You Like Least?"

Response	Number of Times Given
Industrialization: power, irrigation, mineral development.	0
Communications: ports, roads.	0
Agriculture: improved methods, land reform.	0
Village Programs: cottage industries, Panchayati Raj, rural electrification, village social programs, block development, tribal programs, cooperative programs, "social welfare", famine-flood-drought relief programs.	18
Family Planning	0
Implementation of programs, not the programs themselves: lack of balance among the programs, too much monopoly control, programs not followed up once they are begun, policies too doctrinaire.	8
"None of the programs is bad".	4
TOTAL	30

Number in IAS group 28
Number giving 1 response: 26
Number giving 2 responses: 2
28
Total number of responses given: 30

Source: Richard Taub, op. cit., p. 116-117

Weltanschauungen of officers and those of the masses"[1]. The IAS officers were asked which development programs they like best and which they like least. As Tables 13 and 14 show, the IAS officers are predominantly interested for "modernisation" programs of the government such as heavy industry, increased electricity and mining. They are less interested for the agricultural and village welfare programs.

The young IAS officer very often sees the government as it is understood in the class room of the Indian Universities. As a matter of fact Indian Universities have never prepared him for the district world of Indian farmers and landlords. Officers have come predominantly from urban areas and have western-style educations. They prefer big programs, which may transfer this country into a modern industrial state. They are least interested in agricultural programs which are designed to improve the lot of Indian villagers. "These attitudes seem inappropriate for 'public servants' in a predominantly rural country; consequently, they deserve closer scrutiny"[2].

In the developing countries, the development process demands more popular participation and involvement. Consequently, it is necessary to anticipate a change in the attitude of the administrators towards the citizens.

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1 Taub, op. cit., p. 116.

2 Taub, op. cit., p. 118.

The character of the bureaucracy in India is changing since the British left India. But this change has not been simple.

> "Administrators do not change their backgrounds, normative orientations, or behavioural practices overnight. Nor can the public be expected to understand the system and adapt to it quickly. Penetration of the new ethic is a slow process, especially in a democratic society in which indecision, deliberation, debate and conflict attended the movement towards new structures and new norms" [1]

Consequently, there have been strains and tensions in the relationship between the administrators and the public. The solution to the problem certainly lies in proper training, socialising and directing this elite cadre of administrators who will have to adapt to the public needs and demands.

D. THE IAS AND THE LOWER BUREAUCRACY

The Indian Administration Service is an all-India service, which, as we have seen earlier, is common to the Union and the states. The members of these services are alloted to work under state governments except when they are appointed to a post under the central government on deputation. They are of course centrally recruited. The members of this service constitute the elite service. The group is highly cohesive and its solidarity isstrong. They have been

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1 Eldersveld, Samuel J. & others (eds), The Citizen and the Administrator in a Developing Democracy, Scott, Foreman and Company Glenview, Illinois, 1968, p. 8.

the dominant instrument of government. Under British rule there were 1157 ICS officers in service immediately before Independence (1947). They were able to control the entire populations of India by means of a carefully organised bureaucratic apparatus. The size of this elite cadre was extremly small in comparison to the total bureaucracy. Since Independence, as the following table shows, the concept of a small elite cadre retaining their hold in key positions has persisted.

TABLE 15 : Population, Total Government Employment and Elite Cadre Strength in India and Pakistan, 1964

A	B	C	D	E
Country	Total government employment	Elite cadre	Population	Percentage (B of D)
India	9,271,000	1,974	449,400,000	2.06
Pakistan	995,000	432	96,500,000	1.03

Source: Braibanti and Associations, Asian Bureaucratic Systems emergent from the British Imperial Tradition. Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Centre, Duke University Press, 1966.

The above figures show that in 1964 about 1974 officers out of a total of nearly 9,271,000 million government employees in bureaucracies controlling nearly 449,400,000 populations.

Besides,this elite cadre, the central government employees are divided into four classes, namely Class I, Class II, Class III, Class IV. The classes I, II and III correspond roughly to the administrative, executive and clerical classes into which the British civil service has been traditionally divided. Class IV is a peculiarity of the Indian administration and consists of the staff generally employed on manual work of one kind or the other.

The present distribution of government employees among the various classes in the central government ministries is shown below.

TABLE 16 : Distribution of Central Government Employees

Class	Number of Employees
Class I	14,585
Class II	29,050
Class III	1o,28,751
Class IV	11,23,834
N.A.	4,417
	22.oo,637

Source: Census of Central Government Employees as on March 31, 1963. Quoted by V.A. Pai Panandiker, Personnel System For Development Administration Bombay 1966, p. 95. The only exceptions to these four broad classes are the all-India Services, viz., the Indian Administrative Service and the Indian Police Service and the three new Services, the Indian Forest Service, the Indian Medical & Health Service, and the Indian Engineering Service which are excluded from this classification because they form a nucleus from which both Central and State Governments draw many of their higher officers.

Civil posts are also categorised as "gazetted" or "non-gazetted". The distinction is apparently made to show the public importance of these posts. Generally, officers in Class I and Class II posts are given gazetted status and employees in Class III and Class IV posts are treated as non-gazetted employees. The system is that it divides the civil service not only into classes, but also into civil posts. Again the recruitment to Class I and Class II posts is made in consultation with the Union Public Service Commission. There is no such provision of recruitment in regard to Class III and Class IV services. The method of recruitment also gives an indication of the importance attached to these services[1].

The present classification has serious shortcomings as it creates an acute class consciousness.

> "Bureaucratic organisations frequently reinforce the class structure of the community and the nation through their staffing procedures"[2].

The fourfold classification of the services has sometimes been interpreted as the new caste system. Nehru once told: "Whatever we may say, we are so caste-ridden, and not caste-ridden in terms of caste only, but in terms of another things: group-ridden consciously and very often unconsciously, so that it is difficult to get out of it ... The British introduced in the Services this caste feeling, the superior services, the inferior services, the

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1 V.A. Pai Panandiker, op. cit., p. 91-93.

2 Gideon Sjoberg, Bureaucracy And The Lower Class, Sociology and Social Research, Vol. 5o, Number 3, 1966, p. 326.

ICS and all that. It is a bad inheritance which we have got"[1].

The Second Pay Commission have recommended to abolish this four-fold classification as it is not done on any systematic basis. Further it creates unhealthy psychological problems[2].

In analysing the Indian situation one finds that there is a rigid demarcation between the superior cadres of higher civil servants and the Class III and IV servants. This dichotomy appears to be a part of the Indian administrative ethos. Scholars on Indian administration often publish articles and monographs which deal exclusively with Indian Administrative Service or other All-India Services but they rarely try to know and analyse the vast lower reaches of the bureaucratic apparatus. It seems if one talks about the IAS then he has covered all that is worth looking at. The lower classes of the service are essential for the good and effective performance of the bureaucratic organisation. Little attention has been given to this problem. The attitude of higher civil servants seems to be that the lower classes of the service may be left to themselves.

Appleby sums up the factors contributing to present poor morale in lower ranks in the following words:

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1 Prime Minister's Address At The Annual Meeting. Ind. Journ. Pub. Adm. October-December 1960. Vol. VI No. 4, p. 335.

2 V.A. Pai Panandiker, ibid, p. 101.

> "The failure of people in upper ranks to demonstrate a real personal interest in subordinates individually and in the welfare, needs and possibilities of subordinate personnel generally. A very remote and cool relationship is the rule".
>
> "Communication with subordinates is too largely a matter of giving orders, demanding particular things, criticising mistakes, with too little encouragement, praise, instruction and solicitation of the kind of help to be had only from people treated as equals ..."
>
> "One net result of these things is that subordinate personnel have no sense of mission, of being important parts of very great enterprises carried on for the betterment of the country. Often they are given no possible means of seeing any connection between what they do and the goals of revolutionary India. Nor has the treatment accorded to them provided any evidence that there is a revolution"[1].

There is also some antagonism existing between the elite IAS and other superior services. The IAS is inheriting the mantle and functions of the famous imperial ICS service. Membership in the IAS carries more prestige in comparison to any other service in India. They enjoy also a better scale of pay. This has certainly aggravated the problem of intra-bureaucratic relationship between the elite cadres. Appleby pleads for a common service[2]. A few Indian writers have recommends unification of the elite cadres, but not of the entire bureaucratic establishment[3]. These suggestions have not found a receptive

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1 Paul H. Appleby, Morale At Subordinate Levels, The Ind. Jour. Pub. Adm. Vol. III, 1957, No. 2, p.97-98.

2 Appleby Report, pp. 62.

3 Asok Chanda, op. cit., p. 127.

audience. The Indian concept of cadre service has become, through long years of traditions, an accepted way of administrative life.
"Perhaps the most important reason for the continuance of separate cadres is that the discrete entities reflect the caste-structured society of which they are a part and are closely correlated with social status, level of education, and linguistic competence. If this is so, changes in the social order may eventually induce equivalent changes in the present system of structurally fragmented bureaucracy"[1].

In this chapter we have looked at the problems of bureaucratic relations and attitudes between IAS and the political sector, IAS and the citizen mass, IAS and the lower bureaucracy. We have tried to analyse how the assumption of power by the political elite, the new role of pressure groups, the changing pattern of local administration like Panchayati Raj and the emergent citizen in a democratic country affect the role of the IAS officers. Consequently the IAS officer had to make adjustments in its thought and life-style and to adapt to the new ethos. This is not an easy task. As a result the relationships of IAS officer to the new political masters and the people as well as within the bureaucracy itself have become strained.

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1 R. Braibanti (ed.), op. cit. p. 659.

CHAPTER VIII
THE GENERALIST AND THE SPECIALIST IN INDIAN BUREAUCRACY

A. THE IAS: A GENERALIST CIVIL SERVICE

In India, British rule built up a strong generalist administrative tradition. This tradition is institutionalised in an elite corps of general administrators who are usually recruited at an early age from the best graduates of the universities. Their careers are deliberately designed to prepare them for broad and important coordinating responsibilities. Even today it is thought that the generalist is the best person to handle a difficult decision and the more difficult the solution of the problem, the more he is needed. The administration of technical programmes undertaken by the government in power had added to the complexities of his task, but faith in his ability to deal with them has not been abandoned. The image and concept of the civil service that was handed down to us by the British is more than a hundred years old and still has not lost its importance for us. "The persisting notion of elite service is visible in more favourable pay scales, jealously guarded powers, and higher prestige"[1].

The administrative tradition of the Indian Administrative Service, the successor of the Indian Civil Service, is founded on the belief that in an

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1 Merle Fainsod, "The Structure of Development Administration", in Irving Swerdlow (ed.), Development Administration - concepts & Problems, (New York-Syracuse University Press, 1963), pp. 11-12.

administrator it is not the knowledge of some specialised subjects that is required but a way of thinking, a moral and mental discipline. The aim is not to secure an expert but an administrative officer who is capable of becoming skilled by contact with his actual work. Wallace S. Sayre writes:

> "By education, training and experience he was deliberatly made non-specialised. His functions were to limit the role of government, to promote stability by minimising change, to coordinate the activities of government and to provide a tight chain-of-command control over governmental actions and personnel"[1].

The administrative service is based on the belief that the requirement of a successful administrator is his ability to judge things and sift the evidence properly in order to take a quick decision. A penetrating intellect and an agile perception is the hallmark of success. Specialised knowledge is not required, because the administrator knows when to call in the expert and when to abide by his advice. The rationale is that a generalist can evaluate a problem from all sides taking into consideration specialist reports. Thus the generalist administrative tradition in India has a certain tendency to look down upon the specialist.

But the situation has changed. The necessity to administer 5-year plans for the last two decades have made the civil service responsible for jobs it

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1 Wallace S. Sayre, 'Some Problems of Public Administration in a Developing Economy', Indian Journal of Public Administration, VIII, No. 2, April-June, 1962.

could never have dreamed of earlier. Besides, the complex tasks of developmental schemes and industrialisation call for more specialised knowledge and technical skills, which the civil servants normally do not possess. So it is not always the administrator's keen intellect that is necessary but a more specialised knowledge, too. The peculiar anomaly in the present situation is that while the tasks of the administrator has dramatically changed, the belief in a generalist civil service remains the same. We have now reached a stage when this concept of civil service needs reexamination. The past experience shown that the specialist has been, more or less, denied his rightful place and there has been an extraordinary overemphasis of the generalist. Richard Symonds writes:

> "Macauley and his school were responsible for much unhappiness and waste. In order to produce a relatively small elite, the whole educational system was harnessed to a course of studies which was unrelated to agriculture or to increased productivity or to the national culture. Because the British generally failed to develop industry or agriculture, the prizes at the top of government service had an almost universal attraction"[1].

I Generalist-versus-Specialist Debate

We are here not concerned with the debate in favour of the generalist or the specialist. In the generalist-versus-specialist debate, the two sides

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1 Richard Symonds, 'The British and their Successors' (Faber and Faber, 24 Russel Square, London 1966) at 258.

start with different assumptions. As Anthony Sampson says, "the specialist does not believe that administration is an art in itself, while the generalist insists that the trained mind can deal with any problem"[1]. We are here however concerned with the task of regulating their interrelationship which raises problems both in developed and underdeveloped countries. But the nature of issues are different in the two instances. Even in the more developed countries the interrelationship differs from country to country. Germany, for instance "has not known either the complicated structure of general and specialist classes familiar in Britain, nor the specialized and elitist corps of France. Instead, even though the political structure was federal and administration was not organizationally integrated, there developed at all levels a more or less uniform public service, founded on the principles that all those in it must be appropriately qualified for whatever career within it they aspired to. Despite the crisis of the twentieth century which have shaken and finally split the German state, there is no mistaking the continuing influence of these traditions on the public service of the Federal Republic"[2].

It is common in Germany to find officials with technical qualifications like civil engineering, mining engineering and forestry taking their place in the public service along with others specially qualified in law.

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1 F.F. Ridley (ed.), SPECIALISTS AND GENERALISTS (George Allen and Unwin LTD, LONDON), 1968, p. 211.

2 Ibid, p. 135.

The developing countries are relatively in shortage of specialists. They must build up and train a corps of specialists on the basis of which their development programme should be carried out. Further, they must give the specialist an honoured place in the administration. In many developing countries, the all-purpose general administrator enjoys a slightly preferential treatment in the matter of remuneration and holding of superior administrative and policy making posts. The specialists should be given equal treatment in the matter of remuneration and responsibilities. Since the developing countries heavily rely on the public sector for industrialisation, they must create favourable conditions of employment for specialists through equal treatment and the elimination of the present class-consciousness which vitiate harmony.

B. THE CASE OF INDIA

In India the generalist tradition is very strong indeed. The senior IAS officers work as secretaries to the ministries like 'Mines and Fuels', 'Steal and Heavy Industries','Food and Agriculture','Railways', and in various other specialised fields. In a developed country these works would have been normally assigned to specialists with necessary detailed knowledge and technical skills. Again these IAS officers hold key positions close to the president and the prime minister. They also remain in charge of coordinating cabinet policy, controlling the recruitment, training and discipline of the higher civil service. They are concerned with administrative reforms as well.

The study of Bhambhri (Table 17) shows that there are 29o officers in the senior management of public administration at the central government level[1]. The Table 18 shows out of 29o higher civil servants working at the central government in New Delhi, 191 officers are general administrators. This means a dominance of the generalists in the higher management personnel[2].

Structure of Bureaucracy at the central government level

TABLE 17 : Senior Management of Public Administration

Cabinet Secretary	1
Secretaries	36
Special Secretaries	4
Additional Secretaries	25
Joint Secretaries	143
Advisors of the rank of Joint Secretary	38
Heads of non-Secretariat Organizations equivalent to Additional or Joint Secretaries	43
Total	29o

Source: Compiled by C.P. Bhambhri: "Administrators in a changing society", Delhi 1972, p. 29.

1 C.P. Bhambhri, 'Administrators in a Changing Society' op. cit., p. 29. Bhambhri does not mention the year of compilation of these figures, but since the book is published in the year 1972, the figures are assumed to be up to date.

2 C.P. Bhambhri, ibid, p. 29.

The following table shows dominance of the generalists in the higher management personnel.

TABLE 18:Position of Generalists in the Service

	Generalists	Others
Secretaries	33	4
Special Secretaries	3	1
Additional Secretaries	18	7
Joint Secretaries	115	28
Advisors and others	9	29
Heads of non-Secretariat Organizations	13	3o
Total	191	99

Source: Compiled by C.P. Bhambhri: "Administrators in a Changing Society", Delhi 1972, p. 29.

In the states and local levels the same pattern of IAS dominance is seen. The IAS officers 'are found managing all sorts of things, but specially the central secretariat, the state secretariats and district administration are their almost exclusive preserve'[1].

I Review of some relevant studies

Both Appleby and Gorwala were thoroughly committed

1 C.P. Bhambhri, Ibid.

to the generalist approach in Indian administration[1]. Their reports generated a series of thorough re-examination of the administrative system inherited from the British colonial regime. Many of the Indian writers have followed this lead.

The Bombay Administrative Enquiry Committee recommended that: "Secretaries should be drawn from ICS or IAS with their background of general education and administrative experience and technical and professional officials should not be appointed for such posts"[2].

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1 In 1952-53 the Ford Foundation sponsored Paul H. Appleby, then Dean of the Maxwell school at Syracuse University and long a leading figure in America Public Administration, on a seven-month trip to India, during the course of which he surveyed the state of bureaucratic practice and structure there. The Government of India issued his findings as the APPLEBY REPORT (public Administration in India: Report of a survey. New Delhi: Cabinet Secretariat, Organisation and Methods Division, 1953). Three years later Appleby returned to India and again the government published his findings, this time as A RE-EXAMINATION OF INDIA'S ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM. (Government of India, Cabinet Secretariat, Organisation and Methods Division.) For the support of the generalist position see Appleby, "The Generalist and the Specialist in Administration", in his PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION FOR A WELFARE STATE, (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1961).
The Government of India published a study written by A.D. Gorwala, an officer in the Indian Civil Service corps d'elite of administrators under the British. The Gorwala report had a wide-spread effect on public administration. (A.D. Gorwala, Report on Public Administration, 1951).

2 R. Dwarkadas, Role of higher civil service in India (Popular Book Deport, Bombay, 1958), p. 47.

None attacks the generalist tradition directly, though some suggest improvements that could be made. Paranjapa, for instance, thinks that the practice of frequent transfer which is so prevalant in the higher civil service, should be discouraged. It is rather unusual for an officer to remain in the same post for more than a couple of years. In order to attain a certain degree of expertise in his job if he is to accomplish it with any dispatch, it is necessary that the duty must be long enough for him to familiarise himself with it before being sent off to his next assignment[1]. This means the general administrator must be 'something of a specialist himself'. "In India, for example, a certain proportion of the elite service has already been reserved for secretarial service in specialized fields, and rotation in assignments has been limited by requiring officials 'in key posts' to remain in their jobs for at least five years. It would, of course, be unfortunate if specialisation jeopardised the vital contributions of general administrators. The danger, though occasionally feared, appears remote"[2].

One writer, an IAS officer, sees a threat to the generalist system when he writes: "Presumably, one of the factors responsible for this new interest in the question of generalists and specialists is the close American association with economic development in India and Pakistan which has pitted the American community's deep faith and bias in favour of the

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1 H.J. Pananjape, "Political and Administrative Problems of Interpreting the Indian Plan", in Indian Journal of Public Administration IX (1963), 608-648 at 643-644

2 Irving Swerdlow (ed.), op. cit., p. 12.

'specialist' against the Indian inheritance of an equally ardent British bias in favour of the 'generalist'"[1].

The same writer notes with some degree of satisfaction a reverse penetration of the generalist views in the form of the Second Hoover Commission report's recommendation for the creation of a senior corps of generalist administrators in the United States bureaucracy. It is usual for the civil servants of this generalist class to take such views[2]. But they are not the only ones to think so. Rajgopalchari, a former party leader, writes,'that experts cannot govern nor can they be safely allowed to govern'[3]. Similarly Gadgil writes: "We should have the general mind in preference to a specialised mind ... What really is needed is not knowledge in a detailed way but the right approach, the right perspective,... The expert is well up in theories. His gaze is intensive but the horizon of his knowledge is limited ... A general mind is far more important today when the entire character of the state is undergoing radical and revolutionary change"[4].

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1 S. Banerji, "A Unified Civil Service", in Indian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. IX, No. 2, 1963

2 Ibid, p. 208.

3 Rajagopalchari, "The Good Administrator", The Indian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. II, 1956, p. 2.

4 N.V. Gadgil,"The New Administrator", The Indian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. V, 1959, p. 49.

C. THE ROLE OF THE GENERALIST

In India, the spheres to which the role of the generalist relate are three - at the district level, at the secretariate level and in the public enterprises. We will now make an attempt to analyse the impact of the generalist administrator in these three spheres of the Indian administration.

I District Level

The district is a 'primary unit of administration' in India. A comparative statement showing the area, population and number of districts in the various states of India is given below. (Table 19)

The Indian units of administration are much larger than those of Africa. Some of the Indian districts contain a population as large as that of Gold Coast or Uganda. The table shows that the average population of a district for example in Bihar is 2,732,767, which is the largest in the whole of India.

Each district has an officer-in-charge who represents the state government in that area in the capacity of Collector, District Magistrate and District Officer. He is customarily referred to as Collector or Deputy Commissioner[1]. This post is usually occupied by anIAS personnel. He is a generalist administrator.

As collector he is in charge of the collection of landrevenue as well as of other kinds of government taxes, fees and dues. As district magistrate he

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1 The collector or deputy commissioner is the senior administrative officer at district level, and derives his title from the days when he was primarily responsible for revenue collection besides keeping law and order.

TABLE 19 : Area and population of different states and districts in India

State	Area in Sq. Miles	Population	Number of Districts	Average area in Sq.Miles	Average Population
Andhra Pradesh	1o6,o52	35,977,999	2o	5,3o3	1,798,9oo
Assam	47,o98	11,86o,o59	11	4,282	1.o78,187
Bihar	67,198	46,457,o42	17	3,953	2,732,767
Gujrat	72,154	2o,621,283	17	4,244	1,213,1o7
Madhya Pradesh	71,21o	32,394,375	43	3,982	753,358
Kerala	15,oo5	16,875,199	9	1,667	1,875,o22
Jammu and Kashmir	-	3,583,585	9	-	398,176
Madras	5o,132	33,65o,917	13	3,856	2,588,532
Maharashtra	118,884	39,5o4,294	26	4,572	1,519,396
Mysore	74,122	23,547,o81	19	3,9o1	1,239,32o
Orissa	6o,161	17,565,645	13	5,397	1,351,2o3
Punjab	47,o84	2o,298,151	19	2,478	1,o68,324
Rajasthan	132,15o	2o,146,175	26	5,o85	774,853
Uttar Pradesh	113,454	73,752,914	54	2,1o2	1,365,795
West Bengal	38,928	34,967,634	16	2,121	2,185,477

Source: Haridwar Rai, 'Helping the District Officer in India', Journal of Administration Overseas, London 8, 1969, 1. p. 36.

enjoys first-class magistrate powers. In some states he tries a few cases. He supervises all the executive officers working under him in his district and controls the police. He also supervises jails, municipalities, emigration, medical relief, sanitation, vaccination etc. As district officer he has many other executive duties and responsibilities, the details of which vary from district to district. The district officer is the main supplier of information to the government as its local agent and representative. He is responsible for all development projects in the district undertaken by the government departments. Accordingly he is the chief coordinating authority on behalf of the state government at the district. Whenever a new act is passed, or taxation is imposed or new activity of government is undertaken, the burden of administration, the duty of assessment and collection and the task of implementation are thrown on district officer. His is the duty, in the old Roman formula, to see that the state suffers no harm[1]. In short, he performs all those duties which he ought to do to make the government a going concern in this area and to keep himself continuously in touch with the general state of the district.

Besides, the collector receives all V.I.P.s like the Chief Minister of the State, the Prime Minister and the President and foreign dignitaries, when they enter the district and accompanies him on tour.

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1 Edward Blunt, THE INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE (London, Faber and Faber, 1937), p. 116.

"The point at which a V.I.P. ceases to be a V.I.P. for the Collector varies from district to district; foreign diplomats daily visit Agra District, home of the Taj Mahal, and the Collector ignores them; a foreign student of no importance enters Barmer District, a barren desert tract, and the Collector comes to call"[1].

It is difficult to make an assessment of the workload of a Collector. It varies from district to district and depends on the size of the district, the intensity of administration, the level of advancement attained by the local population and last of all the character of the people-litigations, assertive, caste-ridden, fractious and so on. The analysis of the work of collectors in the former Bombay state shows the breakdown of a collector's workload as follows:

TABLE 2o :

	Per cent of his time
Correspondence	54
Case hearings	2
Official and other meetings	7
very important persons	6
Daily visitors	5
Touring	26
	1oo

Source: See below.[2]

1 David C. Potter, GOVERNMENT IN RURAL INDIA. (G. BELL AND SONS LTD, LONDON.W.C.2., 1964), p. 72.

2 P.K. Dave, "The Collector Today and Tomorrow", Ind. Jour. Pub. Adm., Vol. XI, No. 3, 1965, p. 383.

This breakdown suggests the average time spent by the Collector in a given year. It does not apply to any particular period of the year.

The following Table shows an all-India average of hours spent by collectors 'on the job' is 7o hours per week. The break-up of this time is as follows.

TABLE 21 :

	Per cent
Paper work (including studying documents and reading material)	36
Touring and Inspecting	18
Attending public functions	4
Attending meetings	7
Giving and receiving instructions and information orally	6
Receiving visitors in office hours	11
Presiding formally at courts	6
Time for thought and reflection	4
Receiving dignitaries and providing red carpet treatment	4
Job connected social activities	3
Other	1
	1oo

Source: See below[1].

Even though there is a great difference in percentage as revealed in the above tables, the fact remains that the Collector spends a fair amount of time for paper work and in touring the villages of

1 P.K. Dave, "The Collector Today and Tomorrow", Ind. Jour. Pub. Adm., Vol. XI, No. 3, 1965, p. 383.

the district he serves. "It is unlikely that an average workload of 7o hours per week, even if the figure is somewhat exaggerated, can leave the Collector time for keeping abreast of developments in the field of administration, for reflection and deep thinking on the problems of the district and for planning improvements in the district machinery"[1].

The Collector today has far more to do than before the attainment of Independence. What is more important, a great deal is expected from him both by the government and the people. His responsibility calls for the ability to persuade, influence, convince and encourage not only his colleagues in the district but also the members of Zilla Parishad, the Block Samiti and the Village Panchayat. In this capacity, his role as collector remains crucial to the governance of the country.

II The Collector as 'District Officer'

In his capacity as Collector and Magistrate, he exerts a great deal of influence in the district he serves. He is best equipped to enlist the active support of the people in the implementation of developmental projects. The First and Second Five Year Plans envisaged the position of Collector as the head of the district, with the district officers of the development departments working with him as a team. The Third Five Year Plan charges the District Officer with the responsibility of ensuring coordination at

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1 op. cit., p. 384.

the district level between the Zilla Parishad and the technical officers in different fields. In the context of the Community Development and National Extension Service Programme, the Collector is invested with powers of coordination and supervision of the district heads of technical departments, besides being made entirely responsible for the execution of development plans in the district. This role of the District Officer as generalist administrator and coordinator fulfils the need of coordination in order to prevent conflicts, competition, duplication and waste, and differences in approach and treatment.

The method of control at the district level is based on the theory of dual hierarchy. It rests on a dichotomy between the specialist and the generalist and assumes a dual line of supervision and control from the top down and a dual set of loyalties from the bottom up. "The crux of the problem is that certain officers must be administratively responsible to one superior, and technically responsible to another"[1]. But the district officer is in charge of general administration. The role of the district officer as coordinator is essential in the system of integrated field administration. The state government have decided that all development and welfare duties should be entrusted to the district officer. This is justified on two grounds: "First, unless there is a single state authority on the spot with a general responsibility and recognized superiority over other state officials ... cooperation

1 M.E. Dimock and G.O. Dimock, New York (1954), p.331.

must either consist in informal arrangements between the local heads of services or be imposed by decisions taken at the centre by the ministries. The second justification ... is that decisions and activities can be controlled locally and not by remote control by central officials unaware of local circumstances and sentiments"[1].

The necessity for this dual supervision arises out of the peculiar circumstances of the district which require the district officer to be a generalist. For example, if a bridge is being considered, the design and estimates of cost as well as the preferred location are technical decisions. But it is also an administrative judgement to take account of public protest about the inconvenience of the proposed location and to approve a different site even at an increased cost. The district officer's task consists of coordination and unified execution, for he alone among all the development officers has the opportunity to see the process and the effect of development in its totality. It seems that the generalist administrator is best suited for coordinating and supervising development projects in the district level.

But the performance of the Collector during the past few years has been subject to serious criticism. The main aspect which has a bearing on his performance is his age and experience. The following table shows that in 1939, the average ICS (direct recruit) officer administered the district at the

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1 Chapman, Brian, The Profession of Government, London 1966, p. 72.

age of 47 years and 1 month with an average length of service of 17 years and 3 months. The comparable figures in 1960 were 38 years 9 months and 6 years 11 months respectively. By 1965, the average age had fallen still further to 36 years and 5 months but the length had increased slightly to 8 years and 4 months. These figure shows how the IAS officers are entrusted with such responsible posts at a very young age with shorter experienee, which must have consequences on the performance of their duties.

TABLE 22 :

As on 1st February of	Age		Length of Service	
	Direct Recruits		Direct Recruits	
	Years	Month(s)	Years	Month(s)
1939	47	1	17	3
1960	38	9	6	11
1961	38	7	6	11
1962	39	1	6	6
1963	37	11	7	8
1964	37	4	8	1
1965	36	5	8	4

Source: See below[1].

Besides, the frequency of transfer of Collectors is alarming, the all-India average length of posting in a district being one year eight months only. "This is a feature which cannot but detract from the adequacy of the Collector's performance and may

1 P.K. Dave, op. cit., p. 386.

indeed require re-thinking of the structure and management of the Indian Administrative Service"[1].

III THE SECRETARIAT LEVEL

In India the bias in favour of the generalist civil service (ICS/IAS) to work as secretary to government both at the central secretariat in New-Delhi and in the state's secretariats, is undoubtedly an inheritance from the British Raj. During the period of British rule in India the posts of secretaries were always reserved for the officers of the ICS cadre working in the various districts. The government always enjoyed the benefit of a group of officers having practical experience in field administration. The practice of keeping ICS/IAS officers in the secretariat continues. "Central policies, to be vital and real, must be in intimate touch with the people. This can be provided only by administrative officers who have recently come from district administration"[2].

There is hardly any doubt about the need of ICS/IAS officers in the policy-making level considering that the state has taken up various responsibilities of social and economic development. The responsibility of advising the ministers on the matters of administrative policy and general administration has been assigned to the generalist civil service. The role of the specialist is to carry out the work of

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1 Dave, op. cit., p. 386.

2 A. Chanda, Indian Administration, London 1967, p. 112.

the various special and technical departments under the general control of the generalist and to advise the generalist on policy-making matters. The continued practice of channelling the expert advice to the ministers through the generalist has been subject to severe criticism. The following remarks of Sisson, though said about British civil service, equally explain the Indian situation:

> "The senior administrative officials have to learn to extract from the specialist flowers around them the honey their ministers needs, explaining as they do so that the Minister does not live on honey"[1].

This arrangement that 'the expert should be on tap, not on top' certainly lowers their position and thereby their profession and service as well. On the other hand the IAS officer must be feeling comfortable in that the bulk of top administrative jobs both in the central secretariat as well as in state secretariats are virtually reserved for them. This cannot but provide poor initiative and a certain amount of demoralisation in the services.

Changing nature of responsibilities

During the post-Independence development there is a tremendous growth of secretariat work and its size. This has been in response to the 'shift in emphasis to development goals'. New departments like Atomic Energy, Steel and Heavy Industry, Family Planning, Food and Agriculture, Shipping and Transport,

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1 F.F. Ridley, op. cit., p. 17.

Petroleum and Chemicals, Mines and Metals, which never existed before, have been created. This naturally needs new skilled and trained technical personnel. One can hardly execute development projects and programmes without help of technical and professional people. "As Indian society, and particularly Indian government, becomes more technologically oriented, as more of the problems to be solved require technical skills, those who hold these skills want greater rewards; and they want more direct control over their tasks"[1].

This certainly raises the question of higher pay, status and respect which are rightfully theirs. The Second Pay Commission have also considered this question and its recommendations are as follows:

> "Where the work of a department at the headquarters of the Government of India is mainly technical, it is desirable, in our view, that the Secretary should be a person who, while possessing administrative ability and capable of taking a broad government-wide view of matters, has a technical background in the particular field. In a department which has a considerable amount of technical as well as administrative work, the secretary may be either a technical officer with proved administrative capacity or a generalist administrator. Technical officers should not be excluded from the field of choice, on a-priori considerations but should be considered on merits. Further, the top technical advisers or heads of departments should have full opportunity to have their views considered by the Minister, along with any views which the Secretary of the Department may have; for which a suitable arrangement may be a joint discussion with the Minister, whenever there is unresolved difference of opinion between the technical head and the Secretary. The basic idea governing the relationship must be in the recognition that the former should have an

1 Taub, op. cit., p. lol.

> effective share in the framing of policies and programmes at the highest official levels"[1].

Krishnamachari also recommended to put the technical men at the top of the agricultural and animal husbandry services in view of the importance of agriculture in the Five Year Plan[2].

Debate continues about the status of generalist-versus experts in the sphere of policy formulation at the secretarial level. But there is no doubt that the general administrator still dominates the administration and "the emphasis is on administrative sovereignty rather than on the technical departments"[3].

IV PUBLIC ENTERPRISES

The constitution of India had been enacted in 1950 and has sought to establish a welfare state[4]. In the fulfilment of this promise, India started with a planned economy and the congress government has set as its goal the achievement of a socialistic pattern of society.

> "The adoption of the socialistic pattern of society as the national objective, as well as the need for planned and rapid development require that all industries of basic and

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1 Report of the Commission of Enquiry on Emoluments and conditions of Service of Central Government Employees, 1957-59, Government of India, p. 111.

2 Report on Indian and State Administrative Services and Problem of District Administration. September 1962, p. 52.

3 Guy Hunter, "The Administration of Agricultural Development", Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 36.

4 Article 39. The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing...(b) that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good; (c) that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment.

> strategic importance, or in the nature of public utility services, should be in the public sector. Other industries which are essential and require investment on a scale which only the state, in present circumstances could provide, have also to be in the public sector"[1].

This has resulted in the expansion of public enterprises in India. Public corporations and companies in the model presented by the countries of the West came into existence. "The public corporation was a device to de-bureaucratise the management of public sector undertakings which needed 'autonomy' in day-to-day management and 'flexibility' in operations. India adopted this institutional device for managing its nationalised industries like Airlines, Industrial Finance Corporations and Life Insurance business. Borrowing a formal institutional structure from a developed country is one thing, however, to work it in the same spirit in a developing country is sometimes more difficult"[2].

The management and control of public enterprises, as happened elsewhere in the third world, call for a variety of skills, rarely available in the bureaucracies of the developing nations, where the function of government were originally limited to the maintenance of law and order. The developing countries suffer from a shortage of experienced executives to manage the newly established government corporations

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1 Industrial Policy Resolution, 1956. Quoted by S.S. Khera, "Management and Control in Public Enterprise", Asia Publ. House London 1964, p. 11.

2 Bhambhri, op. cit., p. 154-155.

and companies. As a result, senior civil servants are frequently appointed as general managers of projects in which they have no previous knowledge. "Large-scale use of civil servants in state industrial enterprises is often not a matter of choice but of necessity. Experienced industrial and business managers and accountants are simply not available. Some stop-gap arrangements have, therefore, to be made if underdeveloped and backward countries are to embark on the industrial road"[1].

In India the "elite cadre officers dominate the boards of directors of the central government companies and corporations"[2]. They bring with them their bureaucratic approach and bureaucratic methods, making the corporation thoroughly bureaucratic in its operation. The study of Taub in Bhubaneswar, a small state capital in India, also confirms this. Many of the IAS officers serving full-time or part-time in the corporation may be more or less specialists. If they work in the corporation for a long time, they may become specialists and may never return to secretariat work [3]. The point at issue, is, whether these higher civil servants can develop "an entrepreneurial outlook" and master "the unfamiliar problems of costing inventory control, manufacturing schedules and standards, investment and price decisions, and labour management relations associated with the direction of public enterprise"[4].

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1 Quoted by Merle Faisod in "Development Administration", Irving Swerdlow (ed.), op. cit., p. 17.

2 Braibanti and Associates, "Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition", op. cit., p. 171. In 1971, 58 ICS/IAS officers were serving on deputation in public sector undertakings. The Indian Express, New Delhi, March 5, 1971.

3 Taub, op. cit., p. 1o4.

4 Irving Swerdlow (ed.), ibid, p. 17.

No higher civil service in any developing country will perform these new functions perfectly. In India, it is often said that technical persons who like to be in charge of the technical side of the work should not be given managerial posts. But those who are considered suitable for managerial posts should not be denied that opportunity. The debate continues on the question of the proper relationship between the generalist and the specialist in public enterprises. Recently H.M. Patel, an ICS officer has written:

> "There is tendency to extol the merits and the value to the country of the technologists, the engineers and the scientists, and simultaneously to run down the administrators. There can be no objection to singing praises of the former. But it is unnecessary to institute a comparison and to say that one is more valuable than another. Each has a role to perform, and each would be handicapped without the other"[1].

Patel stresses a 'collaborative ideal' but there is hardly any doubt that the general trend is to reward the generalist with key positions in public enterprises in India, because historically he came into government earlier than the specialist.

D. SOME OBSERVATIONS

Thus we have made an attempt to assess the relevance of the generalist administrator in the three spheres

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1 Irving Swerdlow (ed.), op. cit., p. 12.

of the Indian Administrative System - the district administration, the secretariat and public enterprises. It reveals that the generalist is amply rewarded with a better status in the Indian administration. There is certainly discontentment amongst the specialists who think that they are deprived of their legitimate status within the community.

The most balanced view appears to be offered by Asok Chanda who suggests to combine the advantages of the generalist and the specialist through a unified civil service. Noting the success of the British and French unification of their higher cadre, Chanda suggests a similar reform for India. Such a unified service, according to Chanda, would provide an opportunity for advancement for the specialised lower and middle levels while at the same time creating a core of seasoned administrators who, after having specialised experience in several fields, would be capable of furnishing generalist leadership from the top[1]. Despite Chanda's stature in Indian administrative circles, none of the reformist writers has followed his lead. There is probably little chance for any significant penetration of American specialist-oriented ideology, for the development of the generalist administrator has been one of the major achievements of the Indian bureaucratic experience and consequently Indian public administration is not receptive to transplantation of alternative solutions.

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1 A. Chanda, op. cit., p. 128-132.

CHAPTER IX
APPRAISAL OF THE IAS

We have now concluded the tasks which were set at the commencement of this dissertation. The analysis has shown that the main causes leading to the present unhappy state of the IAS are the ICS tradition and the present orientation toward colonial administration. On the other hand the political leaders have placed heavy demands of excellence on the service. They have insisted not only upon qualities like efficiency, competence but also dedication, sacrifice, austerity and popular leadership. There has been very little empirical research so far to investigate the extent of the bureaucratic legacy emergent from the imperial tradition or the extent of the absorption of the exhortations of the political leaders.

The previous chapters have made it clear that the IAS inherited many of its institutional characteristics from its parent service - the ICS. The ICS was no doubt a highly successful institution of the British Raj. But it was devised as a system of control by an alien power to rule India. It is to be questioned whether a system devised to serve the British in India will serve equally well when transplanted in an independent India. It will be difficult to find out a direct answer to this. Before that, it will be interesting to point out the institutional characteristics of the ICS and compare each of these points with its realisation in the IAS.

A. THE IAS: A BRITISH INHERITANCE

There have been five institutional characteristics of the ICS throughout its long development.

1. The recruitment to the ICS was effected on the basis of a competitive examination, open to graduates in any of the arts or sciences. The emphasis had been on a broad general education, including the study of languages and natural and social sciences but excluding the professional or technical fields. The IAS recruitment procedures were similar to its parent service. Emphasis is on the liberally educated persons educated in western ways. They speak western languages in addition to their native language. They come predominantly from the larger cities of India.

2. In the early years of their service the officers of the ICS cadre had to undergo training in revenue administration and legal procedures. The emphasis was on acquiring experience of administration through actual performance of a wide variety of duties at the district level. As we have seen earlier, the National Academy of Administration at Mussoorie has been created to make the IAS capable of performing the new tasks of administration. After completion of the institutional training programme in the academy the probationers are attached to a state training institute and to the Collector's office for field training and learning by doing the job. The IAS probationer, like his predecessor, must be well acquainted with revenue matters and legal procedures. When he joins a district as a subdivisional officer or Collector his main job

remains the same i.e. collection of taxes and maintenance of law and order.

3. The status and salary of the ICS was fixed at a level higher than that of all other all-India services. So they enjoyed a position of superiority and eminence. The high salary ensured a high standard of living. The IAS began with similar arrangements. Their salaries are fixed at higher level in comparision to all other all-India services. The top of the ICS scale was Rs 4000 per month; the top of the IAS scale is Rs 3500 per month. In the meanwhile the country has undergone inflation since India won independence. The real income of an IAS officer is certainly less than that of the ICS officer. The critics in the community know well that the IAS people are paid too much in a developing country like India and treat them as a separate caste.
   The service retained to some extent the promotion and the assignment procedures of the ICS. The officers are assigned various posts of responsibility in a few years of service and at an early age. Similarly promotions are automatic and based strictly on the seniority of service.

4. The higher posts in all spheres of administration were reserved for officers of the ICS not excluding, in many cases, administrative posts even in scientific and technical departments such as agriculture and engineering. The higher posts in the Indian Foreign Service and in public enterprises have also gone to officers of this service. This is also true of the IAS. "As for administration, the prestige, prospects, and pay of the Indian Administrative Service are at their height

in the Foreign Ministry; agricultural administration, especially at the crucial level of the Block, is almost always in the hands of people with no chance of entering the IAS"[1].

5. The ICS had developed a highly integrated character through traditions of mutual social intercourse on the one hand and isolation from other services and the public on the other. This has imparted to the service the characteristics of a caste. The British ICS officers came from the governing classes and aristocratic society. Their social differentiation from the rest of the British population was remarkable. This character of the British administrators was well stamped on the Indian bureaucracy. Even though recruitment to IAS is based on a democratic system, the officers selected for the IAS cadre did not eliminate the caste spirit in the Indian bureaucracy. They feel quite at home with its caste spirit. They also think too much about their personal status in relation to society. There is a wide gap between them and the masses.

The foregoing analysis shows clearly that the IAS is built on the solid traditions of ICS. It should also be borne in mind that Indians became heirs to the features of British administration that have been instrumental in the formation of the Indian administration.

It is now necessary to ask whether a system devised to serve the British in India can be success-

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1 Paul Streeten and Michael Lipton (eds.), The Crisis of Indian Planning: Economic Planning in the 1960s. London 1968, p. 103.

fully adopted to the present situation. In so far as the objectives are the same, the transplanted institution served the country well. The people are not used to any other system of higher bureaucracy. The IAS, the Indian version of ICS, is successful in maintaining law, order and security in the country. The revenues are collected and the traditional functions are carried on in the same way as before. These are certainly major achievements of the IAS.

But the emphasis in India has been shifted from the maintenance of law and order and collection of revenue to the various tasks of development administration. The ICS had been primarily concerned with the maintenance of law and order, the IAS has to spend a greater proportion of its time in administering development programmes. The ICS developed an attitude of spirited amateurism towards administration but suffered from the defect of technological illiteracy in relation to the problem of economic development. These characteristics are certainly transmitted to the IAS. Most of these IAS officers shared in this technological illiteracy. Since the country has laid more emphasis on the complicated and varied development projects in the post-independence days, one needs to reflect, whether a new type of senior administrator is required with scientific outlook rather than a liberally-educated generalist. The IAS officer deeply rooted in the tradition of ICS, may be more effective as guardians of law and order rather than administrators for economic development.

B. THE IAS: A WESTERN BUREAUCRATIC ORGANISATION

Here we are concerned with the problem of introducing western bureaucratic organisation into nonwestern cultures. India inherits a bureaucracy that fits the classical pattern described by Max Weber. Many of the American writers are impressed to see the closeness of Max Weber's outline of the legal-rational model of bureaucratic civil service with the existing features of the IAS.

Weber's model of bureaucracy can be characterised by: "impersonal social relations, appointment and promotion on the basis of merit, authority and obligations which are specified a priori and adhere to the job rather than the individual (i.e., sparation of work from private life), authority organised on a hierarchical basis, separation of policy and administrative positions, the members of the bureaucracy being concerned with administrative decisions, general rules for governing all behavior not specified by the above, and, finally, specialisation. If the organisation is large and structured by these ideal conditions, it will be more efficient than any other kind of organisation"[1].

Weber suggests that his model represented an organisation

> "capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is, in this sense, the most rational known means of carrying out imperative control of human beings ... It is finally

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1 Eugene Litwak, "Models of Bureaucracy Which Permit Conflict", American Journal of Sociology (67, 2, September, 1961), p. 177.

> superior both in intensive efficiency and in the scope of its operations, and is formally capable of application to all kinds of administrative tasks"[1].

The following analysis will show that the IAS, though it fits the classical pattern described by Weber, is not able to perform all kinds of administrative tasks. Weber's descriptions are well known and it may be useful to begin with a resume of the Weberian bureaucratic model, against which the different features of IAS can be set. Weber's descriptions are as follows:

1. "Administrative officials are personally free and subject to authority only with respect to their impersonal official obligations". This is largely true for the members of the IAS cadre. In order to ensure public confidence in them, there is some control over their non-official behaviour, where such behaviour might interfere with the proper performance of their duties.

2. They are organised into a clearly defined hierarchy of offices". This is true of the IAS. The members of the IAS know exactly who ranks where in the hierarchy. The Civil List of the IAS is always kept up-to-date showing the different rank and position of the officers in the Service.

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1 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. by A.R. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (William Hodde and Company Ltd, London 1947). The outline of the legal-rational model, including all of the criteria quoted below, appears on pp. 306-309. (Max Weber, "Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft", erster Halbband, Kiepenhauer und Witsch, Köln/Berlin (1964), p. 162-164). See also Taub, op. cit., p. 194-198.

3. "Each office has a clearly defined sphere of competence in the legal sense". This is also true of the Service. The tasks and responsibilities of the officers are well defined. Each officer knows what he is there for. The scope of work and the definition of an officer's responsibilities are often rigid. This makes coordination of work, especially in different development projects, difficult, as the officer wants to remain within the defined boundaries of his job.

4. "The office is filled by a free contractual relationship". This is certainly the case for the Service.

5. "Candidates are selected on the basis of technical qualifications. In the most rational case, this is tested by examination or guaranteed by diploms certifying technical training, or both. They are appointed, not elected". This is also a feature of Service procedures. There are however two kinds of technical personnel i.e. technical personnel with their administrative skills and engineers with their technological skills. We have already noted the attitude of the specialist and the generalist in the Indian administrative system. The generalist resents the aggressive self-assurance of the specialist and the specialist resents the higher status given to the generalist. This attitude is certainly detrimental, especially in development schemes and projects where cooperation of both kinds of skills are needed.

6. "They are remunerated by fixed salaries in money, for the most part with a right to pensions. Only under certain circumstances ... does the employing

authority have the right to terminate the appointment, but the official is always free to resign. The salary scale is primarily graded according to rank in the hierarchy ...". All these components are part of IAS procedures. The officers are safeguarded against arbitrary dismissal or punishment. Dismissal is resorted to only in cases of utter corruptions. The salary scales of officers in the IAS cadre are graded according to the different ranks in the Serviee.

7. "The office is treated as the sole, or at least the primary, occupation of the incumbent". This is also true of the Service. The rules and regulations of the Service normally prohibit the officer to take any other part-time job or to run any other office of profit.

8. "Service in the bureaucracy constitutes a career. There is a system of 'promotion' according to seniority or achievement, or both". This is certainly the case of the Service. Normally promotions are made strictly on the basis of seniority. But in the highest echelons of the Service achievement criteria are used for promotion. This implies that a mediocre officer can reach a high level by showing normal efficiency in his work and doing it strictly according to the prescribed rules. Ambitious young officers with administrative talents cannot, under this system, supersede the senior mediocre officers. Ambitious young officers are seldom rewarded. They are very often suspected by senior officers, resulting in constant transfers for the former. Excessive reliance on the seniority system acts as an obstacle for selecting competent officers for the different development projects.

An achievement-oriented system of promotion is certainly desirable for the country but will not be favoured by the senior officers, who are interested in maintaining their status and rank in the service.

9. "The official works entirely separated from ownership of the means of administration and without appropriation of his position". In one way this is true of the Service. There is always danger that an office may be used to obtain bribes. If any officer stays in any place for a long time he may allow concessions for his castemen or develop personal commitment to certain individuals or groups. These factors may impede any impartial decision. To avoid this, officers are frequently transferred from post to post and from place to place. This constant transfer policy has certainly severe drawbacks. It does not help the officer to specialise in any particular field of administration which is necessary for development administration. The very fact that he is supposed to stay for a short time in a position may not encourage him to take the initiative in bigger development projects. Consequently, as a Development Officer he will be happy to build a club room in a village or things like that.

lo. "He is subject to strict and systematic discipline and control in the conduct of the office". With regards to this item, the IAS clearly deviates from the Weberian model. We know that it is extremely difficult to remove an officer from the Service. Again promotion is made strictly on the basis of seniority. Hence the weapons a senior officer has at hand to maintain strict and systematic discipline in the conduct of the office are limited.

I Some Comments

Taub comments:

> "The point revealed by this analysis is simply that the bureaucratic model put forward by Weber as the most efficient and rational possible means of administration is neither efficient nor, in that sense, particularly rational when applied in the development context. In other words, the Weberian model lives up to its billing only in certain limited circumstances, and is not universal, as Weber himself might have thought. One of the limitations, as we have seen, is that the tasks to be performed by the bureaucracy must be clearly defined and routine; that is, they must be predictable. It is precisely a lack of predictability, however, that is characteristic of development tasks"[1].

Similarly Litwak writes:

> "Weber's model is most efficient when the organisation deals primarily with uniform events and with occupations stressing traditional areas of knowlege rather than social skills"[2].

In his discussion of bureaucracy Weber implicitly assumes that occupations stressing traditional areas of knowledge dominate the organisation. "By traditional areas of knowledge is meant, say,

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1 Taub, op. cit., p. 198.

2 Eugene Litwak, op. cit., p. 177.

knowledge of engineering, of chemistry, of economics, of the law, of company rules, and the like. By social skills or abilities is meant the actual capacity to communicate with others, to motivate them to work, to co-operate with others, and to internalise the values of the organisation. Granted Weber's assumptions about traditional areas of knowledge, his model of bureaucracy does not necessarily lead to efficiency when the job requirements stress social skills"[1]. In many developing countries, the bureaucracy tends to be regarded as the sole instrument for bringing about economic and social development, and the demands of the people are directed towards it. The job requirements of the bureaucrats should stress precisely social skills rather than the traditional areas of knowledge. Hence the Weberian model, which puts more emphasis on the traditional areas of knowledge, seemingly does not fit the requirements of a developing society.

> "To attempt to remake the bureaucracies of the developing states to conform to any abstraction derived from a Weberian model involves more than an effort of Herculean proportions. The effort itself, insofar as it may succeed, is of dubious value in that a bureaucracy heavily encumbered by Weberian-derived norms may for that reason be a less efficacious instrument of economic change. To put the matter succinctly: one might simply observe that, in a place like India, public administrators steeped in the tradition of the Indian Civil Service may be less useful as developmental entrepreneurs

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1 Eugene Litwak, op. cit., p. 179.

> than those who are not so rigidly tied to notions of bureaucratic status, hierarchy, and impartiality. The economic development of a society, particularly if it is to be implemented by massive intervention of the public sector, requires a breed of bureaucrats different (e.g., more free-wheeling, less adhering to administrative forms, less attached to the importance of hierarchy and seniority) from the type of man who is useful when the primary concern of the bureaucracy is the maintenance of law and order"[1].

The real issue is whether the Service in India organised along Weberian model would be suitable for rapid development and social change. The Service has continued inconformity with the same model as it existed during the colonial rule. Some sanctity has been attached to this model. The Administrative Reform Commission have choosen to accept the model without advancing any alternative pattern.

However, the Weberian model is not the only way to achieve national goals. In the past rapid development took place in the United States, Western Europe and Japan long before bureaucracy acquired any degree of rational organisation and behavior that characterises them today. It is significant that Italy, even today, has the successful experience of the working of Enrico Mattei's E.N.I. (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi) without a rational bureaucracy[2].

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1 La Palombara, op. cit., p. 12.

2 Enrico Mattei was the economic magnate and a manager of public corporation who defied many of the western organisation and behavioral norms. See La Palombara, op. cit., p. 55.

C. REFORMING THE IAS

We have already seen that the IAS is based on the stable traditions of ICS. The Service is successful in maintaining a certain degree of order in the country. The revenues are collected and the traditional functions of the government are carried on in the same way as it was before independence. It is then necessary to ask whether such a Service designed to perform these routine tasks will be considered capable for the development tasks.

The capability of the Service has become a crucial issue since 1950 when the Planning Commission was set up. Since then various committees and commissions have been appointed by the Government to study and recommend reform measures which may increase its capacity. The major reports, appearing at considerable intervals and proposing reforms, have been continued.

A brief survey of the findings of these reports seems to be appropriate at this stage. The survey of Gorwala shows that he is in favour of the retention of the generalist IAS for managing development projects. He rejects the idea of creating an Economic Civil Service. He suggests the continuation of IAS which could manage development administration with some training in economics and industrial management[1].

The survey of Appleby does not suggest any alternative to the IAS for managing various development projects. On the contrary he writes:

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1 Gorwala, op. cit. p. 63-65. From the same writer "The Role of the Administrator: Past, Present and Future", Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, R.R. Kale Memoried Lecture, 1952.

> "It is true that one of the great virtues of the Indian system is the emphasis placed on "generalist" qualifications for officials in top positions"[1].

Neither Gorwala nor Appleby are in favour of any radical change in the IAS system.

The debate on the suitability of the IAS system continues. The Study Team on "Centre-State Relationships" observe that:

> "(a) The main objectives underlying the all-India services remain valid today. The continued need for the Indian Administrative Service ... is affirmed. The creation of all India services, where feasible, should be welcomed.
>
> (b) The states must accept these services as their own, the centre must keep a vigilant eye to ensure their health and vigour, the members of the service must act in a manner befitting the trust and responsibility reposed in them, the government must discourage resentfulness in other services"[2].

The Study Team on "Promotion Policies, Conduct Rules, Discipline and Morale", write:

> "A system which supports the superior status assumed by a generalist elite does not adequately recognise the need for greater scientific or technological content in

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1 Paul H. Appleby, Reexamination of India's Administrative System, (1959), op. cit., p. 25.

2 ARC Report of the Study Team on Centre-State Relationships, New Delhi, Government of India, 1968, Vol. 1, p. 267.

> administrative thinking essential in a welfare set-up and developing economy"[1].

Similarly the Study Team on "Personnel Administration" analyse the shortcomings of the present system and suggest that

> "a functional field must be carved out for the IAS. This could consist of Land Revenue Administration, exercise of magisterial functions and regulatory work in the states in fields other than those looked after by officers of other functional services"[2].

The suggestion for the improvement of IAS by the different Study Teams are sporadic and peripheral. However, it is difficult to reform any bureaucracy when the bureaucrats have full control over the levers of powers. The suggestion made by different Study Teams to reform the Service was scrutinised by the Senior bureaucrats themselves. It is then quite natural to think that proposals limiting the role of the IAS were not considered. "As Eisenstadt's analysis of bureaucratic empires showed, each social class has a certain predisposition toward reform in general and administrative reforms in particular. The elite classes support reforms that leave essentials unaltered and their position intact"[3]. An entrenched bureaucracy can frustrate major reforms unless the reform proposals are supported by the political executive. This raises

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1 ARC Report of the Study Team on Promotion Policies, Conduct Rules, Discipline and Morale, New Delhi I & II, p. 26.

2 ARC Report on Personnel Administration, New Delhi, 1969, p. 16.

3 Caiden, Administrative Reform, op. cit., p. 179.

again an important strategical consideration. The British situation in implementing the Fulton Committee's recommendations was to some extent similar. However, the then Prime Minister Wilson's personal involvement in the reform was instrumental in ensuring quick compliance even against the opposition of the top bureaucrats.

Again the suggestions made for the improvement of the Service were never in favour of a complete break with the past. The Administrative Reform Commission wanted to retain the IAS but with a truncated role. The Commission defined areas where IAS is needed and areas where it is not needed. This involved delineating areas of work and jurisdiction, and ultimately surrendering certain area of work and jurisdiction to others. This was a difficult job and was considered impossible by the bureaucrats.

The Commission could not advance any alternative model of Service to the present IAS. Such an alternative model, if found scientific and practicable, would have been much appreciated by the public and the press. The external pressure from the public and the press could have played a great role in reforming the IAS.

Judging from the facts presented above, the higher administrators in India are left to themselves to do most of the thinking about reforming the Service. They tend to perform the theoretical functions of importing ideas and assessing their worth, as well as the practical function of implementing them. There are some risks built into such a situation. The IAS officer, as an entrenched administrator with

a vested interest to protect the Service, may be less receptive to new concepts. But there are advantages also, for the ideas which are accepted would tend to be those which have some chance of practical success and impractical notions would be more likely to be dropped immediately.

D. A COMMITTED BUREAUCRACY FOR INDIA

Recently there has been a great deal of talk about the need of a committed bureaucracy for India. This would mean commitment of the IAS to the ideology of the ruling party. The Congress party has been able to retain the governmental leadership since Independence. Under its leadership India is committed to build a democratic socialist society. In the present context, "commitment" means to have a bureaucracy trained and committed to the democratic socialist ideology for two reasons. Firstly Congress has become an instrument to bring about a radical and fundamental change in India's economic structure and social systems. Social legislation like the Hindu Code Bill helped to achieve a partial social revolution. Similarly a planned economic development through Five Year Plans was calculated to bring about transformation of the largely rudimentary capitalist economy into an industrialised socialist economy. But no attempt was made to evolve a service dedicated and committed to the socialist ideology.

In view of the vital implemental role of the Indian bureaucracy, the IAS is an ideal choice to serve as the ideological agents of democratic socialism. Secondly, a government comitted to a

socialist ideology starts with the initial disadvantage of being assisted by the IAS officers distrustful of any change that would disrupt their status and security. Again, a non-committed bureaucracy may not be innovative.

The Prime Minister has recently criticised the IAS as stumbling block in the way of the country's social and economic development. The All-India Congress committee held in Delhi in November 1969 complained:

> "The present bureaucracy under the orthodox and conservative leadership of the Indian Civil Service with its upper-class prejudices can hardly be expected to meet the requirements of social and economic change along socialist lines. The creation of an administrative cadre committed to national objectives and responsive to our social needs is an urgent necessity"[1].

Viewed in this way the model of a committed bureaucracy put more emphasis on the accountability of bureaucrats to the politicians and on the ideology of the ruling party rather than on fitness of the bureaucratic organisation to accomplish the development work. This may not work under a coalition system of Government. Rather than trying to make the bureaucrats accountable to the politicians, one should try to organise a new kind of service to meet the demands of a planning and welfare state. The service must be capable of meeting the functional aims for which it has been brought into being.

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1 The Hindustan Times, 1 December 1969, p. 9.

E. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The preceding chapters have explained the major problems of the Indian Administrative Service. The training programmes, the superior status of the Service and its colonial traditions have contributed to the isolation of its personnel. The gap between the IAS personnel and the rest of the society is wide indeed. The IAS has not yet successfully adopted to the political environment. The relationship of the IAS officers and the politicians is critical. Consequently the service has nurtured an esprit de corps that has perhaps strengthened it against political interference.

The dominance of the generalist bureaucratic elites still persists. The country needs the help of both technical and non-technical personnel who must be empowered to make decision within their areas of competence. The channelling of all decisions through a small number of generalist bureaucratic elites is only tolerated because the government exaggerates the competence of these administrators. The practice of posting ICS/IAS officers to different Public Sector enterprises as managers still continues. The management of a modern steel project in Rourkela, for example, cannot be left to ICS/IAS officers, who have absolutely no background in steel technology.

As an institution, the IAS has failed to produce any dynamic leadership in the country. Since promotions are strictly according to seniority, the system does not encourage any competitive struggle for advancement. Talented administrators are seldom rewarded. The Service has lost much of its prestige

and claim for efficiency. Some have started arguing that the 'steel frame' has become a 'cheap alloy'.

The effectiveness of an institution is sustained and conditioned by the efficiency of the infrastructure in a society. A developed group infrastructure helps to facilitate the articulation of demands and provides a linkage between the mass and the elite. By doing so it influences the political decision-makers and suggests a course of action to be taken. But unfortunately in India the interest groups have a low level of institutionalisation. Consequently the interest groups in India play a little role either in reforming or in controlling the Service.

It is the shortcomings of the IAS as an institution that are being scrutinised here and not the criticism of the IAS officers as individuals. These officers are a quite impressive group of people. In the past they have served the country in various ways. In the states affected by the rise and fall of weak coalition governments, the IAS officers have managed to prevent major disruption. They helped to maintain the unity of India in the face of its great variety of languages, races and local nationalism and against the deep historical tendencies towards separatism. The officers are certainly not incompetent. They have been asked to do various types of administrative tasks for which they have neither the education nor the necessary training. They are a Jack of all trades and rotate between the district and the state secretariat, between the state and the centre. They are being posted as managers or as assistant managers to the various

public sector enterprises. At each level the demand for their specialised training is far greater than that of British Raj. Thus the dilemma confronting them is much more than the dilemma which the British ICS officers were facing in India. Under these conditions the IAS officers are unable to carry so heavy a load which is expected from them.

REFERENCE MATERIALS

Most of the materials for research on Indian administration are in the India Office Library, the Library of the British Museum, London University Library and the Library of Common Wealth Studies, London.

The Library of International Institute of Administrative Sciences, Brussels, also contains literature which will be helpful for research students working on the problem of public bureaucracy in the developing countries.

The research for this study is based mainly on materials collected from London and Brussels. The "Graduiertenförderung" generously extended me grant for educational journey to London and Brussels, without which this dissertation would not have taken this form.

ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS

(An approximation of a sytem that varies from State to State and is in the process of change.)

Village (300-2000 people). Elected Village Panchayat.
Administrators: 1 village level worker, 1 revenue collector for 3-7 villages.
Responsible to BDO.

Block (20 - 30 villages). Elected Panchayat Samiti.
Administrators: 1 Block Development Officer (BDO); about 5 technical officers.

District (2 - 30 Blocks). Indirectly elected Zilla Parishad.
Administrators: 1 Chief Executive Officer (CEO) - Revenue Collector.
Both are members of Indian Administrative Service (IAS) and have substancial staffs.

State (typically 15 - 30 districts).
State Parliament.
Members of Legislative Assembly (MLA).
State Ministers and civil services (partly IAS).

Union of India: President

Lok Sabha (contains cabinet) ¦
Rajya Sabha ¦ Parliament

Central Ministries and IAS staff Planning Commission

ABBREVIATIONS

ARC	Administrative Reform Commission
BDO	Block Development Officer
HCB	Hindu Code Bill
IAS	Indian Administrative Service. The higher civil service in India after 1947 is known as Indian Administrative Service
ICS	Indian Civil Service. The higher civil service during the British rule in India is known as Indian Civil Service
MLA	Member of Legislative Assembly
MP	Member of Parliament
UPSC	Union Public Service Commission

GLOSSARY

Bharat Darshan	visit to countryside
British Raj	literally 'British rule' or British dominion in India
Jagirdar	literally 'estate holder', estate or landholder
Khan Sahib	Indian title of rank
Lok Sabha	House of the People (Government of India)
Panch	Member of a Panchayat
Panchayat	literally 'assembly of five'; traditional term for a village council of whatever size
Panchayat(i) Raj	literally 'panchayat rule'; Prime Minister Nehru's translation of democratic decentralization
Panchayat Samiti	literally 'committee of panchayats'; in fact, a local authority at the block level
Patwari	state revenue official at the village level
Raja	Indian king, prince, or chief
Rajya Sabha	Council of States (Government of India)

Rao Sahib	Indian title of rank
rupee	primary Indian monetary unit
tehsil	an administrative sub-division of a district, especially for revenue purposes
Tehsildar	government official in charge of a tehsil
thug	Indian professional assassin
Zamindar	literally 'holder of land' ; land-holder
Zamindari	one of the intermediary tenure systems existing in India. The abolition of such intermediary tenure has been almost completed
Zila Parishad	local authority at the district level
Yojana Bhavan	The building for the Planning Commission in New Delhi

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

I was born on the 10th of February 1933 in Puri (Orissa), India.

I attended the Puri Zila School and passed the Matriculation Examination for school students in the year 1949. From 1949 to 1954 I attended the S.C.S.College, Puri and passed the examination for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in 1954.

From May 1955 to April 1956, I worked as Coding Superintendent in the Hirakud Benefits Survey, Orissa, conducted by Prof. N.Rath of Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Poona. Then I joined the planning section of the Finance Department of Orissa Secretariat, Bhubaneswar, as an Assistant. In the year 1959 I joined the Estate Office, Hindustan Steel Project, Rourkela, as a senior Assistant and was in charge of welfare of the german technical personnel there.

In the year 1964 I came to Göttingen for higher studies. After completing the german language course I registered myself as a regular student in the winter session 1965/66 and began to study in the Philosophical Faculty of Göttingen University, where I studied the following subjects: Sociology (main subject), Ethnology and Social Psychology (side branches).

In the year 1970, I was accepted to write a doctoral thesis by Prof. Dr. Hans Paul Bahrdt. I concluded my studies with the Dr. phil. examination in the month of December 1974.